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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to provide an explanation for the 
contents of three foreign policy decisions implemented under 
the government of general Ernesto Geisel (1974-79). It does so 
by analyzing the decision-making process which led Brazil l)to 
abstain in the Meetings of Consultation of American Foreign 
Ministers for voting the lifting of sanctions against Cuba; 
2)to restore diplomatic relations with the People's Republic 
of China; and 3)to recognize Angola's MPLA government. The 
central hypothesis of the thesis is that, although the 
doctrine of the regime (National Security Doctrine/NSD) has 
shaped the general conduct of the government, it is not enough 
to explain the changes in the main lines of foreign policy. It 
is necessary to analyze the decision making arena where those 
changes were indeed defined. The first part of the thesis 
seeks to review the literature on Brazilian foreign policy 
under the military regime and to present the perspective of 
analysis. Then the origins and contents of the NSD, in 
particular its external components, are presented. In 
addition, it aims to describe the general structure of the 
decision making arena under Geisel's government, and the main 
aspects of the foreign policy implemented during this 
administration. The following three chapters then seek to 
reconstruct the decision-making process aiming to retrieve 
from the analysis of the bargains among the bureaucratic role- 
players, the meaningful elements of the decision contents. The 
conclusion then claims that it was President Geisel's 
leadership, along with his Foreign Minister, which was able to 
oust the "ideological frontiers" precept from the core of the 
NSD, in spite of its admitted importance during the Cuban 
case. Furthermore it disputes the premise which states that 
the existence of a given ultimate consensus among the 
decision-makers based on the Doctrine is able to explain, on 
domestic grounds, the foreign policy of "Responsible 
Pragmatism". It does so by maintaining that the way whereby a 
new consensus around foreign policy was developed within the 
decision making arena is, in itself, a crucial element in 
understanding the decision contents.
To Nicolai and Stephan 
with love,
in exchange for the years 
I couldn't share their 
smiles.
"Where secrecy exists in diplomacy it lies 
in the process of negotiation and this type of 
secrecy is commom to many professional or 
political activities. (...) Any negotiation 
attempting to bring two sides together, 
reconcile differing interests or resolve 
disputes accept that there has to be a stage of 
dialogue, understandings and misunderstandings 
which must be protected from third p a r t y  
observation and interjection so as to avoid the 
pressure from outside interests on the issue 
which might detrimentally influence the debate. 
Diplomacy activity is essentially a negotiation 
activity."
Azeredo da Silveira, "0 Brasil 
e a Nova Ordem Internacional", 
Revista Brasileira de Politica 
Internacional. 18 (69/72), p.8.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to study Brazilian foreign 
policy under the military regime taking into account the 
variables that shape the decision contents. I shall firstly 
outline the arguments that comprise the level-of-analysis 
debate1. My purpose is to work within the second debate 
(nation state vs. bureaucracy) proceeding "bottom-up", that 
is, to account for the behavior of the state in terms of the 
behavior of its constituent bureaucracies. Moreover, the 
thesis seeks to explain some aspects of Brazilian foreign 
policy under the government of General Ernesto Geisel 
(1974/79) as opposed to understanding them.
Previous analyses appraised the subject either within 
the first debate (international system vs. nation state), or 
within the second debate (nation state vs. bureaucracy) both 
proceeding "top-down", that is, either accounting for the 
behavior of the state in terms of the behavior of the
!SINGER,J. David. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in 
International Relations", in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba 
(eds.) The International System - Theoretical Essays. New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1961, pp.77-92; and 
HOLLIS,Martin & SMITH,Steve. Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p.9.
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international system, or accounting for the behavior of the 
bureaucracy in terms of the behavior of the nation state2.
To clarify this debate, the following figure presents 
the three layers of the level-of-analysis problem, and the six 
ways which the argument can follow:
2In contrast to what used to be the main tendency until 
the 80s, recent attempts to analyze the Latin American foreign 
policy within the second debate proceeding "bottom-up" must be 
noted. Amongst them, the study by Maria Regina S.de Lima and 
Monica Hirst about the relationship between Brazil and 
Argentina, and Brazil and the United States is an example of 
the increasing importance the analysts have been giving to the 
opening of the "box" to explain the policy contents. 
Notwithstanding its merits, however, this study does not 
contemplate the period of the military regime. See 
HIRST,Monica & LIMA,Maria Regina S. de. "Crisis y Toma de 
Decisi6n Brasilena: El Programa de Integracidn Argentina-
Brasil y las Negociaciones sobre la Informdtica con Estados 
Unidos", RUSSELL,Roberto (org.) Polltica Exterior y Toma de 
Decisiones en America Latina. Buenos Aires, RIAL/Grupo Editor 
Latinoamericano, 1990 pp.61-110. For a good panorama of how 
the decision making approach was gradually being employed for 
explaining the Latin American in general, and the Brazilian 
foreign policy in particular, see MUftOZ,Heraldo & 
TULCHIN,Joseph S. A America Latina e a Polltica Mundial. SSo 
Paulo, Editora Convivio, 1984; and RUSSELL,Roberto (ed.) 
Polltica Exterior y Toma de Decisiones en America Latina. 
Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1990. It is worth 
noting, however, the remaining shortage of studies concerned 
with the third debate (bureaucracy vs. individual) proceeding 
"bottom-up", as pointed by Munoz. MUNOZ,Heraldo. "El Estudio 
de las Pollticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas: temas y enfoques 
dominantes". WILHELMY,M. (ed.) La Formaci6n de la Polltica 
Exterior - los palses desarrollados y America Latina. Buenos 
Aires, RIAL/Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1987, pp.287-315, 
p.311. Nevertheless, those recent analyses added a good deal 
of improvement to the area, particularly with regards to Latin 
America, as once suggested by Edy Kaufman. KAUFMAN,Edy. "Latin 
America", in Christopher Clapham (ed.) Foreign Policy Making 
in Developing States: a comparative approach. London, Saxon 
House, 1977, pp.131-164, p.158-59.
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Internat. system
Level of analysis: first debate
A
vs. top down bottom up
Nation state
Level of analysis: second debate ^ vs. j
Bureaucracy
Level of analysis: third debate 1vs* I
Individual
Source: Reproduced from HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op.cit.. p.9.
The studies that have explained Brazil's foreign affairs 
concerning the opportunities and constraints dictated by the 
international system (first debate), can be classified in 
different categories, varying from an orthodox systemic 
perspective to a less conventional one. The distinctions 
between them can be detected in the emphasis upon Brazil's 
capabilities to behave in a more or less constrained way by 
the international system.
The basis of the argument embraced by the supporters of 
a traditional systemic approach3, is found in their view of
3Amongst others, see MARINI,Rui Mauro. "Brazilian 
Subimperialism", Monthly Review. 23, February 1972, pp.14-24; 
VAYRYNEN,Raimo• "Economic and Military Position of the 
Regional Power Centers", Journal of Peace Research. 16, n.4, 
1979, pp.349-69.
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Brazil (the unit) as primarily reactive to the international 
system. From their vantage point, Brazilian international 
conduct should be explained by its insertion within the 
international division of labor, where the opportunities of 
benefiting from the system's advantages and, indeed, of having 
a more salient role in the international system were dependent 
upon the country's predisposition to act as a "sub-imperial" 
actor in the regional arena, e.g., to safeguard us interests 
in the continent, where Brazilian presence would gradually 
increase. The shortcomings of which have been labeled the 
"sub-imperialist expansionist" or "privileged dependence" 
approach4, have already been shown elsewhere5. Nevertheless, 
it is worth underlining its main weakness.
I do not dispute the role played by the international 
system in influencing the behavior of the nation states. 
Indeed, by referring throughout this thesis to the 
international scene within which the decisions under 
investigation were taken, my aim is to retrieve its influence 
on the units' behavior. However, the advocates of the approach 
mentioned above, who have explained Brazilian international
4LIMA, Maria Regina Soares de. The Political Economy of 
Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy. Trade, and Itaipu. 
Ph.D. thesis, Nashville, Tennessee, Vanderbilt University, 
August 1986, p.9
5For a critical review of this perspective of analysis, 
see LIMA,M.R.S.de Idem. p.12-19 and p.30-31; and 
PEIXOTO,Antonio Carlos. "La Mont§e en Puissance du Br6sil: 
Concepts et Realit6s", Revue Frangaise de Science Politique. 
v.30, n.2, Avril 1980, pp.328-55.
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behavior based on the Dependency Theory6, did not take enough 
from their own premise which states that a country like Brazil 
Y has some leeway in its regional sphere of influence7. In other 
words, at the same time they admit the existence of some 
latitude for the unit's conduct, they do not consider this 
fact as an actual source of autonomous behavior8. Conversely 
they regard the unit demeanor as no more than the reproduction 
of the system's interests at the regional level. As a result, 
they postulate that Brazilian international policy was defined 
by the country's automatic alignment to the hub of the system 
- the United States. It has been demonstrated, however, that 
during the first military government (Castello Branco, 1964- 
67) Brazilian support for alleged US anti-Communist policies 
(Santo Domingo, 1965) was an indigenous aspiration from the 
ruling elite toward the domestic legitimization of the
^ote that although being an important basis for thinking 
about the states' international conduct, Dependency Theory can 
not be seen as a theoretical approach for Foreign Policy 
Analysis. KLAVEREN, Alberto van. "Andlise das Politicas 
Externas Latino-americanas: Perspectivas Te6ricas", in H.Munoz
& J.S. Tulchin (eds.), op.cit.. pp.1-20, p.7-8.
7As one of the supporters of this perspective has put it: 
"It is not a question of passively accepting North American 
power (although the actual correlation of forces often leads 
to that result), but rather of collaborating actively with 
imperialist expansion, assuming in this expansion the position 
of a key nation". MARINI,Rui M. "Brazilian 'Interdependence' 
and Imperialist Integration". Monthly Review. 17, December 
1965, pp.10-29, p.22. Emphasis added.
8Note that I am referring solely to the analysts who have 
examined the Brazilian case. A different perspective can be 
found in the analyses about other countries made by scholars 
equally identified with the Dependency Theory. For comments 
about their works, see KLAVEREN,A. van. op.cit.. p.7-10.
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military regime, in addition to an answer to the US demand9. 
Likewise, the divergence of interest between Brazil and the 
United States in the subsequent administrations (Costa e 
Silva, 1967-69 and Garrastazti M6dici, 1969-74), such as the 
refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Treaty, the 
claim for a 200-mile limit for territorial waters, etc.10, 
seems to confirm the view that, notwithstanding the power of 
the system, the units have indeed their own and, sometimes, 
conflicting interests.
In a less orthodox perspective, there are those 
analysts who have explained Brazilian international conduct 
from the mid-60s to the early 80s by emphasizing the 
opportunities created by the detente and by the loss of US 
hegemony in the international arena, towards a more autonomous 
and prominent behavior from the Third World countries11. In 
contrast to the supporters of the "sub-imperialist
9LIMA,Maria R.S.de & CHEIBUB,Zairo B. Relagoes 
Internacionais e Polltica Externa Brasileira: debate
intelectual e produgao acadfemica. Rio de Janeiro,. Convfenio 
MRE/IUPERJ, fevereiro 1983, paper, p.132-33.
10MARTINS,Carlos Estevam. "A Evolugao da Polltica Externa 
Brasileira na D6cada de 64/74". Estudos CEBRAP. n.12, 
abr/mai/jun. 1975, pp. 55-98, p.68-91
"Among others, BAILEY,Norman A. & SCHNEIDER,Ronald M. 
"Brazil's Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Upward Mobility". 
Inter-American Economic Affairs, vol.4, 27, Spring 1974, pp. 3- 
25; PERRY,William. Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy;-The 
International Strategy of an Emerging Power. Foreign Policy 
Papers, vol.2, n.6, Beverly Hills, Sage Publ., 1976;
SCHNEIDER,Ronald M. Brazil - Foreign Policy of a Future World 
Power. Boulder, Westview Press, 1976; SELCHER,Wayne A. 
"Brazil's Candidacy for Major Power Status: Short-Term
Problems and Long-Term Optimism". Intellect. 105, June 1977, 
pp.400-405.
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expansionist" perspective mentioned above, who usually 
overstate the international system constraints over peripheral 
countries like Brazil, the attempt made by the advocates of 
the so called "emerging power" approach to taking into account 
the opportunities of the system should be welcome. 
Nonetheless, the positive aspects of their appraisals are also 
responsible for the shortcomings. By overemphasizing the 
country's internal capabilities such as economic development, 
military strength and the elite's aspiration to major power 
status, they have made "straightline projections from the 
present to the future, assuming implicitly that the favorable 
political and economic trends of the mid-1970s would 
continue"12.
In this sense, we should welcome the analysis made by 
Lima*about Brazil's chief economic objectives in international 
affairs since the early 1970s - access to foreign markets and 
energy supply13. Based on the Collective Goods approach, she 
developed a framework of analysis that sought to encompass the 
likely pattern of international behavior of semi-peripheral 
countries14. Thus, by taking into account both the 
opportunities and constraints dictated by the international 
system, and the latitude for autonomous behavior from the
l2B0ND,Robert D. "Brazil's Relations with the Northern 
Tier Countries of South America", in Wayne A. Selcher (ed.) 
Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle 
Power. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1981, pp.123-41, 
p.134.
I3LIMA,M.R.S.de. "The Political Economy...", op.cit.
14Idem, p.36.
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nation state, she concluded that Brazil followed distinct 
strategies regarding different issues, due to the 
international regime's characteristics, but also due to 
Brazil's specific power resources and due to constraints at 
the domestic level15. In so doing, Lima achieved the objective 
of taking into account both the power of the international 
system and the nation state's self-interests. However, by 
assuming the latter's existence, but excluding herself from 
its scrutiny, she left a lacuna to be fulfilled.
Moving on to the analyses made within the second debate 
(nation state vs. bureaucracy), I shall firstly stress the 
difficulty of straightforwardly ascertaining if they have 
opted for proceeding "bottom-upM or Mtop-downM. Indeed several 
analysts have accounted for the role played by the units in 
the formulation of foreign policy16. In so doing they advocate 
different hypotheses about which decision units should be seen 
as the ultimate decision makers and with regard to which 
issue, the most recurrent being the President, the National
15Idem, p.60.
,6Besides others that will be mentioned throughout this 
chapter, see GRANDI,Jorge Alberto. Regime Militaire et 
Politique Exterieure du Br6sil: 1'Accord de Cooperation
Nucleaire Germano-Brdsilien du 1975. Ph.D thesis, Paris, 
Institut d'Etudes Politigues de Paris, 1985; FONTAINE,Roger W. 
The Foreign Policy Making Process in Brazil. Ph.D. thesis, The 
John Hopkins University, 1970; ROLAND,Ely. "La Formulaci6n e 
Instrumentaci6n de la Polltica Exterior del Brasil, 1964- 
1985". Secuencia. n.7, enero-abril 1987, pp.157-72; 
RUDOLPH,James D. "Government and Politics". Richard Nyrop 
(ed.) Brazil - a country study. Washington, Department of 
Army, 1983, pp.233-88.
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Security Council (NSC) and the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty)17. 
Notwithstanding having pointed to a plurality of, even to a 
dispute18 between the decision units within the decision 
making arena, those analysts seem not to have made the most of 
this fact in the explanation of foreign policy contents19. 
Therefore it is common to come across conclusions which 
emphasize the collaboration as opposed to the antagonism
,7Amongst others, see BARROS, Alexandre de S.C. "A 
FormulagSo e Implementagao da Polltica Externa Brasileira: o 
Itamaraty e os Novos Atores", H.Munoz & J.Tulchin (eds.) 
op.cit.. pp.29-42; CAMARGO,Sonia de & OCAMPO,Jos6 M.V. 
Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina e no Brasil - uma 
dScada de polltica exterior - 1973-1984. Sao Paulo,
Ed.Convivio, 1988; CHEIBUB,Zairo B. Diplomacia. Diplomatas e 
Polltica Externa: aspectos do processo de institucionalizagao 
do Itamaraty. Masters thesis. Rio de Janeiro, IUPERJ, Junho 
1984; G6ES,Walder de. 0 Brasil do general Geisel - estudo do 
processo de tomada de decisao no regime militar burocratico, 
Rio, Nova Fronteira,1978, p.37-8. HIRST,Monica. Pesos e 
Medidas da Polltica Externa Brasileira. IV ReuniSo Anual de 
Centros Membros do RIAL, Universidad Simdn Bolivar, 4-6 
Outubro 1982, paper; SARAIVA,Miriam Gomes de. A Opgao Europ£ia 
nos Marcos do Pragmatismo ResponsSvel - a polltica externa 
brasileira para os palses europeus de 1974 a 1979. Masters 
thesis. Rio de Janeiro, IRI/PUC, Maio 1990; SELCHER,Wayne. 
“Brazil's Foreign Policy: more actors and expanding agendas", 
in E.Ferris & J.Lincoln (eds.). The Dynamics of Latin American 
Foreign Policies. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1984, 
pp.101-23.
l8MYIAMOTO,Shiguenoli. Geopolltica e Polltica Externa 
Brasileira. Aguas de SSo Pedro, SSo Paulo, VII Encontro da 
ANPOCS, 26-28 Outubro 1983, paper, p.18; SCHNEIDER,R.M. 
“Brazil - Foreign Policy...", op.cit.. p.154-5.
I9I shall not disregard those analysts who have attempted 
to associate decision units to issue areas in a more 
systematic way, as opposed to those who have not succeeded in 
doing so. However, in spite of their effort to explain the 
reasons why some issues are more likely to be handled by 
certain units, they have failed to explain the actual 
consequences derived from this association for the policy 
contents. FERRIS,Elizabeth G. "Toward a Theory for the 
Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy", in 
J.Lincoln & E.Ferris (eds.) op.cit.. pp.269-84, p.278-84; 
SCHNEIDER,R.M. "Brazil - Foreign Policy...", op.cit. 1976, 
pp.149-64.
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between the decision units; or even the domination of one unit 
over the others to explain the foreign policy implemented, 
without actually scrutinizing the consequences of the pattern 
of decision making for the final decision contents20. As a
matter of fact, there are those who advocate that, in reality, 
these disputes have not substantially altered the main 
characteristics of foreign policy21. However, an important 
exception must be noted. In his study on the Geisel 
government, Walder de G6es points to the importance of what he 
has named as "ritualization process". According to him 
"ritualization" means the practice of consulting certain 
agencies or actors about a decision that, in general, has 
already been made. Notwithstanding the fact that this practice 
is a ritual which aims to legitimize a certain decision, he 
adds that "the ritualization does not only give form; it also
20HIRST,Monica. Tempos e Contratempos da Polltica Externa 
Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro, IRI/PUC-RJ & CIDE-Mexico, Outubro 
1983, paper; LIMA,Maria Regina S.de & MOURA,Gerson. "A 
Trajetdria do Pragmatismo - uma andlise da polltica externa 
brasileira". Dados - Revista de Ci6ncias Sociais. vol.25, n.3, 
1982, pp.349-63; SARAIVA,M.G. op.cit.: SCHNEIDER,R.M. "Brazil 
- Foreign Policy...", op.cit.. p.152. By way of example, it is 
worth mentioning that even among those who have referred to 
the military period - though not exactly analyzed it -, based 
on a clear-cut decision making approach, there is a tendency 
to make the importance of the process for the explanation of 
the policy contents rather relative. For instance, despite 
taking into account the quarrels within the Brazilian state 
and the differences among the decision makers regarding the 
handling of some issues, Russell concludes that "those 
quarrels (...) ended up as successfully 'encapsulated' by the 
president and the diplomatic organization". RUSSELL,R. 
"Polltica Exterior..." op.cit.. p.259-60. My translation.
2lPEIXOTO,Antonio Carlos. "Polltica Externa e Sucessao 
Presidencial: nada ou quase nada vai mudar".Brasil -
Perspectivas Internacionais. ano I, n.3, set/out/84, pp 1-4, 
p.2.
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gives content because it produces an explanation, it creates 
a mechanism that is able to adjust interests"22. 
Unfortunately, however, G6es does not go any further than this 
single statement. As a result, in addition to the inadequacy 
of the category employed - after all if "ritualization" really 
involves taking different interests into account, then it is 
more than ritualization -, G6es does not explore the 
consequences of his statement for the explanation of the 
policy contents.
I claim that the main reason why those analysts do not 
correlate different decision units with the policy contents, 
is the belief shared by most of them in the existence of an 
ultimate consensus among decision makers regarding the foreign 
policy during the whole military regime23. This supposed 
consensus, therefore, seems to reduce - if not to eliminate - 
the need for analyzing the process of policy making as a 
substantive source of information. By way of example, 
Oliveiros Ferreira has claimed that Brazilian foreign policy 
implemented from Castello Branco to Geisel (1964-1974) had the 
same origin, source and goals. These were, respectively, the 
military class, the National Security Council reports and the
22G6ES,W. op.cit. ,p.33. My translation.
^SELCHEI^W. "Brazil's Foreign Policy. ..", op.cit.. p.102. 
Andrew Hurrell claims a slightly different view, saying that 
the consensus was regarding a more assertive and independent 
foreign policy. Yet, I ascertain that the consensus over more 
assertiveness and independence does not necessarily mean 
consensus over its means and limits. HURRELL,Andrew James. The 
Quest for Autonomy: The Evolution of Brazil's Role in the 
International System. 1964-1985. Ph.D.Thesis, University of 
Oxford, 1986, p.205-206.
development of a National Power which could make Brazil one of 
the greatest powers in the international system24.
By so doing, they did not take into account the process 
of conflict towards consensus building which, then, turns into 
the so called national interest. Moreover, they seem to depart
Am* <
from the assumption that the units - the decision makers - 
adjust their views about foreign policy in response to the 
demands of the system - the nation state. As a result, even 
when they do regard the units' contribution to the change in 
the pattern of Brazilian foreign policy - after all it is hard 
to imagine changes within the system without changes within 
and between the units25 -, they do so by assuming that the 
decision makers were compelled to behave towards the change in 
ways shaped by the demands of the nation state, assigning to 
the ‘latter a national interest embodied by the National 
Security Doctrine, in a typical "top-down" approach.
Thus, although they were classified as advocates of the 
decision making approach26, those analysts actually reproduced 
the mechanics of the ideology, to the extent that they embrace 
the same rationale as that of the National Security Doctrine 
which, through the generality of its concepts - national
24FERREIRA, Oliveiros S."Politica Externa a servigo de uma 
id6ia messi&nica", 0 Estado de S3o Paulo, 31/03/74, p.29. 
Quoted by MARTINS,C.E. op.cit.. p.55. My translation.
25HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op.cit. . p. 118.
26LIMA,M.R.S.de & CHEIBUB,Z• op.cit. . p. 144-46; and 
MUNOZ,H. op.cit.. p.306.
26
interest, national power, security and development, etc. - is 
able to explain any attitude taken by the government. In other 
words, those analysts were trapped by the regime's doctrine 
which, through its quite flexible concepts, led them to 
believe that they could indeed explain any state of affairs, 
almost in the same way as the NSD supporters use them to do 
so. By way of example, Saraiva concluded in her thesis that 
"although sometimes contradictory in its attitudes, the 
foreign policy implemented during the period [Geisel] (...) 
was coherent with the aims based on the 'national 
interests,27.
Conversely, I maintain that the process of pulling and 
hauling involving the different units within the decision 
arena must be investigated in order to ascertain what ends up 
being seen as the expression of the NSD premises, rather than 
adopting the latter as an instrument of analysis. As Arnold 
Wolfers put it, "when political formulas such as 'national 
interest'(...) gain popularity, they need to be scrutinized 
with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to 
different people. They may not have any precise meaning at 
all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for 
broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label 
whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly 
deceptive name"28.
27SARAIVA,M.G., op.cit.. p.90. My translation.
28WOLFERS, Arnold, "National Security as an Ambiguous 
Symbol", Political Science Quarterly. December 1952, pp.481- 
502, p.481, quoted by Fred A.Sondermann. "The Concept of
27
Therefore, it is not enough to claim that Brazilian 
foreign policy under the military regime was based on the 
precepts of the NSD as the expression of the national 
interest29. Certainly the military regime pursued goals which 
would presumably contemplate the interests of the state. The 
question is by whom they were defined, how they were pursued, 
and what they meant. I claim that the only possible way to 
ascertain this is by examining the acts of political choice 
through a decision making analysis. Hence I place myself on 
the opposite side of those who, by denying the need of 
scrutinizing the foreign policy making processes, state that 
Mif the international behavior of nations can be attributed 
primarily to their position in the international system, or to 
national attributes, or to other nations' behavior toward 
them, we have narrowed the scope of the variables which must 
be analyzed. Moreover, if the greater percentage of the 
variation in foreign policy behavior is attributable to such 
systemic or attribute factors, why look at the actors who 
actually make foreign policy?1'30. On the contrary, I claim
National Interest", OrbisP vol.21, n.l, Spring 1977, pp.121- 
38, p.127.
29From the book by Charles A.Beard to the more recent 
works, the question of how much - or how less - the concept of 
National Interest can be useful for Foreign Policy Analysis 
has been deeply discussed. For a review of the theoretical 
standing of the concept, see ROSENAU,James N. "National 
Interest", in SILLS,David (ed.) International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, vol.II, The MacMillan Co & The Free 
Press, 1968, pp.34-40. It is also worth looking at Frankel's 
work. FRANKEL,Joseph. The National Interest. London,
MacMillan, 1970.
30HERMANN,M. & HERMANN, C. "A look inside the 'black box': 
building on a decade of research", in G.Hopple (ed). 
Biopolitics, Political Psychology and International Politics.
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that the option for the first level of analysis (international 
system vs. nation state), or for the second level (nation 
state x bureaucracy) both proceeding "top-downM are 
insufficient in the explanation of foreign policy contents, 
particularly in accounting for cases when a shift in foreign 
policy main lines was implemented, as happened under the 
Geisel government.
Indeed, the political and economic conditions inherited 
by Geisel from his predecessor and the ongoing international 
situation were responsible for a great deal of innovation in 
Brazilian domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the 
achievement of most of those changes was very much dependent 
on the process of decision making. As mentioned by Monica 
Hirst, "the implementation of the foreign policy of the Geisel 
administration became caught up in the rearrangement of the 
forces within the structure of power. It was a project - she 
continues - that looked like both cause and effect of that 
rearrangement, to the extent that it formed part of the group 
of policies that, when carried out, intensified the level of 
tensions within military circles themselves"31. As a result, 
the removal of the hard-liners from the power structure, still 
according to Hirst, led to the increase of support for and 
legitimacy of the "pragmatic" foreign policy, as long as it
London, Frances Pinter, 1982, pp.1-36, p.2.
31HIRST,Monica. "Transigao Democr£tica e Politica Externa: 
a experiAncia do Brasil". Heraldo Mufioz & Joseph S.Tulchin 
op.cit. pp.207-218, p.209. My translation.
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allowed the reformulation of political-strategic concepts 
whose achievement was dependent on the enlargement of the 
ideological flexibility of the regime32. In addition to that, 
I maintain that even before the stage of implementation the 
adjustment of interests around the main NSD premises has 
happened within the intra-bureaucratic quarrels of the 
decision making process.
Indeed, "to effect a change in governmental foreign 
policy, agents must act on the governmental decision process. 
The decision making process itself can obstruct or facilitate 
change"33. After all, to quote Steve Smith, "purely functional 
explanations are bound to be suspect, unless they include a 
causal contribution from the units"34. In this sense, as much 
as Geisel's style of governing and a new process of decision 
making contributed to the strength of the presidential 
authority and to the restoration of military hierarchy and 
cohesion, they also helped to implement significant changes in 
Brazilian domestic and foreign policy content. Therefore, my 
aim is to proceed "bottom-up" within the second debate, by 
looking inside the "black box".
32HIRST,Monica & RUSSELL,Roberto. "Democracia y Politica 
Exterior: los casos de Argentina y Brasil". Documentos y
Informes de Investigacidn, Buenos Aires, FLACSO, n.55, August 
1987, p.29. My translation.
33HERMANN,Charles F. "Changing Course: When Governments
Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy". International Studies 
Quarterly. 34, 1990, pp.3-21, p.13.
34HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op.cit. . p. 198.
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Hence, I regard the nation state as the system, and the 
bureaucracy - a concept which I shall discuss later on - as 
the unit. However, I do not dispute that the system does 
enable and constrain. In fact, although I sympathize with the 
assumption which states that one must choose one level of 
analysis as opposed to the others35, I also believe that they 
are all-inclusive. As stated by Yurdusev, "whatever analytical 
distinction or choice may be made, in fact, these categories 
are not mutually exclusive, but interconnected. One may 
conduct an analysis of only one of them, but at the cost of 
having to operate within its limits. An analysis of one of 
them, without paying attention to the others, is not wrong, 
but it is incomplete"36. In other words, by choosing to 
analyze Brazilian foreign policy within the second debate 
proceeding "bottom-up", e.g, by deciding to open the "box", I 
am * implying that systems are not all-determining, 
notwithstanding the fact that the units do not choose in a 
vacuum either37.
I must stress that I am not going to use the concept of
35As Singer put it, "The problem is really not one of 
deciding which level is most valuable to the discipline as a 
whole and demanding that it be adhered to from now unto 
eternity. Rather, it is one of realizing that there is this 
preliminary conceptual issue and that it must be temporarily 
resolved prior to any given research undertaking. (...) We may 
utilize one level here and another there but we cannot afford 
to shift our orientation in the midst of a study". SINGER,J.D. 
o p .cit.. p.90.
36YURDUSEV, A.Nuri. "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of 
Analysis': A Case for Distinction". Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, vol.22, n.l, 1993, pp.77-88, p.83.
37HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op. cit. . p.146.
bureaucracy as has been done by those who espouse the 
Bureaucratic Model. Amongst other reasons, because I do not 
share the view which claims that "where you stand depends on 
where you sit"38. Otherwise I will work with the notion of 
rolerplayers as it has been formulated by Hollis and Smith39. 
As they put it, "role involves judgement and skill, but at the 
same time it involves a notion of a structure within which 
roles operate"40. In addition, the category of role-player 
"relates reasons to structure and allows for flexibility and 
judgement in the playing of the role: in so doing - they
continue - we bring the individual back in without reducing 
our explanations of foreign policy to the individual as the 
unit of analysis"41. Indeed, although I do not intend to work 
on the level of the Individuals, I do accept their ability as 
having a powerful role within the bureaucracy. So, restricting 
myself to the second debate, bureaucratic role-players shall 
be seen as the units, within the nation state as the system.
It is evident that most of what has been said above 
accounts for the importance being placed on the decision 
making approach. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to expand 
further on that matter, however a few words about the chief
38ALLISON,Graham T. Essence of Decision - Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971, 
p.176.
39For more details of what they had developed from the 
reworking of both the Rational and the Bureaucratic Models, 
see HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op.cit.. pp.143-70.
40Idem, p. 168.
41 Idem, ibidem.
elements involved with this approach are required.
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Forty years ago Richard Snyder, H. Bruck and Burton 
Sapin42 pointed to the importance of understanding the way 
whereby the decisions are made in order to explain foreign 
policy outcomes. Or in Rosenau's words that "foreign policy 
action is a product of decisions, and the way decisions are 
made may substantially affect their contents"43. Since then 
several authors have questioned the heuristic capabilities of 
the approach44, as well as others have been developed them45. 
Among the former, the main criticisms are related to the 
explanatory power of the framework and/or the feasibility of
42SNYDER, Richard C., BRUCK, H. W., SAPIN, Burton. 
"Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International
Politics". Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series, n.3,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1954.
43ROSENAU, James N. (ed) International Politics and 
Foreign Policy. New York, The Free Press, 1969, p.169.
^Just to mention some of them, DOUGHERTY, J . E . &
PFALTZGRAFF,R.L. Contending Theories of International 
Relations. Philadelphia,, Lippincott, 1971; McCLOSKI,H. 
"Concerning strategies for a science of international 
politics", in R.C.Snyder, H.W.Bruck, and B.Sapin (eds.) 
Foreign Policy Decision Making - An Approach to the Study of 
International Politics. New York, Free Press, 1962, pp.186- 
205; ROSENAU,James N. "The Premises and Promises of Decision 
Making Analysis", J.C.Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary 
Political Analysis. New York, Free Press, 1967, pp.189-211.
45In addition to the paradigmatic work by Graham Allison, 
examples of this approach's development can be found in 
B.P.White. WHITE,B.P. "Decision Making Analysis", in T.Taylor
(ed-) ApgrQacheg— and Theory in International Relations.
London, Longman, 1978, pp.141-64. Since then, however, many 
other scholars have worked on the model so as to improve it. 
For an updated overview, see CLARKE,Michael & WHITE,Brian. 
Understanding Foreign Policy - the Foreign Policy Systems 
Approach. London, Edward Elgar, 1989.
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scrutinizing the so called "black box"46. As Morse put it, "no 
matter how much analysis is brought to bear on processes they 
can tell us very little about policies themselves and can 
hardly explain them"47. In addition, there are also those who 
point to the need for identifying which variables the analysts 
should take into account in their study, in order to not be 
overwhelmed by the multitude of them which are supposed to 
explain the decision making process48. This question is likely 
to have been raised by the massive quantity of determinants 
that are able to influence the decision makers, presented by 
Snyder et al.'s model49. Hence they say that it is necessary 
to qualify the question of why policy makers choose what they 
choose, by asking "which kind of explanatory variables are 
most potent in accounting for decision maker's choice?"50. 
However, this gave rise to a wide list of dependent variables 
and demanded a comparative exercise of them. Last but not
46MORSE,Edward L. "Defining Foreign Policy for Comparative 
Analysis: A Research Note", mimeo. Princeton, New Jersey, June 
1971, quoted by CARLSNAES, Walter. Ideology and Foreign 
Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization. Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1986, p.57-58.
47Idem, p.57.
48BRECHER,M., STEINBERG,B. & STEIN, J. "A Framework for 
research on foreign policy behavior". Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, v.XIII, n.l, March 1969, pp.75-101, p.78.
49According to Brecher et al., some examples of these 
variables are: "actors, perceptions, values, motivation,
spheres of competence, etc.". BRECHER,M. et al. op.cit.. p. 
78.
50HERMANN, Charles F. & PEACOCK, Gregory. "The Evolution 
and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of 
Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. 
and James N. Rosenau (eds.) New Directions in the Study of 
Foreign Policy. Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1987, pp.13-32, p.24.
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least, it led the analysts to ask if the same variables could 
be equally powerful in the explanation of any sort of 
decision, at any time, and anywhere. In so doing, the task of 
reducing the scope of analysis was added to by the requirement 
of having to determine the most adequate variables, as well as 
the latter's hierarchical order.
Perhaps the best attempt to solve this problem is the 
search for a classification of the issues as has been done by 
the issue area advocates51. From a quite simple typology like 
the one suggested by Theodore Lowi to a highly complex one 
like William Zimmerman's or even Rosenau's, the objective was
5,From the pioneering work by Theodore Lowi to the most 
recent attempts, there are several options about how to work 
on this matter. See LOWI,Theodore J. "American Business, 
Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory". World 
Politics. 16, July 1964, p.677-715; LOWI,Theodore J. "Making 
Democracy safe for the world: national politics and foreign 
policy", in J. Rosenau N. (ed) Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Policy. New York, The Free Press, 1967, p.295-331; BREWER, 
Thomas L. "Issue and Context Variations in Foreign Policy". 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution. March 1973, pp. 89-114; 
GEORGE, Alexander L. "Case Studies and Theory Development: the 
method of structured, focused comparison", in P.G.Lauren (ed). 
Diplomacy: new approaches in History. Theory and Policy. New 
York, The Free Press, 1979, pp.43-68; ROSENAU,James N. "Pre- 
Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", R.Barry Farrell (ed) 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. 
Evanston, Northwestern Press, 1966, pp.27-92; 
ZIMMERMAN,William. "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Process: a 
research note in search of a general theory". American 
Political Science Review, v.67, n.4, december 1973, pp.1204- 
12. For an useful overview of the subject see, for instance, 
EVANGELISTA,Mathew. "Issue Area and Foreign Policy revisited". 
International Organization, v. 43, n.l, Winter 1989, pp.147- 
71; and POTTER, William. "Issue Area and Foreign Policy 
Analysis". International Organization. 34, Summer 1980,
pp.405-27; As for applications of the typology see 
WALLACE.William The Foreign Policy Process in Britain. London, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976; J.Lincoln 
and E.FERRIS, op.cit.. pp.269-84; and for the Brazilian case 
in particular, see SCHNEIDER,Ronald M. "Brazil - Foreign 
Policy...", op.cit.
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"to accommodate issue-generated differences without permitting 
their multitude to overwhelm analysis and reduce it to a 
fragment and idiographic enterprise"52. In other words, all of 
them were attentive to the need to avoid the assertion that 
"it all depends on the issue"53. Nevertheless, though 
apparently conscious of the need to avoid the extreme 
relativism stressed by the assertion that "from now on all 
would depend on the criterion of clustering the issues", they 
were criticized by having made other mistakes. According to 
Cohen and Harris, for instance, either they start to build 
typologies which became less useful for the purpose of 
hypothesis generation the more simplified for operational 
purposes they attempted to be; or to create a process-related 
classification, instead of a problem-related one54.
In so far as my aim is to retrieve from the decision 
making process the elements which can help me to explain how 
certain decisions were taken and to what extent the process 
can account for their quality, I shall firstly identify who 
were the decision makers. Following Snyder et al., "only those 
who are government officials are to be viewed as decision­
makers or actors. In other words, no private citizen - no 
matter how powerful - can be a member of the analytical unit
52ROSENAU, J.N. "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area", in 
J.N.Rosenau (ed). Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. New 
York, The Free Press, 1967, pp.11-51, p.15.
53Idem, p. 12.
^COHEN, F. & HARRIS, S. "Foreign Policy". F Greenstein & 
N. Polsby (eds). Handbook of Political Science, v. 6, Addison, 
Wesley Publishing Co, 1975, pp.381-437, p.397-98.
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unless he temporarily holds a federal office"55. So, I regard 
the decision units as the actor or group of actors who have 
the authority to solely formulate or to formulate and to 
implement the decisions which will be viewed as the actions of 
the state56. In so doing, I am assuming that states are indeed 
the most important, although not necessarily the only, actors 
in international politics. Nevertheless, I do not take the 
view that they should be analyzed as monolithic actors. In 
other words, although I am taking a "state-centric" 
assumption, I am not taking a "state-as-actor" one57.
In addition to the identification of the decision 
units, a crucial aspect has to be faced, e.g., the question 
concerning the feasibility of isolating from the process of 
policy formulation the very moment when a decision was taken. 
This-question has been treated from different standpoints in 
the relevant literature. Among the several and, even, 
conflicting opinions, there is at least one widespread, 
although not predominant belief, e.g., the purposeful, but not 
necessarily rational, character of a decision58. For those, a 
decision represents a choice among two or more alternatives, 
by whatever kind of process it has been made. Whether they are
55SNYDER et al. op.cit. p.99. Bold in the original.
56Idem, ibidem.
57WHITE,B. op.cit. . p.141-42.
58A decisive exception is, nevertheless, those who point 
to the non-decisional factors. BACHRACH,P • & BARATZ,M .S.
"Decisions and Non-Decisions: an analytical framework",
American Political Science Review. 57 (3), pp.632-42.
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identifiable, and whether the process is divisible, that has 
been methodologically and even semantically discussed.
Michael Brecher is perhaps the best example of one who 
believes in the possibility of pointing to the exact moment at 
which a decision is taken. According to him "a decision is an 
explicit act of choice, which can be located precisely in time 
and space. It has definable sources within a setting". 
Therefore, he continues, "it can be described and explained: 
that is, it is researchable. Moreover, consequences can be 
identified"59. In addition he sees the process of decision 
making as being made up of different stages or, in his words, 
of three systemic phases - input, process, and output. Thereby 
he starts with what he calls the relevant pre-decisional 
events, proceeding to the decisive inputs60; then he examines 
the decisional stages, leading to the selection of a certain 
option and finally to the implementation of the decision61.
Though less sure about the straightforward possibility 
of researching the decisions, Hermann and her associates also 
believe that a decision is indeed a precise moment in the 
policy making process. As they put it, "in the life of every 
organization actual points of decision do occur, although not
59BRECHER,Michael. Decisions in Israeli Foreign Policy. 
London, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.2.
“The former constituted of "occurrences which impinge 
upon the decisional setting"; and the latter the "direct 
environmental stimuli or pressures leading to a decision". 
Idem, p. 5 and 8.
61Idem, p.8.
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always in a fashion visible to all who have participated in 
the process. Certainly key decisions and those who make them 
are constrained by available inputs and the subsequent 
implementation may lead to distortion, but nonetheless choice 
points do occur with some regularity"62. Nevertheless they do 
not seem to be particularly concerned with the division of the 
process.
However, as mentioned earlier, there are other analysts 
who take quite different positions on this subject. For 
instance, there are those who think that the decision is, in 
itself, a complex process of policy formulation, and as such 
must be analyzed. That is the view of William Wallace, for 
instance, who stresses that "the process of policy making is 
less one of a series of discrete and identifiable decisions 
than* of a continuous flow of policy, in which successive 
messages received about the international environment, the 
interpretation given to the information received, the 
preconceptions of those responsible for policy, their 
assessment of possible alternatives in terms of their 
competing and often incompatible objectives, and the 
organizational context within which they make policy all 
combine to shape the direction of that flow"63. Thus, as 
Michael Clarke puts it, "to say that foreign policy processes
62HERMANN,Margaret, HERMANN,Charles F. & HAGAN, Joe D. "How
Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior", in Charles F. 
Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau (eds) 
op.cit., pp. 309-36, p.310.
63WALLACE,W. op.cit. f p.5-6.
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are about 'making decisions' does not say very much. We still 
need to understand the flow of actions and procedures of which 
those decisions form a part - and often only an indirect 
part"64. In so doing, contrary to Brecher, Wallace does not 
exactly fragment the process of decision making; rather he 
dilutes it into a stream of actions. As a result, though not 
denying the existence of a particular moment in which a 
decision has been made, Wallace does not seem to attribute any 
explanatory power to the possibility of singling it out, or 
even to actually selecting it from the other moments.
Finally, there is Carlsnaes and his definition of 
policy as actions65. According to him although foreign policy 
can - and perhaps must - be viewed as a result of purposeful 
behaviors, it does not necessarily mean that these actions are 
susceptible to this singling out66. Explicit in his 
disagreement with Brecher, Carlsnaes says that decisions are 
observable only by those who take part in its formulation. 
Therefore, he stresses, "those decisions which in actual fact 
are open and thus systematically researchable are precisely 
those which bear the imprint of 'policies'. Thus, in so far as 
policies necessarily imply decisions (but not vice versa), and 
in so far as the only systematically researchable decisions 
are those which are contained in the substance of policies, -
^CLARKE,Michael. "The Foreign Policy System: A Framework 
for Analysis", in M.Clarke & B.White op.cit.. pp.27-59, p.52.
65CARLSNAES,W. o p .cit. . p.24-70.
“idem, p.31.
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he continues - I feel that we have to reject Brecher's unit of 
analysis as a practicable option"67.
Having reviewed some ideas concerning this question, I 
would like to address my own view about it. The exact moment 
at which the choice turns into the decision to be implemented 
is not easily identified, be it due either to the secrecy of 
the arena, or to the possible fragmentation of the process. 
Hence the alternative of trying to distinguish the several 
moments gone through by the decision makers, seems to be the 
most appropriate for the purpose of analysis. In doing so the 
analyst is more prone to approaching the rationale of the 
process, insofar as the course of the decision making 
illustrates the relative importance of each particular moment 
for the different actors involved. Thereby I am supposing that 
the process is divisible. In so doing, I agree with Janis when 
he says that "when people adopt a new course of action they 
usually go through more than two distinctive stages", e.g., 
more than solely "the period preceding the announcement of the 
decision and the period that follows it"68. Thereby, I intend 
to identify the decision units present in the Brazilian 
process of foreign policy making regarding certain issues, by 
examining the several stages a decision goes through until its 
final implementation. In so doing, I intend to provide myself 
with the tools for contesting the premise which considers the
67Idem, p.58.
68 JAN IS, Irving L. & MANN, Leon. Decision Making - a
psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment. 
New York, The Free Press, 1977, p.171.
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state under a military regime as a single agent responding to 
its situation according to a given ideology. Moreover, through 
this method of analysis my aim is to retrieve the variables 
and correlations which will explain Brazilian foreign policy 
under the Geisel government.
I am supposing the existence of all or only some of the 
possible identifiable phases: l)defining the problem;
2)identifying alternatives; 3)weighing alternatives;
4)deciding; 5)deliberating about commitment; 6)adhering 
despite negative feedback; and 7)implementing69. In addition, 
I shall stress that it is not likely that certain decisions 
proceed in a linear fashion. Rather the process by which a 
decision is finally taken Mmay involve a great deal of 
fluctuation back and forth"70.
By employing this model of analysis, I intend to 
explain rather than describe the reality. Or put it in another 
way, "unlike paradigms, models are not all inclusive and 
should not be expected to explain every governmental
69Besides the stages identified by Kellerman, I am also 
working with another two suggested by Janis - deliberating 
about commitment and adhering despite negative feedback. This 
addition is due to the importance I ascribe to the latter in 
order to better explain the complex process of policy making. 
KELLERMAN,Barbara. "Allison Redux: Three more decision-making 
models", Polity. 15(3), 1983, pp.351-67; and JANIS,I. &
MANN,L. op.cit.. p.172.
70JANIS,I.& MANN,L. o p .cit. . p.178.
output"71. Therefore, I claim that the option of explaining 
the very process of decision making by such a logical 
procedure, does not mean that the process was logical in 
itself. My aim is to make use of the model as a way to 
retrieve from the reality its meaningful elements, not to make 
anyone believe that the reality is identical to the model. As 
Kenneth Waltz pointed out, "if we could directly apprehend the 
world that interests us, we would have no need for theory. 
(...) A theory, while related to the world about which 
explanations are wanted, always remains distinct from that 
world. Theories are not descriptions of the real world; they 
are instruments that we design in order to apprehend some part 
of it. 'Reality' will therefore be congruent neither with a 
theory nor with the model that may represent it. Because this 
is ill understood by a number of political scientists, further 
discussion is required. 'Model' is used in two principal ways. 
In one sense, a model represents a theory. In another sense, 
a model pictures reality while simplifying it, say, through 
omission or through reduction of scale. If such a model 
departs too far from reality, it becomes useless. A model 
airplane should look like a real airplane. Explanatory power, 
however, is gained by moving away from 'reality', not by 
staying close to it. A full description would be of least
7IFREEDMAN, Lawrence. "Logics, Politics and Foreign Policy 
Processes: a critique of the bureaucratic politics model". 
International Affairs, v.52, n.3, july 1976, pp.434-49, p.436.
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explanatory power; an elegant theory, of most"72. In so doing, 
I agree with Singer saying that my "concern is not so much 
with accuracy of description as with validity of 
explanation"73.
Before tackling the final aspect of the problem, that 
is, my option for explaining rather than for understanding the 
process of decision making under the Geisel's government, 
another point has to be faced. That is if the bureaucratic 
perspective which has become the privileged approach for the 
study of the North American foreign policy system74, is 
suitable for explaining the realities of "less developed 
countries", Third World countries, or any other similar term. 
There are a couple of analysts who have faced this question75. 
Most of them, however, seem to follow Allison and Halperin, 
assuming that their framework was applicable to the behavior 
of most modern governments in industrialized nations76.
72WALTZ,Kenneth N. "Theory of International Relations". 
F.Greenstein & N.Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science, 
v. 8, Addison, Wesley Publ.Co, 1975, pp.1-15, p.8-9.
^SINGER,J.D. op.cit.. p.79.
74HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op.cit. . p.64.
75For a broader view about the state of the art of the 
studies of Third World foreign policies, see KORANY, Bahgat, 
"The Take-Off of Third World Studies? The Case of Foreign 
Policy", World Politics. v.XXXV, n.3, April 1983, pp.465-87; 
KORANY, Bahgat. "Foreign Policy Decision-Making Theory and the 
Third World", in B.Korany (ed.) How Foreign Policy Decisions 
are made in the Third World - a comparative analysis. Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1986, pp.39-60.
76ALLI SON, Graham T. & HALPERIN, Morton H., "Bureaucratic 
Politics: a paradigm and some policy implications", in Raymond 
Tanter and Richard Ullman (eds.), Theory and Policy in 
International Relations. Princeton, Princeton University
Perhaps the main point to be dealt with in assessing
this question is that regarding the level of political
institutionalization of the state. In this sense, although
there can be restrictions to the use of Allison's 
Organizational Model77 for Third World countries due to the 
alleged low degree of complexity of their organizational 
hierarchies78, that is not applicable to the Brazilian case, 
particularly when talking about foreign policy. Indeed, the 
chief organization officially in charge of this area - the 
\ Foreign Ministry - was characterized by all four aspects that 
characterize a highly institutionalized unit, as described by 
Huntington, e.g, complexity, coherence, autonomy and 
adaptability79. I will return to these aspects in the
following chapter.
Likewise, I dismiss the critiques about the 
applicability of the "Bargaining Model"80 as far as Brazil is 
concerned, considering the latter as a Third World country, 
since the prerequisites also accepted as the necessary basis
Press, 1972, pp.40-79; MIGDAL,Joel S. "Internal Structure and 
External Behavior: Explaining Foreign Policies of Third World 
States", International Relations, v.5, May 1974, pp.510-25; 
WEINSTEIN,Franklin B. "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia 
- An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less 
Developed Countries", World Politics. v.XXIV, n.3, April 1972, 
pp.356-81.
^ALLISON,G. op.cit.. pp.67-100.
78MIGDAL, J.S. op.cit.. p.515.
79HUNTINGTON, Samuel, Political Order in Changing 
Societies. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.
“ALLISON,G. op■cit.. p.144-84.
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for a so called bargaining situation - autonomous, coherent 
governmental organizations below the actors81 - are not 
missing in the Brazilian case, as stated above. 
Antithetically, the other elements required for this kind of 
procedure, such as strong personalities and leadership 
qualities, are very much in evidence. Perhaps the main mistake 
made by Migdal, who strongly opposes the application of the 
"Bargaining Model" to Third World countries, was the 
acceptance of a "flaw" variable in his designation of Third 
World countries - that of the degree of political 
institutionalization82. Moreover to have put all Latin 
American, African and Asian countries (with the exception of 
the Soviet Union and Japan) under the umbrella term of Third 
World countries, based on the mentioned "flaw" variable 
without undergoing a comparative analysis of those countries' 
characteristics, despite having said that he was aware of this 
drawback83. As a matter of fact, there seem to be a general 
tendency to overlook conceivable differences between "less 
developed countries", "developing countries" , "less modernized 
states", "Third World countries", and so on, which sometimes 
allow, and perhaps even encourage, the use of the decision 
making approach in the explanation of their foreign 
policies84. As argued by van Klaveren, in addition to the fact
8IMIGDAL, J. op.cit. . p.518.
82Idem, p.510.
“idem, p.516.
MHILL,Christopher J. "Theories of foreign policy making 
for the developing countries", in CLAPHAM,C. op.cit.. pp. 1-16.
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that some Latin American foreign bureaucracies are relatively 
complex, "they include highly differentiated and specialized 
groups, each endowed with their own perceptions and interests. 
[And] (...) even in those cases where only one sector of the 
bureaucracy seems to hold sway in important issues, this group 
need not necessarily be monolithic"85.
Finally, as far as the debate as to whether 
international relations should be scientifically explained or 
interpretatively understood, I agree with the analyses about 
the Brazilian foreign policy previously outlined, where the 
aim is to explain as opposed to understand. The main reason 
for such a choice, e.g., for looking for the constituent 
variables and correlations which compose the decision making 
process, rather than for the decision maker's perceptions, 
ideas, etc., is due to my belief that, broadly speaking, by 
choosing the view from the inside (understanding) one makes 
the units appear to have more freedom of manoeuvre than they 
actually have, and therefore one ignores the role of external 
variables86. Moreover, in agreement with Smith, "focusing on 
the insider view overemphasizes the realm of choice and 
underemphasizes the realm of constraint. Even when there seems 
to be choice, remember that the language and concepts an actor 
uses are themselves socially constructed. In essence, then, - 
he continues - I believe that reality is a social construct: 
it is in this sense that I see perceptions and understanding
85KLAVEREN,A. van. op.cit. . p. 14.
“HOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S., op.cit.. p.204.
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as largely determined, and why I see Understanding as 
secondary and not fundamental"87. That seems to be 
particularly significant for cases when, notwithstanding the 
strength of the regime ideology, and the outstanding personal 
leadership of the president and the salient presence of the 
foreign minister, another point has to be taken into account. 
That is the still significant military bureaucracy and the 
highly bureaucratic diplomatic agency, which were quite a 
shield against an over-personalized political process, as was 
the case during Geisel's government.
To put it in more usual Foreign Policy Analysis terms, 
I do not intend to work on the cognitive aspect of the 
decision making process. It was Snyder and his associates who 
firstly suggested that the main factor by which one is able to 
explain the behavior of the decision maker is through the 
knowledge of their perceptions. As they put it, "the key 
explanation of why the state behaves the way it does lies in 
the way its decision-makers define their situation. The 
definition of the situation is built around the projected 
action as well as the reasons for the action"88. By so doing 
the configuration of any decision is, in the final analysis, 
shaped by the perceptions of the decision makers regarding the 
situation as a whole. Moreover everyone who embraces the 
cognitive perspective agrees - with minor or even major 
distinctions regarding the meaning of perceptions,
87Idem, p.206.
88SNYDER,R. et al. op.cit. p.65. Bold in the original.
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motivations, values, belief systems, etc. - about the ultimate 
importance of this realm in order to explain the actions or 
decisions made in a certain polity. In so doing my main 
criticisms are, obviously, not concerned with the relevance of 
such an approach. Indeed, the explanatory power of the 
cognitive perspectives in the realm of decision making seems 
to have been absolutely proved. Moreover because, as John 
Steinbruner has put it, "presumably there is no one who would 
seriously contest that the human brain is the ultimate locus 
of decision making"89. The problem, however, is indeed the 
tendency to reduce the decision making analysis to the realm 
of perceptions, foreign policy analysis turning into a study 
of the structure of thought - entailing the cultural, 
ideological and even psychoanalytical aspects - of the 
decision makers. In so doing, I argue that, though the 
cognitive aspect of the decision making process possess a 
strong explanatory power, it is neither enough nor exclusive 
of others' perspectives. As Michael Clarke puts it "no one 
type of issue, not even a crisis, can be satisfactorily 
characterized by one perspective of policy making"90.
Indeed, notwithstanding avoiding the extremely complex 
debate about the alleged incompatibility between the 
explaining and understanding perspectives91, I argue that
^STEINBRUNER,John D. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1974, p. 9 quoted by Carlsnaes,W. 
QPtCitt/ p.29.
^CLARKE,M . op.cit.. p.55.
9IHOLLIS,M. & SMITH,S. op.cit. . p.196-216.
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there are not always two stories to tell, as put by Hollis and
Smith92. Rather, there are moments when the outside
explanation does not necessarily lead the analyst to a 
complete appraisal of the phenomenon. In other words, although 
the scientific approach (explaining) allows the analyst to 
generalize by giving a structural account, there are moments 
when only with the help of the hermeneutic view
(understanding) it is possible to tell the whole story. 
Indeed, although the proponents of this debate might not 
agree, I suspect that the category of bureaucratic role-player 
could be a step towards the solution of this contend, since it 
takes into account both the structure which the actor belongs 
to and the latter's ability to ponder. In so doing, at same 
time there is some leeway for the analyst to make
generalizations, each case imposes its own limits.
The first part of this thesis is comprised of two 
chapters. The first sets out and discusses the origins and 
contents of the NSD, in particular its external components, so 
as to assess why the doctrine has been considered as the main 
explanation for Brazilian foreign policy contents. In 
addition, it aims to describe the general structure of the 
decision making arena under Geisel's government. The second 
chapter outlines the main aspects of the foreign policy 
implemented during the Geisel administration.
The second part of the thesis is comprised of three
“Idem, p.211.
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chapters in which I analyze crucial decisions taken during 
Geisel's government. The third chapter examines Brazil's 
decision to abstain in the XV and XVI Meeting of Consultation 
of American Foreign Ministers (November 1974 and July 1975) 
for the lifting of sanctions against Cuba. In this chapter I 
claim that thanks to Geisel and to Foreign Minister Silveira 
a milder position towards the Castro regime which was adopted 
to avoid damaging the inter-American system was, later, 
reaffirmed without too much harm being done to those who 
strongly opposed the normalization of the Brazil-Cuba 
relationship. Following this, the final two chapters aim to 
prove that the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with 
the People's Republic of China (August, 14 1974), and the 
recognition of Angola's MPLA government (December, 11 1975) 
were actually feasible thanks to the way in which they were 
carried out. Hence, my aim is to retrieve from the decision 
making process the meaningful elements for explaining the 
decision contents. Moreover, to ascertain that the process 
whereby changes occur in foreign policy includes, in addition 
to the interplay of international forces and the dominant 
regime's doctrine, the decision makers' action, a view which 
I consider fundamental in the analysis of other similar cases.
The aforementioned decisions reach the heart of the 
debate undertaken in this thesis, since they are related to 
Communism, an ideology totally opposed to the conservative 
Brazilian military doctrine of the time. As a result they fit 
my aim of scrutinizing the role of the decision making process
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in relation to the attempts to make the National Security 
Doctrine compatible with a less ideological foreign policy. 
Moreover, all of the decisions assembled different categories 
of problems (economic, political and strategic), they belonged 
to the South-South axis, and they called for a prompt response 
from the government due to their new profile within the 
international system - the changing hemispheric attitudes 
towards Cuba's continued exclusion from the inter-American 
system; the new opportunities created by the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China; and the 
swift evolution of African decolonization93.
Methodological reasons were also responsible for my 
choice to examine this particular period and the three 
decisions cited above. The obstacles placed in the way of 
gaining access to privileged sources so as to perform an 
analysis of the decision making process, led me to choose a 
period of history sufficiently explored in the literature. In 
this respect, amongst all the military governments, Geisel's 
administration is the one that has received the most detailed 
investigation, especially regarding the area of foreign 
policy. There are several reasons for this. The most 
significant is the fact that, during the military regime, this 
period can be seen as a turning point in Brazilian foreign 
policy history - regardless of the fact that it is indeed 
possible to identify the origins of some policies in the
93SCHNEIDER, R. M • "Brazil - Foreign Policy...", op. cit..
p. 65.
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previous government. Besides, due to the redemocratization 
project sought by the government, there was a softening in 
censorship which resulted in a increase in the quantity and 
quality of the available information. Even so, due to the 
inaccessibility of private and public archives94, my option 
was to counterbalance this shortcoming by creating as many 
sources as possible by conducting interviews. In addition, I 
tried to cross check the data with one or more other sources. 
The main contribution of this work, therefore, must be seen 
not in the originality of the sources, although several times 
they were indeed so, but rather in the strength of the 
argument. Thus, although the access to more information could 
be helpful in supporting my hypotheses, I believe that it 
would not distort the main lines of my argument.
Finally my conclusion disputes the premise which states 
that the existence of a given ultimate consensus based on the 
National Security Doctrine, is able to explain, on domestic 
grounds, the foreign policy of "Responsible Pragmatism". It 
does so by maintaining that the way in which a new consensus 
around the foreign policy was developed within the decision 
making arena is, in itself, a crucial element in understanding 
the decision contents. Hence, it claims that it was the
wIn addition to the non-existence of private archives 
comprising foreign issues of this period open to consultation, 
the public ones are ruled by the determination that only the 
documents produced more than 30 years ago are declassifiable, 
and only those considered not harmful to the national 
security. LAFER, Cel s o . "Diplomacia e Transparfencia: o arquivo 
do Itamaraty". Acervo - Revista do Arquivo Nacional. v.4/5, 
n.2, jul/dez. 1989 & jan/jun. 1990, pp.35-43, p.40-41.
foreign policy executive95, e.g., President Geisel and Foreign 
Minister Silveira's partnership, which was characterized by an 
intense proximity and by a relative detachment from the 
external variables, that was able to oust the "ideological 
frontiers" precept from the core of the National Security 
Doctrine, in spite of its admitted importance during the Cuban 
case.
95This term was coined by Christopher Hill to explain the 
partnership between British Prime Ministers and Foreign 
Secretaries from October 1938 to June 1941. HILL,Christopher. 
Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy - the British Experience 
October 1938-June 1941. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1991.
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Chapter II
Foreign Policy and the Military Regime in Brazil 
- doctrines and actors
It might be correct to say that to explain the foreign 
policy contents of a military regime it is necessary to look 
at its doctrine, since the latter is responsible for making 
certain issues relevant to the regime. And moreover, as 
Parakala suggests, "the identification of the salient foreign 
(and the related domestic) policy issues for each military 
regime can be achieved, and the specific nature of the impact 
of the military regime on the conduct of the policy can be 
satisfactorily understood by examining the evolution of civil- 
military relations and the security doctrines developed and 
adopted by the armed forces (...)1,1.
Unquestionably the very existence of the National 
Security Doctrine (NSD) per se did not hamper Geisel's 
government in its divergence from the usual foreign policy 
stance, towards a more pragmatic one in response to the 
political and economic conditions inherited from the former 
government, and to the current international situation - both 
responsible for a great deal of innovation in Brazilian
'PARAKALA, Prabhakar. Military Regimes. Security 
Doctrines, and Foreign Policy: Brazil. Indonesia, and Ghana. 
Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, 1991, p.24.
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foreign policy2. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to
^ I believe that it is possible to explain the contents of the
j foreign policy of "Responsible Pragmatism" implemented during
I
his government by the external components of the NSD3. In my 
view, to say that a certain doctrine has shaped the policy 
contents is to start at the end of the process instead of at 
the beginning. It is still necessary to explain how it 
happened. In other words, how a supposed consensus, epitomized 
by the National Security Doctrine, was actually built.
2I shall expand on both aspects in the following chapter.
3As a matter of fact, despite its merits, this is the most 
serious shortcoming in Parakala's thesis. Notwithstanding 
having said that the civil-military relations was a point to 
be taken into account, he says very little which is meaningful 
about this relationship. Perhaps due to his aim to demonstrate 
the importance of the military doctrine in the understanding 
of the foreign policy contents, he opted for highlighting the 
evidence that the low profile civilian actors had on the 
foreign policy making. In doing so, however, Parakala almost 
ignores the role played by the diplomats in this matter. For 
instance, when talking about ambassador Joao Augusto de Aratijo 
Castro, one of the most important ideologues of Brazilian 
foreign policy, he describes him as just a "unofficial but 
influential opinion". However, as it has been explained by 
several scholars, the Foreign Ministry and its members have 
been a fundamental source of foreign policy in Brazilian 
history. PARAKALA,P. op.cit.. p. 115. For an account of Aratijo 
Castro main ideas, see AMADO,Rodrigo (ed). Aratijo Castro. 
Brasilia, Ed.UnB, 1982. Likewise, it is worth quoting William^ 
/• Selcher, as one amongst others who advocates that the NSD TiT 
enough to explain foreign policy decisions. In his words, 
"This doctrine conditions the leadership's view of the world 
and its definition of the domestic and international interests 
and priorities of Brazil. Although the doctrine is not 
accepted by all politically relevant groups, its application 
by those holding power is so thorough that acquaintance with 
its origins, contents, diffusion, and impact on society is 
central to an understanding of civilian-military relations and 
the formulation of policy in Brazil today". SELCHER,Wayne. 
"The National Security Doctrine and Policies of Brazilian 
Government", in Parameters - Journal of the US Army War 
College. v.II, n.l (1977), pp.10-24, p.10.
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As an ideological framework, a doctrine has its inward 
dynamism. "New information, new interests can add or subtract 
from values and beliefs as well as change the certainty or 
intensity with which each is held"4. In so doing, the 
doctrine's applicability to reality can be explained looking 
at the way in these new elements were incorporated. In so far 
as talking about different interests is the same as talking 
about different actors advocating them, the process of 
decision making is a key element to be taken into account.
For the decision making process I do not mean the 
formal structure of the decision making arena as the latter 
has been established to work. Rather, I intend to examine the 
way in which foreign policy expressed a different view of the 
NSD, by retrieving from the process of decision making the 
elements that, at the end of the day, made the foreign policy 
of "Responsible Pragmatism" feasible. In other words, I will 
not work with the standardized decision making arena, but 
rather with the actual management of the process5.
I shall firstly expand on the origins and contents of 
the NSD, with particular regard to its external components. 
Then the reasons why it has been considered as the main 
explanatory tool for foreign policy contents will be
4LEVI,Werner. "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy". 
International Studies Quarterly. 14, n.l, March 1970, pp.1-31, 
p. 13.
5An Appendix at the end of this chapter shows a diagram 
of the formal and actual foreign policy making process under 
the Geisel government.
indicated. Then having shown that the NSD was also affected by 
different interests, I will show the actual process of 
decision making under the Geisel government, where those 
interests were spelled out. By way of conclusion, I shall 
point to the possible association between the process of 
decision making and the final outcome of this foreign policy.
1.The Military and the National_Securitv Doctrine
In the history of Brazil's military regime, talking 
about the insertion of the military class into politics is the 
same as talking about the role of the NSD on policy contents. 
Indeed, the military presence in the Brazil's political system 
after the 1964 takeover6, was singularly based on how the
6For an account about the military presence in the 
Brazilian political history, see CARVALHO, Jos§ Murilo. "Armed 
Forces and Politics in Brazil, 1930-45". Hispanic American 
Historical Review, v.62, n.2, 1982, pp.193-223; COELHO,
Edmundo Campos Em busca da identidade - o ex^rcito e a 
politics na sociedade brasileira. Rio de Janeiro, Forense 
Universitciria, 1976; COMBLIN, Joseph. El poder militar en 
America Latina. Salamanca, Ediciones Sigueme, 1978, 
particularly pp. 180-1; JOHNSON, John J. The Military and 
Society in Latin America. Stanford, California, Stanford 
University Press, 1964, particularly Chapter VII "The 
Political Role of the Brazilian Military", pp.177-223; 
SCHNEIDER, Ronald M. The Political System of Brazil - 
emergence of a "modernizing" authoritarian regime, 196.4=2.0. 
New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1971, pp.37- 
72; STEPAN,Alfred. "The New Professionalism of Internal 
Warfare and Military Role Expansion" in Abraham F. Lowenthal
& J. S. Samuel Fitch (eds.) Armies and Politics in Latin
America. New York and London, Holmes and Meier, 1986, pp. 134- 
150.
military intended to assume and to retain control of the state 
which had been formulated within the spirit of the NSD7. 
Hence, the military's "old professionalism" of territorial 
defense and political neutrality was replaced by, the "new 
professionalism of internal security and national 
development"8.
The origins of the NSD, which encompasses the "new 
professionalism", date back to the end of World War II and, 
moreover, to the beginning of the Cold War. Indeed the 
Doctrine's main principles were closely associated with US 
security policy for the continent, which had been readapted 
from a defence strategy to protect Latin America against the 
Axis' threats, to a major anti-communist defence project, 
later reinforced by the perceived peril represented by the 
Cuban Revolution (1959)9. From then on, the emphasis on the 
external threat to Latin American political stability, was 
shifted to the internal sphere, turning counterinsurgency into 
the main defense strategy. In addition, the idea of internal 
defense became closely related to national development, an 
aspect which was supposed to "win the hearts and minds of the
7For a critical assessment of this view, see MARKOFF, John 
& BARETTA,Silvio R.Duncan. "Professional Ideology and Military 
Activism in Brazil - Critique of a Thesis of Alfred Stepan". 
Comparative Politics, v.17, n.2, January 1985, pp.175-91.
8STEPAN,Alfred. "The New Professionalism of Internal 
Warfare...", op.cit. p.134.
’CHILD,Jack. Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: 
quarrels among neighbors. New York, Praeger, 1985, p.68.
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people"10. Therefore the scope of internal security 
encompassed all social, economic and political aspects of 
life.
In spite of the influence of US security policy on the 
NSD postulates, we should not forget the indigenous components 
in the development of this new military doctrine. The 
historical search of the Brazilian military class for an 
identity as an institution which could in itself unite and 
impose discipline and hierarchy has also to be taken into 
account". Furthermore the influences of Brazilian 
authoritarian thought12, particularly regarding the belief in 
the lack of abilities of the civilian elites to run the 
country, must also be considered13. Both aspects contributed 
to the formulation of a doctrine which, to the extent that it 
belittled the civilian capabilities, gave the military class
10Idem. p. 69.
"COELHO, Edmundo C. op.cit. p.163-67.
"Developed during the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and first mid of this century, through historical and 
sociological essays, the major characteristic of this thought 
was the search for the intensification of the central public 
power. Amongst others, its chief representatives were Alberto 
Torres, Oliveira Vianna, Azevedo Amaral and Francisco Campos. 
For a general account, see LAMOUNIER,Bolivar. "FormagAo de urn 
Pensamento Politico Autoritario na Primeira Reptiblica. Uma 
interpretagSo", in Boris Fausto (ed). Hist6ria Geral da 
Civilizagao Brasileira: 0 Brasil Republicano; Sociedade e
Instituigdes. (1889-19301. Tomo III, vol. 2, Rio De Janeiro, 
Difel, 1977, pp.343-74; and MEDEIROS,Jarbas. Ideoloaia 
AutoritSria no Brasil. 1930-1945. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. da 
FundagSo Gettilio Vargas, 1978.
"COMBLIM, Joseph, op.cit. p.153; and OLIVEIRA, Eli6zer 
R.de. As^orgas Armadas: Polltica e Ideologia no Brasil (1964- 
1969). Petrdpolis, Vozes, 1976, p.35-38.
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a national task which united them around a unique aim, as well 
as to differentiate them from the rest of the society. As 
Alfred Stepan states "instead of the gap between the military 
and political spheres widening, the new professionalism led to 
a belief that there was a fundamental interrelationship 
between the two spheres, with the military playing a key role 
in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems 
owing to its greater technical and professional skills in 
handling internal security issues"14. Henceforth, a doctrine 
which could justify, and stimulate military interventionism in 
civilian affairs was not only desirable, but also necessary 
from the military vantage point.
To sum up, the NSD can be seen as the result of three 
main variables: l)the innate military need for a strong
ideology; 2)the influences of Brazilian authoritarian thought; 
both added by 3)the North-American concept of "security", as 
was developed after the end of the World War II.
Although the expansion of military participation in 
politics was based, among other reasons, on their mistrust of 
civilian capabilities to run the country effectively, it does 
not mean that the military planned to ban civilians totally 
from Brazilian political life. In reality, one of their aims 
was to prepare civilians for this task according to their own
I4STEPAN, A. "The New Professionalism of Internal
Warfare...", op.cit.. p.137.
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doctrine15 as the role played by the Higher War College 
(Escola Superior de Guerra/ESG) shows.
Based on the model of US National War College and with 
US military assistance, the College was established by Law 
n.785 on August 20, 1949, following the Presidential Decree 
n.25.075 on October 22, 1948 which recommended its creation. 
Initially the School was intended to help overcome the lack of 
military skills and experience in the Brazilian military class 
made evident to the officers of the Brazilian Expeditionary 
Force (Forga Expedicion£ria Brasileira/FEB) who fought with 
the Allies in Italy in World War II. Subsequently the ESG's 
main objective became the formulation of a "national strategy 
that effectively coordinated the country's military, 
industrial and bureaucratic sectors"16, and the preparation of 
"civilians and the military to perform executive and advisory 
functions especially in those organs responsible for the 
formulation, development, planning, and execution of the 
policies of national security"17.
Directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces (Estado Maior das Forgas Armadas/EMFA) and to the 
president, the ESG was - and still is - headed by a military 
director (chosen every two years from high ranking officials
15Ideffi/ p.140.
16PARAKALA,P. op.cit., p.50.
17Decree .53.080, December 4th, 1963. BOBBIO,Pedro Valente 
(org). Lex 1963. tomo XXVIII. Sao Paulo, Lex Ed.Ltda, 1963, 
pp.1541-55.
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of the three armed forces) and assisted by one representative 
from each of the four military ministries and one from the 
Foreign Ministry. As a means of fulfilling the ESG's objective 
of civilian indoctrination, the civilian elites - of politics, 
banking, communication, industry and education areas - have 
always made up a substantial part of ESG classes. As for the 
maintenance of its influence over the students, the Alumni 
Association (Associagao dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de 
Guerra/ADESG) played an important role. Through its 
conferences and periodicals, the ESG's ideology was reinforced 
in the years to come. Hence, by those means the ESG intended 
to build Ma military-civilian network that institutionalized 
and disseminated the Doctrine of National Security and 
Development1*18.
1.1.The NSD's main external premises
Formulated by the Higher War College19, the NSD elected
l8ALVES,Maria Helena Moreira. State and Opposition in 
Military Brazil. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985, 
p.14. For an account about ESG and NSD see OLIVEIRA, Elifizer 
op.cit.. particularly Chapter I, p.19-55; and for an overview 
of the structure of ESG courses see ADERALDO, Wanda M.C. A
Essalfl Sup.e.ripr d§ Guerra: urn estudo de curriculos e
proqramas. Rio de Janeiro, Masters thesis, IUPERJ, 1978.
,9In addition to the Higher War College, the Army Command 
and General Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do 
Ex6rcito/ECEME) was also responsible for the building up of 
the doctrine. The importance of ESG in this process was by far 
the most significant. KEEFE, Eugene. "National Security",
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the opposition between Western and Eastern blocks as its most 
important external aspect. For, according to the Doctrine's 
geopolitical features20, Brazil's geographical position 
determined the country's allegiance to the Western block21. 
Indeed, the main concepts of Geopolitics, which were a strong 
basis for the Doctrine, gave "firm support to the bipolarity 
thesis and the Nation's adhesion to the anti-Communist fight 
within the notion of national security"22. As put by the first 
military president post-1964, Marshall Castello Branco 
(1964/67), "the current Brazilian situation coincides with the 
wishes for Continental peace, and with the collective security 
precepts, the latter so much a US responsibility"23.
It was also from the East-West antagonism that notions 
regarding economic development and state planning stemmed. 
According to one of the Doctrine advocates, "In the present 
day characterized by two rival blocks (...) every political
Chapter 5, pp.289-334.United States. Department of Army. 
Brazil - a country study. Washington, D.C., Government 
Printing Office, 1983, p.300.
20For an overview of the Geopolitics influence on the 
Latin American military thought see CHILD, John. "Pensamento 
Geopolitico Latino-Americano". A Defesa Nacional. n. 690, 
jul/ago 1980, pp.55-79; MYIAMOTO, Shiguenoli. Militares e 
Geopolltica na America Latina. SAo Paulo, fev. 1987, mimeo, 
pp.21-38.
21SILVA,Golbery do Couto e. Geopolltica do Brasil. Rio de 
Janeiro, Livraria JosA Olympio Editora, 2nd edition, 1967, 
pp.95-138.
22COMBLIN,J. op.cit. . p. 30.
23MRE. Departamento de AdministragAo. A Diplomacia da 
RevolugAo Brasileira. Brasilia, DivisAo de DocumentagAo. SegAo 
de Publicagoes. 1964. p.11. My translation.
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activity is, directly or indirectly, related to national 
security (in such a way) that any economic, cultural or social 
development plan for the country, cannot be formulated without 
taking into account the multiple and, sometimes, rigorous 
obligations imposed by the National Security premises"24. 
Indeed, the notion of development fostered by the Doctrine was 
closely associated with the idea of security. In Castello 
Branco's words, "The inter-relationship between development 
and security leads on the one hand to the security level being 
determined by the degree of economic growth; and on the other, 
the (belief that) economic development cannot be attained 
without a minimum of security"25.
The concept of "ideological frontiers" as opposed to 
"territorial frontiers", was another basic concept of the NSD. 
Indeed, by pointing to the existence of an ideological border 
separating the pro-Capitalist and the pro-Communist countries, 
the "ideological frontiers" concept "represented an essential 
component of the [military] regime's legitimizing ideology, 
once the 'revolution of 1964' was justified by its makers as 
a defensive reaction against the 'international communist 
aggression'"26. The dispatch of Brazilian troops to Santo
24Quoted from a internal document of ESG. TAVORA, Juarez. 
"A Seguranga Nacional, a Politica e a Estrat6gia: conceituagao 
e inter-relagoes", ESG. A-01-53. p.13. Bold in the original. 
My translation.
25Quoted by COMBLIM,J. op.cit. f p. 66.
26LIMA, Maria Regina S.de The Political Economy of
Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy. Trade and Itaipu. 
Ph.D.thesis, Nashville, Tenessee, Vanderbilt, August 1986,
p. 16.
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Domingo (1965), and the support for the creation of a 
permanent Inter-American Force were part of the same 
rationale, which claimed the political stability of Latin 
American continent against the International Communist 
Movement27. In so doing the principles of self-determination 
and non-intervention became subordinate to the premise of 
collective security in the hemisphere.
In addition, the counterinsurgency theory also became 
part of Brazilian military dogma. In fact, the “revolutionary 
warfare" concept is a basic point to be highlighted. As a type 
of non-classical warfare, the "revolutionary warfare" is 
described by the Doctrine as: "a conflict normally internal, 
that is stimulated and aided materially or psychologically 
from outside the nation, generally inspired by an ideology. It 
attempts to gain state power by progressive control of the 
nation"28.
Having looked at some basic concepts of the NSD, I 
shall now discuss the reasons why the Doctrine has been taken 
as the ultimate rationale for explaining the military regime's 
foreign policy.
27MOURA,Gerson. "Brasil-Cuba: enfim, o reatamento". Brasil 
- Perspectivas Internacionais. ano II, n.10, abr/jun 1986, 
PUC/RJ, pp.1-4, p.l
28MANUAL bASICO DA ESG. Estado Maior das Forgas Armadas, 
ESG. Departamento de Estudos, 1976, pp.78-79, as quoted by 
ALVES,M.H.M. op.cit.. p.16.
1.2.The deification of the NSD
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There seems no doubt that the foreign policy decisions 
taken during Castello Branco's government were closely related 
to the general lines of the NSD and its geopolitical aspects. 
One of the most important representatives of the military 
associated with the Higher War College, and one of the main 
ideologues of NSD, Castello Branco advocated the idea that 
Brazilian development had to be pursued through the country's 
security, which in its turn had to be established by a strong 
anti-Communist policy. The document which best characterizes 
the pattern of foreign policy then implemented, is Castello 
Branco's speech at the Rio Branco Institute's graduates 
ceremony in July 196429. There the former notion of an 
"Independent Foreign Policy" was rejected, the concept of 
neutralism was deeply criticized, and the "adulterated" idea 
of nationalism which was said to be an obstacle to foreign 
investments, was abandoned30. Moreover the Cold War became the 
chief influence on Brazil's orientation towards international 
affairs. As a result the automatic alignment to the United 
States, which had been the foreign policy's mainstream from 
the mid-1940s to the late 1950s, was reincorporated into
^ R E .Departamento de Administragao. op.cit..
30 Idem. For an overview of the "Independent Foreign 
Policy" implemented between 1961 and 1964 under the government 
of JAnio Quadros (1961) and Joao Goulart (1961-64), see
STORRS,Keith L. Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy,_
1154.; Background. Tenets. Linkage to Domestic Policy and
Aftermath. Cornell University, 1973.
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Brazilian foreign policy.
However, in spite of several alterations made to this 
general pattern of foreign policy in the following 
governments, and in particular under Geisel's government, a 
direct association of the ESG and the NSD original premises 
with the foreign policy of the military regime continued. 
There are two main reasons for this association: on the one 
hand, General Golbery do Couto e Silva's ascent within the 
decision making hierarchy; on the other, the deification of 
the NSD. It is to these aspects that I next turn.
Considering the first reason, I claim that the 
identification between Brazilian domestic and foreign policy 
to the NSD is, in largely measure, a result of Golbery's 
presence in the decision making arena31, since his name is 
strongly associated with the ESG and with the doctrine 
developed by this College32. As Myiamoto and Gongalves put it, 
"from 1964, the analyses of the regime established a link 
between the ESG and Golbery to the extent that it was not 
possible to mention the latter without mentioning the former.
31After having being the first head of the National 
Intelligence Service (Servigo Nacional de InformagOes/SNI), 
from 1964 to 1967, then a prominent governmental agency, 
Golbery was later reincorporated into the government as Head 
of the Civilian Cabinet of the Presidency (1974-81), a very 
important position as far as the designing of the regime's 
political strategy was concerned.
32Golbery was the author of one of the most important 
Brazilian works on Geopolitics and he had also helped to 
create ESG, with the result that he was considered a chief 
ideologue of the National Security Doctrine. SILVA,G.C. 
PPtCitt.
In so doing it is possible to understand the myth surrounding 
the institution, due to Golbery having always been ascribed 
the label of "The Gray Eminence" of the governmental political 
strategy. In other words, the ESG became important because 
Golbery, the ESG's most notorious member, came from it"33. As 
a consequence, they continue, "the link ESG-Golbery has 
assumed mystifying effects of such amplitude that the 
institution has assumed a disproportionate role, not only in 
academic interpretations, but also in the media and the 
political milieu, who began to identify the ESG, through 
Golbery, as the country's laboratory of ideas"34.
Nevertheless, this automatic association does not 
correspond with the reality. While it can be said that the ESG 
had indeed fulfilled its role of generating a military 
doctrine - particularly between 1952-5635 -, a different story 
has to be told with regards to the association between this 
doctrine and the actual contents of Brazilian policy during 
the years of the military regime. Once again quoting Gongalves 
and Myiamoto, despite the close relationship between the NSD 
supporters and the ESG, it is not correct to explain the 
foreign policy contents of the period (with the exception of 
the Castello Branco government), even the period when those
33MYIAMOTO, Shiguenoli & GONSALVES, Williams da S. 
"Militares, Diplomatas e Politica Externa no Brasil P6s-64". 
Primeira Versao. n.36, IFCH/UNICAMP, 1991, p.13. My 
translation.
^Idem. p.14.
35STEPAN, Alfred. Os Militares: da Abertura A Nova
Reptiblica. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Paz e Terra, 1984, p.57.
closely associated with the College were again in power as 
during Geisel's government, by the so called esguiana 
ideology, e.g., the ESG's ideology36. As they correctly put 
it, the ESG's acquiescence regarding governmental decisions 
followed the implementation of the decisions and not without 
a initial degree of disagreement which was subsequently put 
aside37. Perhaps the best example for the purpose of this 
thesis is the fact that, when Brazil reestablished diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China in August 1974, 
the ESG's intellectual output, as well as the military's in 
general, showed its opposition to this change38. However, soon 
after the decision was taken, this literature incorporated the 
new pragmatism in Brazilian foreign relations, as long as 
Brazil did not get close to those countries which export 
"harmful doctrines"39.
Likewise, Golbery's identification with traditional 
geopolitical thought and thus with the foreign policy of the 
entire military regime should be also qualified. It is indeed
36MYIAMOTO,S. & GONSALVES,W .S• op.cit. . p. 10-11.
37Idem, p.11. In addition, it is worth noting what General 
Golbery stated about the ESG's connections with Brazilian 
policy contents. In a interview with Alfred Stepan, he 
emphasized that the ESG was not important as a center of 
ideology or politics after the coup d'6tat, and that he hardly 
used any ESG papers when formulating government policy during 
his term as Head of Civilian Staff (1974-1981). STEPAN,A. "Os 
Militares: da Abertura...", op.cit.. p.64.
38MYIAMOTO,S. & GONSALVES, W . S. op.cit. . p.11.
39MYIAMOTO, Shiguenoli. "A ESG: Mito e Realidade",
Politica e Estrat6gia. v.V, n.l, Janeiro/Margo 1987, pp.76-97, 
p. 90.
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true that Golbery was the author of one of the most important 
Brazilian works on Geopolitics - Geopolltica do Brasil40. In 
this sense, one could expect an immediate correlation between 
the contents of Brazilian foreign policy and the main ideas 
advocated by the geopolitical literature and by the NSD, both 
allegedly disseminated by the ESG. Nevertheless, as LamaziSre 
puts it, "le Gouvernement [Geisel] qui marquait le retour au 
pouvoir des 'castelistas' de la ESG 6tait justement celui oh 
les iddes de cette dernifere avaient le moins de poids; et 
(...) 1'ascension du G6n6ral Golbery do Couto e Silva ne
devait absolutment pas signifier la mise en pratique de 
"Geopolltica do Brasil"4I.
In fact what seems to have happened was a significant 
review of the original ideas in the above mentioned framework. 
In this sense the rigorous aspects of geopolitics and the 
principles of the NSD which had characterized military thought 
during the 50's and 60's42, were replaced by more flexible 
ones to match the new demands of the Brazilian state in the 
equally new configuration of the international system. Thus, 
we have to admit the existence of a pragmatic geopolitical 
thought which instead of stressing the traditional Western 
alignment and an anti-Communist stance, was much more
40SILVA,G.C. op.cit..
41LAMAZIERE,Georges. Pensed Geopolitique et Politique 
Exterieure du Brfesil. Paris, University de Paris I, 1983, 
p.46.
42In fact Golbery's book was essentially a compilation of 
lectures and essays written by him on the late 50's and early 
60' s.
/
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concerned with energy issues, the arms industry, information 
technology and increasing exports43, regardless of their 
relations with the East-West conflict. Obviously, this
pragmatism did not touch upon all matters of Brazilian foreign
relations nor all constituencies of the military regime - as 
I will show when discussing the case-studies.
As far as the second reason is concerned, which indeed 
constitutes the central argument of this chapter, e.g., the 
worship of the NSD as it was initially formulated, I maintain 
that what is seen as a military ideology should perhaps be 
substituted by the notion of mentality, as put by Juan Linz44. 
In other words, although the NSD was formulated and initially 
applied as a military ideology in the sense that it was "a 
more or less elaborate doctrine which embraced the holder with 
sufficient force, which was sufficiently elaborate in its 
details, and which had sufficient coherence that it could 
seriously constrain behavior"; it turned out to be a military 
mentality, to the extent that it became "more a set of
attitudes than a cognitive structure, more a global
orientation than a detailed guide, more inchoate than 
coherent, in short, not a set of deep and clear commandments
43GRANDI,Jorge Alberto. Regime Militaire et Politique
Exterieure du Br6sil: I'Accord de Cooperation Nucleaire
Germano-Bresilien du 1975. Ph.D. thesis, Paris, Institut 
d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1985, p.165.
44LINZ,Juan. "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", in 
Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. (eds.) Handbook of
EQliigcal Science: Macropolitical Theory, vol. 3, Reading,
Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1975, pp.175-371, p.266-69.
to which action must adjust"45, but rather a set of directives 
adjustable by the actions. Indeed, as stressed by Alfred 
Stepan, "the new professionalism [that was closely associated 
with the NSD] contributes more to the military's general 
attitude to political action than to specific policies"46. 
Moreover, he continues, "despite the new professionalism's 
agreement on the inseparability of internal security and 
national development,(...) the ideology itself leaves 
unspecified most concrete policy decisions"47. In this sense, 
it is possible to imagine issues about which there were not 
straightforward guidelines, hence the eventual disputes. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of military pride, and with the 
serious consequence of becoming an academic cornerstone, 
foreign policy throughout the entire military regime kept 
being explained by NSD supporters and by scholars alike, as 
the realization of an elaborate military ideology, namely the 
National Security Doctrine.
The conflicts involving different branches within the 
armed forces regarding their distinct views about the national 
interests48, and the different patterns of foreign policy
45MARKOFF,J. & BARETTA, S. R. D. op.cit. . p.184.
^STEPAN, A. "The New Professionalism of Internal 
Warfare...", op.cit. p.145.
47Idem, p. 147.
48For an account of three main ideological branches within 
the armed forces, see FONTAINE,Roger Warren. The Foreign 
Policy Making Process in Brazil. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, An 
Arbor University Microfilms, The John Hopkins University, 
1970, chapter V "The role of military in foreign policy­
making", pp.167-217, particularly pp. 177-215. The Presidential
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decisions implemented by the military governments49, albeit 
some degree of continuity, illustrate how distinctly the NSD 
premises can be interpreted. Indeed, sometimes "ideology plays 
a subordinate and minor role in deciding the state's 
objectives and plan for action to reach them, and a more 
important role in justifying the decision once it has been 
made"50. Therefore, I maintain that the process by which 
certain concepts were adapted to the conjuncture and to the 
interests involved, is a crucial element to be dealt with. In 
doing so I shall expand on how those interests were configured 
in the decision making arena.
2.Decision Making Arena - the President, the Military, and the 
FQCejflP-Ministry
Proceeding to Geisel's administration, the increase of
succession issue is another example to illustrate the 
divisions within the Armed Forces. For this question see 
GOES,Walder de & CAMARGO,Aspdzia 0 Drama da Sucessao e a Crise 
do Regime. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1984. Also for 
a general view of the problem under Geisel's government, 
particularly, between Geisel and the "intelligence and 
security community" see OLIVEIRA,Eli€zer R. "Conflict 
Militaires et Decisions sous la Pr6sidence du General Geisel 
(1974-1979)", in Alain Rouqui6 (ed.) Les Partis Militaires au 
Br6sil. Paris, Presse de La Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques, 1980, pp.105-39.
49MARTINS,Carlos Estevam. "A Evolugao da Politica Externa 
Brasileira na D€cada 64/74". Estudos CEBRAP. n.12. abr/mai/jun 
1975, pp.55-98.
^LEVI,W. op.cit. p.5.
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the Brazilian state along with the diversification of the 
country's interests in the international system led to a 
remarkable complexity in the realm of foreign policy. Hence, 
the adjustment of interests around the main NSD premises 
became even more complicated. Indeed, it must be noted that it 
was during Geisel's government when the shift of emphasis from 
security to the area of development was finally completed. As 
a result the intra-bureaucratic quarrels presumably became
^— i -
more constant and intense. Therefore, I shall describe the 
decision making process which characterizes Geisel's 
government, as opposed to the decision making structure, so as 
to explain how those interests were orchestrated. In so doing, 
my purpose is firstly to find the factual procedures which 
made Geisel's administration quite unique, rather than 
recounting how the several agencies constituting the state 
bureaucracy were supposed to operate. And secondly, to 
indicate the correlation between this uniqueness and the 
changes performed in the foreign policy contents.
I must stress that my aim is to focus my analysis on 
the examination of the central executive agencies. By this I 
mean that I will not work on the supposed role played by the 
non-governmental actors such as the political parties51, the
5,The Institutional Act n.2 of October 27, 1965 abolished 
all the existing political parties. Following that, a 
complementary Act created a biparty system, in November 1965 
(a pro-government party called ARENA (Alianga Renovadora 
Nacional) and a an opposition party called MDB (Movimento 
Democrdtico Brasileiro). SKIDMORE,Thomas. The Politics of 
Military Rule in Brazil. 1964-85. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1988, p.45, p.48. In so doing the process towards a 
more systematic participation which can be observed between
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private and the state business community, the press, the 
church, the union, etc; or even by the several ministerial 
agencies, mostly economic. Although acknowledging that the 
latter could have had some say in the process, this influence 
was characterized by an erratic pattern52.
I will concentrate on the examination of three spheres 
of decision making: l)the Presidency; 2)the inner-circle; and 
the 3)outer circle. While in the first the unique presence of 
the president is obvious, in the second I shall emphasize the
1961 and 1964 was halted. It is true, however, that 
historically Brazilian political parties were not 
characterized by a high profile in foreign affairs. To be more 
precise, they had an intermittent performance in this area, in 
spite of being sometimes quite intense. Nevertheless, their 
presence was usually perceived regarding specific issues such 
as foreign assistance and investment, lacking a clear-cut 
proposal for Brazilian international policy. By comparing the 
programs of the main political parties during two different 
periods, 1946-64 and 1964-1984, Paulo Roberto de Almeida shows 
their loose interest and low commitment regarding foreign 
affairs. The only exceptions being, in the first period, the 
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and the Popular Representation 
Party (PRP), both with very weak influence on matters of 
State. However, I must stress that, although soon after the 
military takeover foreign policy issues gained a much more 
important place in the parties political programs, that was 
proportionally inverse to the political parties' real 
capabilities to intervene in the realm of policy making. 
ALMEIDA, Paulo Roberto de. "Partidos Politicos e Politica 
Externa". Revista de Informagao Legislativa. Brasilia, ano 23, 
n.91, jul/set 1986, pp.173-216. For an account of the role of 
Congress in foreign policy from the late 50's to the mid 60's, 
see FONTAINE,R.W., op.cit.. Chapter VI "The Congress: the 
sometime critic", pp.218-245.
52Amongst them, the National Monetary Council (Conselho 
Monetdrio Nacional/CMN), the National Foreign Trade Council 
(Conselho Nacional de Exportagao/CONCEX), the Foreign Trade 
Office of Bank of Brazil (Carteira de Com6rcio Exterior do 
Banco do Brasil/CACEX), the Brazilian Coffee Institute, etc. 
There are excellent studies where it is possible to obtain an 
overview of the subject. FONTAINE,R. op.cit.: SCHNEIDER,
Ronald M. Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power. 
Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1976; GRANDI,J. op.cit..
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role of the Foreign Ministry, in addition to other close 
advisers to the president. Finally, in the third sphere, I 
shall scrutinize the outsider role of the most important 
federal agencies, mostly military-constituted, such as the 
National Security Council and the National Intelligence 
Service in the process of foreign policy making53.
2.1. The Presidency: Ernesto Geisel's policy-makincL system_and 
management style54
According to Luciano Martins, within an authoritarian 
military regime where the President also holds a military 
rank*, his first and most important constituencies are the 
military class. Nevertheless, he continues, "the power 
resources at the disposal of the general-president (along with 
his possible qualities of statesmanship) tended to increase
53Although embracing a somewhat different view from mine, 
it is possible to draw a parallel with Perlmutter's article, 
saying that what he has named "presidential political center" 
would encompass those three dimensions, although his 
"presidential court" would perhaps be more appropriate to 
designate what I describe as the presidential inner-circle. 
See PERLMUTTER,Amos. "The Presidential Political Center and 
Foreign Policy: a critique of the Revisionist and
Bureaucratic-Political orientations". World Politics, 
vol.XXVII, n.l, October 1974, pp.87-106.
^The title of this section is based on Alexander George's 
analysis of presidential management styles. GEORGE,Alexander. 
Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: the effective 
use of information and advice. Boulder, Colorado, Westview 
Press, 1980, Chapter 8, "Presidential Management Styles and 
Models", pp.145-68.
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his personal autonomy from the only institution to which he 
was accountable"55. That was what happened during Geisel's 
administration regarding some issue areas, as the President's 
centralist style augmented his autonomy, though not making it 
absolute.
In addition, within the military regime, President 
Geisel was the only one, among his predecessors, with some 
previous experience in decision making on a macro level56. 
Furthermore he had a distinctive experience with foreign 
matters, which he acquired when he worked as Military Attach^ 
for the Brazilian Embassy in Montevideo (1947-50), and 
particularly when he headed the Brazilian state oil company, 
PETROBRAS (1969-1973). When chairing this company, Geisel 
dealt with an area of remarkable importance during the 70's. 
Besides, it was under his direction that PETROBRAS increased
55MARTINS,Luciano. "The "Liberalization' of Authoritarian 
Rule in Brazil". Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter & 
Laurence Whitehead (eds). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
- Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore and London, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986, Part II, chapter 4, pp.72-94,
p. 81.
56 On several occasions he worked either with military 
ministers or with Presidents. It is worth mentioning his 
position as Head of the General Secretariat of the National 
Security Council, under general Eurico Gaspar Dutra's 
government (1945-1950); Head of president Pascoal Ranieri 
Mazzilli's Military Staff (1961); and Head of president 
Castello Branco's Military Staff (1964-1967). Regarding the 
latter, it is worth noting that during this time Geisel 
developed a way of handling politics very similar to that of 
his superior - discrete, silent, and hard working. For more 
details of General Ernesto Geisel biography see FUNDA£AO 
GETOLI0 VARGAS.CPDOC. Dicion&rio Histdrico-BioarAfico
Brasileiro:1930-1983. Rio, Ed. Forense-UniversitAria, 
FGV/CPDOC: FINEP, 1984, 4 volumes, v.2, p.1450-1459.
its reliance on imported oil57, which while making the country 
even more dependent on external resources for energy, provided 
Geisel with a certain "savoir fai^on foreign issues.
Geisel's political and ideological background is 
usually identified with the ESG, of which he was a member 
since 195258, and, as a result, to the general principles of 
the NSD. Besides, Geisel's close identification with the first 
military president, General Castello Branco, made him one of 
the several military men identified with the so called 
"Castelista" group. Like Castello Branco, Geisel strongly 
supported the principles of military hierarchy and 
constitutional government and, despite some discretionary 
measures taken by his administration59, he was an eager 
opponent of the military "hard-liners'*.
Nevertheless, despite having kept a strong allegiance 
to the general precepts of the NSD, as far as the opposition 
between Eastern and Western countries - the core of the 
doctrine regarding foreign matters - was concerned, Geisel 
held a different view. Indeed, for him the nature of 
international politics and conflict should be searched in the 
North-South strife, rather than in the Capitalist-Communist
57SKIDMORE,T. op.cit. . p. 179.
58FUNDAgAO GETtJLIO VARGAS.CPDOC. op.cit. . p. 1450.
590ne of the most significant being the so called "pacote 
de abril" (April package), in 1977. In a Complementary Act he 
closed the Congress and announced a series of major 
constitutional changes. SKIDMORE,T. op.cit.. p.190-192.
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dispute. Moreover, he was extremely concerned with Brazil's
*7
independence, sovereignty and non-compliance regarding the 
United States60. In other words, for him what was good for the 
US was not necessarily good for Brazil.
As for his managerial style, his remarkably centralist 
methods were striking. Geisel's habit of immersing himself in 
administrative details61, as well as his preference for making 
decisions personally62 are well known. The latter 
characteristic does not mean, however, a complete absence of 
previous discussions with his advisors, particularly as far as 
foreign matters were concerned as I shall illustrate later on. 
As correctly stressed by his former minister of Planning, 
Geisel's administration can be characterized by an emphasis on 
team-work, despite the fact that the final choices were not 
taken in a group decision-making style63. In fact, at the very 
beginning of his administration Geisel made clear his 
intentions of being the ultimate decision maker64. In this 
sense, there was little - if any - room for Geisel's advisors 
either to make or to implement a decision without his
“Confidential source.
6IG6ES,Walder de. 0 Brasil do General Geisel. Rio de 
Janeiro, Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1978, p.19-20 and 24.
62SCHNEIDER, R.M. "Brazil - Foreign Policy...", op.cit.. 
p.64-65 and p.79.
“interview with former Secretary of Planning, Joao Paulo 
dos Reis Velloso. Rio, 27/03/92.
“GEISEL,Ernesto. Discursos. v.l, 1974. Brasilia, 
Assessoria de Imprensa e Relagdes Publicas da Presid6ncia da 
Reptiblica, 1975, p.32.
knowledge. Therefore, in contrast to the government of his 
predecessor (Garrastazu M6dici, 1969/74), in Geisel's 
administration there was no opportunity for the existence of 
a kind of super^jninister or secretary holding a central 
position in the decision making arena, with any degree of 
advantage over the president65.
The combination of Geisel's personal characteristics 
and his view about the need for a more centralist method of 
formulating decisions in order to avoid potential obstacles to 
his plans, led him to impose a significant narrowing and 
increased control in the decision making arena.
2.2. The inner circle
Geisel introduced one important change in the pattern 
of decision making that prevailed during his predecessors 
governments. He gathered around himself a group of direct 
assistants, namely the Head of the Military Staff, General 
Hugo de Abreu; the Head of the Civilian Staff, General Golbery 
do Couto e Silva; the Head of the National Intelligence 
Service, General Joao Batista Figueiredo; and the Planning
65CAMARGO, Sonia de & OCAMPO, Jos 6 Maria Vasquez. 
Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina e no Brasil - uma
d£cada de politica exterior. 1973-1984. Sao Paulo, Ed.
Convivio, 1988. p.38; and "0 Poder e os novos poderes da 
PresidSncia", Visao. 24/06/74, pp.16-22.
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Secretary, Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso. This group constituted 
Geisel's think-tank and became known as the President's "house 
ministers" ("grupo palaciano")“. According to Walder de G6es, 
the presidential think-tank "certainly constituted the 
government's main informal council, a mechanism from which the 
most immediate decisions were triggered or from which the 
direct instructions for future decisions used to come"67.
The absence of Itamaraty from the "house ministers" 
group should not lead us to think that the Foreign Ministry 
did not have a leading role in the decision making process. In 
fact, in the foreign policy decision arena, the first 
important question to take into account is the special 
^ relationship between Geisel and Azeredo da Silveira. To 
ascertain the special role played by Azeredo da Silveira as a 
decision maker during this period, a crucial aspect has to be 
addressed. I am referring to the unique status achieved by 
Itamaraty in Brazilian history which, although not enough to 
explain the singular partnership between Geisel and Silveira, 
was a strong element in making it feasible.
“Geisel used to meet the "house ministers" twice a day to 
discuss matters of general and specific interest. Questions 
related to the military and to the national security were 
under the supervision of the Head of the Military Staff, who 
also happened to be the General Secretary of the National
Security Council (Conselho de Seguranga Nacional/CSN). 
Political issues were reported to the Head of the Civil Staff. 
As expected, economic questions were reported to the Planning 
Secretary. And, finally, any of those areas, once related to 
the concept of national security, could be taken to the Head 
of SNI.
67G6ES,W. op.cit.. p.27. My translation.
The founding of the Rio Branco Institute - an official 
diplomatic academy in charge of recruitment and preparation of 
candidates for the Brazilian diplomatic service - in 194568, 
coincided with the beginning of a period of serious
shortcomings in the process of the education of Brazilian
political elites. Therefore its importance as a place where a 
homogeneous and high profile education could be developed, had 
remarkably increased69. In other words, the process of 
preparation for diplomatic affairs towards the internal
conservation and consolidation of the nation and the Brazilian
nationality, aimed by the Institute, played a remarkable role 
in the formation of a special group of civil servants. Similar 
patterns of education and socialization were only undergone by 
the military class in Brazil. As a result, a sort of empathy 
between the two groups was established. This fact led to a 
peculiar relationship between them, in which the military 
class displayed a great deal of confidence in the diplomats in 
contrast to the lack of confidence shown towards other 
civilian groups70, notwithstanding the remaining ideological 
and political differences between them71. It is worth
68MRE. Departamento de Comunicagoes e DocumentagAo.
IHgtitUtP Rio-Branco - The Brazilian Diplomatic
Academy.Bras11iaf DivisSo de Divulgagao Documental, 1983.
WCHEIBUB, Zairo Borges. "Diplomacia e Construgao
Institutional: o Itamaraty em uma perspectiva histdrica".
Dados - Revista de Cidncias Sociais. Rio de Janeiro, v.28, 
n.l, 1985, pp.113-131, p.128.
TOIdem. p.127-29.
7lBARROS,Alexandre S.C.de. "A FormulagSo e ImplementagSo 
da Politica Externa Brasileira: o Itamaraty e os Novos
Atores", in Heraldo Muftoz & Joseph S.Tulchin (eds) A America 
Latina e a Politica Mundial. Sao Paulo, Ed. Convivio, 1984,
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mentioning that whilst the military had considerably increased 
their presence in the several bureaucratic federal agencies 
since 1964, not only was Itamaraty preserved from this 
M interventionM, but it also increased its presence within many 
federal agencies72.
In addition, until the mid-50's when Itamaraty demanded 
an active role in Brazilian foreign affairs, leaving behind 
its traditional role of passivity73, a process of continuing 
institutionalization provided it with the tools for 
1)protecting the institution from external influences and 
interventions; 2)developing a more complex structure; 
3)enforcing a cohesive conduct; and, finally 4)guaranteeing an 
alleged autonomy of action74. By way of example, despite the 
radical changes in the contents of the foreign policy 
sponsored by the first military government, the Foreign 
Ministry was the least affected federal agency by the witch­
pp.29-42, p.31-2.
72BARROS,Alexandre de S.C. "Politica Exterior Brasilefia y 
el Mito del Baron", in Foro Internacional. v. XXIV, abril- 
junio 1984, no.4, pp.1-20, p.5.
730n this subject Wayne Selcher quotes an expressive 
critique on Itamaraty's behavior: "All actions have
consequences; these are unforeseeable, so we should not act; 
that is the general principle which governed our Ministry [of 
Foreign Relations] from 1913 to 1956". Quoted from Jos€ 
Hon6rio Rodrigues. "Uma Politica Externa pr6pria e 
independente". Politica Externa Independente. n.l, May 1965, 
p.24. in Wayne Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian 
Foreign Policy. Gainsville, Florida, University of Florida 
Press, 1974, p.12.
74For an excellent analysis of this process, see 
CHEIBUB,Zairo Borges. Diplomacia. Diplomatas e Politica 
Externa: aspectos de institucionalizagao do Itamaraty. Master 
thesis, Rio de Janeiro, IUPERJ, June 1984.
hunt policy executed by the new regime soon after the 
takeover. The number of diplomats then expelled from office 
due to their political and ideological positions was indeed 
very low75. Moreover, the first Foreign Minister named by the 
military government, Vasco Leitao da Cunha, was himself a 
career diplomat. Although not a novelty, the nomination of 
diplomats to head Itamaraty was not traditional in Brazilian 
history76. As a result, notwithstanding Castello Branco's 
strong presence in foreign matters, Itamaraty maintained its 
potential role as a decision maker77. Immediately after the 
takeover, Itamaraty had to exchange its own ideas for its 
integrity, which, however, allowed it to work towards 
restoring its central position in the foreign decision arena 
in the following years78.
In spite of those aspects, I shall discuss the
75Four in total - Jayme de Azevedo Rodrigues, Antdnio 
Houaiss, Jatyr de Almeida Rodrigues and Hugo Gouthier de 
Oliveira Gondim. CUNHA,Vasco Leitao da. Diplomacia em Alto-Mar 
- depoimento ao CPDOC. Rio de Janeiro, Ed.Fundagao Gettilio 
Vargas, p.308-309. Forthcoming.
76Less than 2% of the Ministers during the Republican 
years were diplomats. For more details about it, see 
SCHNEIDER,R. "Brazil - Foreign Policy...", op.cit.. p.83.
^Alexandre Barros takes a different view saying that 
Itamaraty had indeed maintained its central position in 
foreign policy making even immediately after the takeover. He 
then explains - incorrectly in my view - the break off with 
Cuba and Hungary, the sending of troops to Santo Domingo and 
even the alignment to the United States, as compelled 
"concessions" made by Itamaraty to the military, due the fact 
that these issues were key-questions for them. BARROS,A.S.C. 
"A Formulagao e Implementagao...", op.cit.. p.34.
78CHEIBUB,Z. "Diplomacia, Diplomatas e Politica 
Externa...", op.cit.. p.123.
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hypothesis that Itamaraty's ideas were actually produced 
within the NSD premises, which would confirm the NSD as the 
basis of foreign policy. So, I move onto the relationship 
between Itamaraty and the ESG.
Itamaraty's contacts with the College were indeed 
significant. As mentioned above, Itamaraty was the only 
civilian ministry to act as adviser to the ESG's Commander. In 
addition, the presence of diplomats at the ESG as lecturers 
was a common procedure. However, the presence of diplomats as 
students, that is, as an object of indoctrination was not 
quite as expressive79. In this sense, I suggest that, as far 
as Itamaraty developed its own interests and convictions as a 
consequence of its process of institutionalization as already 
mentioned80, we have to consider that Itamaraty used the ESG 
more* as a sphere for experimenting and evaluating the 
receptivity of its own ideas, than as a source for them. In 
other words, it seems that this Ministry preserved within the 
College its own views on Brazilian international policy, 
rather than having them swamped by ESG ideology81.
79Between 1960 and 1977 of 206 diplomats only 49 followed 
the ESG course. Moreover, these 49 had their career promotion 
delayed for approximately two years in comparison to the 
others. In this sense, as stated by Cheibub, ESG "is not an 
important locus in terms of bureaucratic articulations". Idem, 
p.109. Hence, I assume that the supposed indoctrination did 
not work as a guarantee of more prestige and power in the 
realm of foreign policy making.
“Idem, p.121.
8lOn this respect, Myiamoto points to the fact that the 
ESG's papers which could be considered as good quality are, in 
their majority, those written by academics or diplomats. 
MYIAMOTO, S. "A ESG: Mito e...", op.cit.r p.81.
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In this context it is clear that Itamaraty gained a 
high level of autonomy giving its personnel their own 
identity, and developing a pattern of action of its own. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a decision making analysis it 
is not possible to conclude that Itamaraty turned into a 
central decision maker in the foreign policy arena82; and, as 
a consequence, guaranteed the implementation of Itamaraty's 
proposals on foreign policy during the military years in 
general, and Geisel's government in particular83. Now I will 
turn to Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira's attributes in 
order to appraise how much he contributed to Itamaraty 
performing this role.
During the governments preceding Geisel's, Itamaraty's 
real importance as a source of policy contents was partially 
explained by a)the then Presidents' disregard for foreign 
affairs (except for Castello Branco); b)by the outstanding 
professionalism of the diplomats; and c)by the respect in 
which the latter were held by the military. In Geisel's 
government, however, Itamaraty could actually maintain its 
position as a central locus of policy formulation thanks to 
the prestige held by Azeredo da Silveira himself in Geisel's 
eyes, in addition to the latter two aspects.
A former Ambassador to Buenos Aires (1969-1974), and
“CHEIBUB,Z.B. "Diplomacia, Diplomatas e Politica 
Externa...", op.cit.. p.125.
“Idem, p.122-23.
chief of the Brazilian delegation to several UNCTAD sessions 
(1966, 1967 and 1968), Azeredo da Silveira was known as a
supporter of a more independent trend for Brazilian 
international relations. Not surprisingly he failed to secure 
military support when President Costa e Silva considered 
nominating him as General Secretary of Itamaraty84. However, 
when Geisel took over he was particularly keen on implementing 
a shift in Brazilian foreign policy and was determined to have 
Azeredo as his assistant, despite rumors of some resistance 
towards Azeredo's name from factions of the Armed Forces85. At 
one of his first meetings with Silveira, Geisel told him: "You 
are the Foreign Minister I wish to have. If someone throws 
stones on your roof, I will be on your side1*86.
The "Responsible Pragmatism" framework was indeed 
drafted during the meetings between president elect Ernesto 
Geisel and the Foreign Minister candidate, Azeredo da 
Silveira87. It is reported that when Silveira presented his 
ideas to Geisel, a strong convergence of opinion between them
mSCHNEIDER,R. "Brazil - Foreign Policy...", op.cit..
p. 83.
“"O Poder e os novos poderes da PresidSncia". Vis5o. June 
24, 1974, p.17.
WSTUMPF,Andr6 Gustavo & PEREIRA,Merval. A Segunda Guerra: 
sucessSo de Geisel. SSo Paulo, Ed.Braziliense, 1979, p.79; and 
interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Monica Hirst and Maria 
Regina S.Lima, 10/05/79, CPDOC. My translation.
87Idem, p.78-9.
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was asserted88. Azeredo's proposals were already half-formed 
in Geisel's mind89. As posited by Gino Costa, "Geisel's own 
choice of Foreign Minister was essential in allowing him to 
have a subordinate with whom he shared a common global outlook 
and who could express and articulate his own sometimes 
inarticulate views on international affairs"90. As a result 
the most important foreign policy questions were, in general, 
discussed primarily between Geisel and Silveira91.
“interview with Ambassador Luiz Augusto Pereira Souto 
Maior, former Head of Minister Azeredo da Silveira cabinet. 
Rio, 5/12/91.
89"Politica Externa". Jornal da Tarde. January 1st, 1979,
p. 7.
^COSTA^ino F. The Foreign Policy of Brazil towards her 
South American Neighbours during Geisel and Fiqueiredo 
Administrations. Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's College, Cambridge, 
1987, p.26.
9,According to the testimony of some of Azeredo da 
Silveira closest advisors, he usually phoned Geisel from his 
office when a delicate question was under discussion by him 
and his cabinet. Thus the supposed bureaucratic procedure of 
firstly reporting to the Head of Civilian Staff in charge of 
political issues or to wait for his next scheduled interview 
with the president, was replaced by an immediate and direct 
consultation, which was possible thanks to the special 
relationship between Silveira and Geisel. Interview with 
ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, former General Secretary 
of Itamaraty under Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Rio, 
12/11/91; and with ambassador Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti, 
former Sub-head of minister Azeredo Cabinet, Sao Paulo, 
14/01/92. An interesting example of how Silveira attempted to 
keep Geisel reliant on him is the "Fontoura episode". Soon 
after the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das 
Forgas Armadas/MFA) seized power in April 1974, Lisbon 
suggested to Brasilia the replacement of General Carlos 
Alberto Fontoura, for whom they had already given the 
agr6ment, to be the next Brazilian ambassador to Portugal. 
Fontoura, a former Head of the SNI, with links with the more 
conservative Brazilian military men, had been nominated to the 
v post by Geisel's ^nt^cessor, and was oh his way to take the 
office in the embassy. The immediate reaction from Silveira 
was to draft a telegram to the Portuguese government stressing 
that if Lisbon had any problem with Fontoura's nomination, 
Brasilia would keep the embassy headed by a Charge d'Affaires,
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Hence it was not expected that the "house ministers" 
would reach a final decision on foreign matters without the 
presence of or previous consultation to Azeredo da Silveira92. 
Actually the role of the "house ministers" in foreign policy 
making, was almost entirely restricted to opinions given by 
Golbery do Couto e Silva. Indeed, Golbery used to be consulted 
by Geisel93 and by minister Azeredo da Silveira94 on foreign 
questions of any significance to the country, particularly 
regarding Latin America - an area of particular interest to 
him. Besides, Silveira used to discuss with Golbery issues 
about which a personal dialogue with the president was not 
considered essential, without harming other usual contacts 
between the former and Geisel95. In summary, as put by an 
adviser close to Silveira, the Foreign Minister's talks to 
Golbery were one of his ways of assessing both Geisel's and
and it would not indicate any other name for the ambassador's 
post. Having been alerted by one of his advisers about the 
toughness of the telegram, Silveira replied asserting that he 
. y needed to have enough credibility (^before the Brazilian 
government in order to achieve his foreigrTpolicy aims. Hence, 
he needed to present the issue to the president with a 
suggestion of firm response to Lisbon, in accordance to what 
he supposed Geisel's position would be, instead of just 
consulting him. Otherwise he would jeopardize the confidence 
Geisel had in him. Confidential interview.
92Interview with Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso. Rio, 
27/03/92.
93SCHNEIDER,R.M. "Brazil - Foreign Policy", op.cit. . p.66.
^Interview with Ambassador Luiz Augusto Pereira Souto 
Maior. Rio, 5/12/91.
95Interview with Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, 
former General Secretary of Itamaraty under Foreign Minister 
Azeredo da Silveira. Rio, 12/11/92; and with ambassador 
Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti, former Sub-head of minister 
Azeredo Cabinet. SSo Paulo, 14/01/92.
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the system's receptivity to his ideas on foreign policy96.
Likewise, in the case of the Councils created by Geisel 
- Economic Development Council (Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Econdmico/CDE), National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetdrio 
Nacional/CMN) and the Social and Development Council (Conselho 
de Desenvolvimento Social/CDS -, and of any other ministries, 
having to examine matters related to foreign policy, the 
presence of the Foreign Minister was always required97. In 
this respect it is worth noting Silveira's comments on the 
fact that his Ministry did not take part in any of the 
governmental Councils. According to him, by not being a member 
of any Council, when a foreign issue was under discussion he 
was summoned especially to the meeting to give his statement. 
By so doing, he continues, Itamaraty exercised a much more 
decisive influence. Otherwise, Itamaraty would have been heard 
just as a matter of routine, instead of being consulted for 
its specialized opinion98.
I shall now continue to outline the other main elements 
of the decision making process. Thus, what follows is an
analysis of the agencies which, notwithstanding having had a 
strong position during the military regime, as far as Geisel's 
government is concerned, should be seen as the outer circle of
^Interview with Luiz Augusto Souto Maior. Rio, 5/12/91.
97Interview with Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso, Rio,
27/03/92.
98Interview with Azeredo da Silveira, by Monica Hirst and 
Maria Regina S.Lima, 10/05/79, CPDOC.
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the decision arena, particularly regarding the realm of 
foreign policy.
2.3.The outer circle
The National Security Council (Conselho de Seguranga 
Nacional/CSN) was always an important locus for decision 
making during the military regime99. Nonetheless, its 
importance during Geisel's government has to be qualified. The 
NSC constituted: all cabinet ministers, the vice-president, 
the chiefs of staff of each of the three services, the chief 
of staff of the armed forces, the heads of the military and 
civilian presidential staff, and the director of the SNI. 
However, despite the practice of considering this Council as 
"the fundamental locus of the decision making process"100, its 
meetings were not common procedure at this time. In fact it 
seems that the NSC was rarely convened for plenary discussions 
during Geisel's government101, since the president had
"According to the former Brazilian Constitution, the CSN 
was in charge of the establishment of the permanent national 
objectives as well as the national policy, the study of the 
domestic and foreign issues related to the Brazilian national 
security, as well as other more specific domestic matters. 
BRASILIA. SENADO FEDERAL. Constituiqao Federativa do Brasil. 
1986. p.98.
100G6ES,W.de. op.cit. . p.32.
101 Idem, p.27; "CSN - Urn superminist6tio, mas aparece 
pouco". Jornal do Brasil. August 22, 1982. Interview with
Azeredo da Silveira by Monica Hirst and Maria Regina S.Lima,
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deliberately diminished its importance as the locus for 
decision making102. Instead, the consultations usually took 
the form of written questions, the answers to which, as was 
once reported, were virtually fixed103, hence the usual 
unanimity of the decisions. Moreover, according to some 
sources, there were several decisions taken by Geisel which 
were not subject to any previous consultation with the NSC104, 
or submitted to any of the military ministers in 
particular105, or even to the Army High Command106. Therefore, 
as appropriately put by Walder de G6es, "usually the hearing 
of the NSC's members worked just as a ritualization of the 
President's personal decisions"107. In this sense, although it 
is correct to say that almost all crucial policy decisions had
10/05/79. CPDOC; interview with Colonel Kurt Pessek, former 
assistant to the General Secretary of NSC, Brasilia, 21/11/91; 
interview with journalist Walder de G6es, Brasilia, 19/11/91; 
and confidential interview, Rio, 18/03/92.
I02SCHNEIDER, R.M. "Brazil - Foreign Policy of...", op.cit..
p. 67.
103"CSN - Urn superminist^rio, mas aparece pouco". Jornal 
do Brasil. August 22, 1982.
104G6eS,W. op.cit.. p. 29.
105Interview with JoSo Paulo dos Reis Velloso. Rio,
27/03/92.
‘“Luciano Martins says that a four-star general who was 
member of the Army High Command for more than four years told 
him that in the mid-1970s this forum never discussed any 
economic or other major public policy - not even nuclear 
policy. I must add that Martins also says that this 
information was confirmed by one of the top figures in the 
Geisel government. MARTINS,L. op.cit.. p.224-225.
,07G6ES,W. op.cit.. p.29. My translation.
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to obtain the approval of this Council108, an endorsement 
could have been easily forged in advance. In other words, in 
the actual process of decision making the NSC did not perform 
its institutional role as "the highest advisory agency to the 
president on the formulation and execution of the national 
security policy"109.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to underline the 
importance of the by-products of what Walder de G6es has named 
the "ritualization" mechanism. This process is significant 
because the practice of "dressing up" the decisions with the 
formal appearance of having been produced by a certain agency, 
also contributes to the decision contents, as long as 
explanations are produced, and a mechanism of taking into 
account different interests is adhered to the process110. 
Moreover, in this way the actual decision makers were able to 
legitimize their choices through the traditionally important 
agency of the military regime, notwithstanding the latter's 
low capability as the ultimate decision maker.
Another important aspect has also to be scrutinized. 
The NSC has been considered by some analysts as a locus where 
the different political and ideological perspectives of the
,08DALAND, Robert. Exploring Brazilian Bureaucracy z
performance and pathology. Washington, University Press of 
America, 1981, p.80.
,09Decree-Law n.900, 29/09/69. FUNDAgAO GETtJLIO
VARGAS.CPDOC. op.cit., v.2, p.898. My translation.
noG6ES,W. op.cit.. p.33. My translation.
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several sections of the state bureaucracy were integrated111. 
However, this interpretation can be rather deceptive. The fact 
that the final decisions theoretically expressed the opinion 
of all Council members, must not overshadow the fact that 
dissension was also an important element within the process of 
reaching, or just endorsing, a decision. Furthermore, by 
claiming that the decisions taken - or just endorsed by the 
NSC - expressed the opinions of the Armed Forces as a whole, 
besides other agencies represented there, is the same as 
trying to explain the process of decision making by its 
results.
Finally, I shall also take into account two different 
hypotheses about the role of the NSC and in particular its 
relation to foreign policy. Firstly the assertion that there 
was a close association between the NSC and Itamaraty112. 
Secondly, the hypothesis which claims exactly the opposite, 
e.g., that there were no horizontal institutional contacts 
between either113, notwithstanding possible personal contacts 
between Azeredo da Silveira and NSC General Secretary, Hugo de 
Abreu.
niIdem. p.12; and SARAIVA,Miriam Gomes. A OpgAo EuropSia 
nos Marcos do Pragmatismo ResponsSvel - a politica externa 
brasileira para paises europeus de 1974 a 1979. Masters 
thesis, Rio de Janeiro, IRI/PUC, maio 1990, p.72.
1,2LAFER, Celso. Paradoxos e Possibilidades. Rio de Janeiro, 
Ed.Nova Fronteira, 1982, p.160. G6ES,W. op.cit.. p.37-8; 
GRANDI,J. op.cit.. p.151.
,13Interview with Ambassador Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. 
SSo Paulo, 14/01/92.
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According to the first hypothesis, the General 
Secretariat of the NSC - which should function as the locus of 
research, planning and supervision regarding national security 
matters - lacked a permanent and specialized research group 
which could perform all the necessary work114. Hence it used 
to demand the necessary support and information from other 
agencies115. Therefore, the Secretariat was dependent on 
information from Itamaraty regarding foreign issues, even if 
disagreeing with its terms. The second hypothesis maintains 
the nonexistence of such contacts, hence both agencies used to 
send their reports directly to the president, without any 
previous bilateral discussions116. I should mention, however, 
that the role of the General Secretariat as an advice center 
was reported to be particularly significant on the matters of 
arms trading117.
These assertions lead us to suppose that either the 
reports sent by the Secretariat to the president were 
basically produced by Itamaraty (the "Information to the
,,4In 1978 there were 130 people working in the General 
Secretariat. Of the 130 only 23 military men and 3 civilians 
were considered specialists in their respective field areas. 
G6ES,W. op.cit.. p.36. Taking into account the extensive 
volume of subjects under SG supervision, such a number was 
remarkably low.
ll5Idem. ibidem.
,,6Interview with Ambassador Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. 
Sao Paulo, 14/01/92.
i,7CAMARG0,S. & OCAMPO, J.M.V. op.cit. . p.39; and GdES, W. 
op.cit.. p.39-40.
President")118, due to the former's lack of private sources 
about the issue119; or that there was a dispute between both 
agencies regarding who would have the last word on the 
subject, the truth about which only an analysis of the 
decision making process will reveal.
In conclusion, what I regard as central to the 
understanding of the foreign policy making process during 
Geisel's government is the assumption that, although possibly 
prominent in some issue areas120, the NSC cannot be viewed as 
the predominant locus of decision making, either as a plenary 
or as a research agency. Hence the need to scrutinize its role 
in the day-to-day politics.
Finally I shall scrutinize the role of the National 
Intelligence System (Sistema Nacional de Informagoes/SiSNI) in 
the decision arena, in which the SNI was the central agency. 
According to its founding Decree-Law (n.4.341, June,13 1964), 
the SNI's main function was to assist the president by 
supervising and coordinating information and counter­
information activities inside national territory121. The SNI 
relied on its network of divisions and subdivisions, such as
118Interview with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro. Rio, 12/11/91; 
and interview with Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. SSo Paulo, 
14/01/92.
119Interview with Colonel Kurt Pessek, Brasilia, 21/11/91.
120CAMARGO,S. & OCAMPO, J.M.V. op.cit. . p.39; and G6ES, W. 
op.cit.. p.39-40.
121LAGdA, Ana. SNI - como nasceu. como funciona. SSo Paulo, 
Ed. Braziliense, 1983, p.19.
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the Security and Information Divisions (Divisoes de Seguranga 
e InformagSo/DSIs) spread throughout the ministries. In this 
way the SNI kept an eye on the political and ideological 
stance of each ministry, in spite of the fact that those 
Divisions were also subordinate to their respective ministers.
The SNI's role in the decision making process, however, 
should not be measured solely by its official functions. In 
other words, due to the increasing importance given to 
security questions during the government of Geisel's 
predecessor, the boost of SiSNI led to the strengthening in 
the autonomy and power of influence of those working on 
security and intelligence matters, with serious consequences 
for the military and governmental hierarchy and discipline. 
Nevertheless this situation was particularly serious regarding 
internal affairs, primarily in relation to the subjects of 
subversion, regime liberalization and presidential succession.
Regarding the role of the SNI on foreign policy 
matters, I must stress that as a result of Geisel's style of 
not delegating power to any single agency to decide on its 
own, the SNI lost the autonomy it had held during the former 
government to make decisions on foreign matters along with the 
Civil and Military cabinets122. Indeed, during Geisel's 
government the SNI was mainly involved with domestic
122SCHNEIDER,R.M. "Brazil - Foreign Policy of...", op.cit..
p. 65.
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activities123, notwithstanding some concerns on continental 
subversion. Accordingly, Itamaraty's DSI should observe Ml)the 
influence and the activity performed abroad by Brazilian 
citizens who opposed the regime, particularly, those who have 
been exiled from the country, those who had their political 
rights revoked, and those who were political refugees; 2)past 
and present activities of officials from Socialist embassies, 
consulates and commercial representatives within Brazil;
3)organization and functioning of communist organizations;
4) the continental activities of subversive organizations;
5)subversion, actual or potential, within the continent;
6)threats to Brazilian frontiers and to Brazilian territorial 
integrity"124.
Nevertheless, since the DSIs were subordinate to the 
ministries, their activities were dependent on the authority 
of each minister to limit and control their movements. In the 
realm of foreign policy, I claim that Azeredo da Silveira was 
strong enough to keep control over his own "house"125. 
Furthermore Silveira could count on his good relationship with 
the president so as to limit the SNI's action within his area. 
On the other hand, Itamaraty's professionalism ensured that it 
kept its own files of information about the international 
situation and Brazil foreign relations properly updated.
I23SELCHER,W. "The National Security Doctrine... " , op.cit..
p. 15.
I24LAG6A,Ana. op.cit.. p.47. My translation.
I25lt must be also mentioned that the head of the DSI 
within the Itamaraty was himself a diplomat.
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Therefore, notwithstanding any possible reports made by the 
intelligence and security community on foreign policy matters, 
and the alleged competition between this group and Itamaraty 
regarding who would have more ascendancy over Geisel126, 
Itamaraty's place as the President's privileged source in 
foreign policy decisions remained unaltered127.
In conclusion, if intelligence operations contribute to 
the decision-making process by supplying the leader "with the 
information and analytical estimates support necessary for him 
to reach a decision", and by following up "the success or 
failure of the decision and analyze the opponent's 
reaction"128, my task must be the investigation of how those 
duties were performed regarding certain issues so as to assess 
the SNI's actual contribution to the decision contents.
3.Conclusion
According to G6es and Camargo, when the military 
occupied the public administration in its several layers "the 
power was actually shared. Civilian bureaucrats dominate the
126CAMARGO,S. & OCAMPO, J.M.V. op.cit. . p.33.
127Confidential interview.
128HANDEL, Michael I. "Leaders and Intelligence". Michael 
I. Handel(ed.) Leaders and Intelligence. London, Frank Cass, 
1989, pp.3-39, p.9.
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production of information, concepts and values which orient 
the State, but are doing so in the name of the military class 
and inspired by their doctrine and ideology. Civilian and 
military started to work together, sharing governmental 
conceptions and responsibilities, coordinating interests and 
merging world views"129.
Several analysts of Brazilian foreign policy also 
believe in the existence, in the final analysis, of a pattern 
of cooperation between the military and diplomats; and/or the 
occurrence of a kind of division of work between them. 
However, despite differing slightly the interpretations are 
not antagonistic. In fact, those scholars usually support both 
explanations adjusting them throughout the years of military 
regime. In this sense the room for disagreement within the 
literature is small and usually related to differences 
regarding when and with respect to in which issue areas the 
cooperation and the division of work would have actually 
happened130. Regardless of these divergences, and
,29G6ES,W.de & CAMARGO,A. op.cit. . p. 137-38.
,30To mention some of these authors, most of them working 
on the mid-1970s onwards, see CAMARGO,S.de & OCAMPO,J.M.V. 
op.cit.. part I (pp.21-188) and part III (pp. 357-397); 
G6ES,W.de. op.cit.: HIRST,M. Pesos e Medidas da Politica
Externa Brasileira op.cit..Tempos e Contratempos da Politica 
Externa Brasileira. IRI/PUC-RJ & CIDE-Mexico, Rio de Janeiro, 
outubro 1983, mimeo.Transig5o Democrdtica e Politica Externa: 
a experifencia brasileira. mimeo; LIMA,Maria Regina S. de & 
MOURA,Gerson "A Trajetdria do Pragmatismo - uma andlise da 
politica externa brasileira". Dados - Revista de Cifencias 
Sociais. 25(3), 1982, pp.349-63; PERRY, William Contemporary 
Bra?j 1 ian^prejgn Policy: the international strategy of an 
emerging power. London, Foreign Policy Papers, 6, Sage Publ., 
1976; SARAIVA,M.G. op.cit.: SCHNEIDER,R. "Brazil - Foreign
Policy...", pp.gjt•
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notwithstanding the plausibility of the hypothesis, what seems 
to be important to emphasize is the lack of concern of these 
same analysts about the facts behind either the cooperation 
hypothesis or the division of work view. As stated by a top 
diplomat, Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, although it 
seems correct to say that in general terms the Brazilian 
foreign policy was based on a wide consensus, that it is not 
the same when addressing specific issues like the Middle East, 
Angola, etc. Regarding these issues, Brazilian foreign policy 
was, and still is, a subject of debate131. If one does not 
take these facts into account, he/she ends by corroborating 
the rationale of the military doctrine and the habit of hiding 
their differences for the sake of cohesion and. hierarchy. As 
put by Thomas Skidmore, "the heart of decision making in 
Brazilian politics since 1964 (...) remains hidden from the 
public. In order to preserve discipline and the image of 
unity, the disagreements are submerged in the final policy 
adopted by the higher command. That policy may be subject to 
subsequent attack and revision, but only within the private 
channels of officer contact"132.
Therefore, I maintain that the main mistakes made by 
those who based their account for the foreign policy under the
131 SARDENBERG, Ronaldo Mota. "Quatro visoes do futuro das 
relagdes Brasil-Estados Unidos". Semin6rio sobre relagdes 
Brasil-Estados Unidos. Brasilia, UnB, nov. 1981, mimeo, p.4. 
My translation.
132SKIDMORE, Thomas E. "Politics and Economic Policy Making 
in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71", in A.Stepan (ed) 
Authoritarian Brazil - origins, policies, and future. New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1973, pp.3-46, p.17.
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military regime mainly on the external features of the NSD 
were: firstly, to have neglected the fact that the doctrine's 
constitutional ideas are not dateless; secondly to have taken 
the military class and its doctrine as monolithic; and, 
thirdly, to have looked at just one side of the question in 
their attempt to identify Brazilian foreign policy with the 
military doctrine. By so doing those analyses fail to account 
for the importance of the different actors present during the 
process of foreign policy making to its final contents. In 
fact, despite the military having been the ruling elite 
through the years, we have seen that there were other relevant 
actors in the process of foreign policy making. In this sense, 
the analysts who take the above mentioned view removed from 
the process of policy making all its more dynamic elements, 
ending up removing the conflict from it.
So, during Geisel's government, the President and the 
Foreign Minister, constituted the central locus of foreign 
policy making. Hence the decisions which clashed with the 
traditional military stance, or rather, with the current NSD 
premises, were actually made possible thanks to Geisel and 
Azeredo da Silveira's more innovative view about Brazilian 
international policy, and to this partnership's strength and 
autonomy regarding other actors within the decision arena. 
Notwithstanding the level of autonomy held by Geisel-Silveira, 
however, they could not avoid provoking grievances in those
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who took a different view of Brazilian foreign policy133. 
Therefore the role of those actors should be considered in all 
the different phases through which every decision had to go - 
from the definition of the problem to the implementation of 
the decision. These phases constitute important elements of 
the analysis in the understanding of the final outcomes and, 
therefore, they must be investigated.
Hence I claim that the examination of solely ideology, 
doctrine or the belief system behind the foreign policy of any 
country is not enough to explain its contents. As Parakala has 
noticed, however, that does not mean that the mere correlation 
between acts and policies is able to fully explain the policy 
contents either134. What I stress is that the examination of 
the process by which the policy is formulated, which includes 
the arrangements made by the decision makers among themselves
,33The episode which perhaps best illustrates the rivalry 
among the military during Geisel's government, was the 
dismissal of the minister of the Army, General Sylvio Frota
(October, 1977). In domestic terms, Frota's removal was 
related to the presidential succession. As far as foreign 
policy was concerned, the dismissal of Frota made public the 
existence of a focus of strong criticism of the "Responsible 
Pragmatism" policy. Although the hard liners' disapproval 
could already be perceived through the leading articles of 
some newspapers - mainly O Estado de Sao Paulo - and leaks to 
the media ("A qual destas vozes se deve dar ouvido?", O Estado 
de Sao Paulo. April 4, 1976, p.3), on this occasion it was 
made evident. In Frota's manifesto, issued just a few hours 
after his dismissal, opposition to the recognition of the 
People's Republic of China, to the Brazilian abstention from 
voting the lifting of sanctions against Cuba at the OAS, to 
the anti-Zionist vote at the United Nations, and to the 
recognition of the MPLA Angolan government, was spelled out. 
"Via ruir, fragorosamente, o edificio revolucionArio", Q 
Estado de Sao Paulo. October 13, 1977, p.4.
I34PARAKALA,P. op.cit. . p.24.
regarding the policy to be implemented, can help us to trace 
the reasons behind the decisions finally taken. Before doing 
that I shall expand on the main aspects of "Responsible 
Pragmatism".
4.Appendix I
FORMAL FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS
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Chapter III
The Foreign Policy of "Responsible Pragmatism"
The last chapter expanded on some aspects of the NSD 
and its role in the explanation of Brazilian foreign policy 
under the military regime. In addition it portrayed the main 
aspects of the decision making process under the Geisel 
government. In so doing, its aim was to stress the need to go 
further than solely associating the NSD with the foreign 
policy contents by taking into account both the different 
interpretations of the Doctrine and the different actors in 
charge of foreign policy formulation. Hence, I have 
highlighted the limitations of an analysis within the second 
debate (nation state vs. bureaucracy), which proceeds "top- 
down ".
This chapter aims to account for the new pattern of 
foreign policy implemented by president Geisel in connection 
with the international context. Therefore, I shall move the 
discussion from the second debate to the first debate 
(international system vs. nation state), proceeding "top- 
down". I will firstly give a brief account of the most 
significant aspects of the international system, both economic 
and political, that concurrently have activated and enabled 
the Brazilian government to change the course of its foreign 
policy. Following that, I aim to set the economic and
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political scene of Geisel's government, which comprised the 
scenario for the implementation of the foreign policy of 
"Responsible Pragmatism". Finally, the main aspects of this 
foreign policy will be summarized. Having then tackled the 
external opportunities and constraints which led to a 
redirection of Brazilian foreign policy, and the main aspects 
of this revised foreign policy, in the following chapters I 
shall explain how that actually happened by moving the 
analysis to the second debate proceeding "bottom-up".
1.New International Order and Foreign Policy changes
President Geisel took office during the detente, when 
Washington and Moscow were already negotiating major 
disruptive issues between them. SALT I agreement, a treaty on 
limiting defensive anti-ballistic missile systems had been 
signed in 1972, and further talks were already underway 
towards SALT II; and on the verge of the 35-Nation Helsinki 
Conference (1975), aimed at reducing international tension by 
preventing accidental confrontations between the opposing 
power blocs, proposing economic and technological 
collaboration and an understanding on closer contacts between 
peoples of different nations. It was also a period when 
Washington was pursuing a less interventionist behavior based 
on the precepts of the Nixon Doctrine. Accordingly, Washington
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should only assist other countries militarily when it was 
thought that this assistance would indeed contribute to the 
political outcome and when it was seen by the US government as 
a situation of real interest to the country.
Taking the twin policies of superpower detente and 
Nixon Doctrine/ the rationale was that, as put by Litwak, "the 
policy of superpower detente was viewed as a means of creating 
and ensuring the stable conditions along the periphery which 
would allow for an orderly devolution of responsibility to 
incipient regional powers. In effect it was hoped that the 
rhetoric of commitment (...) could continue because the 
reality of detente would allow the commitments to remain 
unimplementedMl.
Likewise, Sino-American relations were going through a 
process of remarkable revision. Whilst the tension between 
Beijing and Moscow had worsened following the Soviet invasion 
of Prague (August 1968) and the clashes on the Sino-Soviet 
border (March 1969), Washington saw the rapprochement to 
Beijing as a means of pressuring Moscow into collaborating 
with their plans for detente2. Therefore, following Beijing's 
readmission to the UN (October 1971), the US and the People's
‘LITWAK, Robert S. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine - 
American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability. 1969- 
1976. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.126.
2BARON, Michael. "The United States and China", in Robert 
C.Gray & Stanley J.Michalak,Jr. (eds). American Foreign Policy 
since Detente. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984, 
pp.38-53, p.40-41; and LITWAK,R.S. op.cit.. p.103.
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Republic of China (PRC) signed the "Shanghai Communique" 
(February 1972), in which, both countries committed themselves 
to not seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region as well as 
to opposing any attempt at such a policy by any country or 
group of countries3. In addition, the signature of the Paris 
Accords in 1973 between the US and North Vietnam which led the 
latter to accept a cease-fire, and the former to agree to 
withdraw all its forces from Indochina, very much contributed 
to the easing of relations between the US and the PRC.
As far as regional matters were concerned, the 1970s 
can be considered a period of reversal in the traditional 
pattern of relationship between American countries. Although 
the Nixon Doctrine took a less interventionist line in US 
foreign policy, it was actually translated in a remarkably low 
profile towards some areas like Latin America, as opposed to 
the high profile North American stance on Asia and Middle 
East, as well as towards the policy of detente towards the 
USSR4. As a consequence, some Latin American countries adopted
3YAHUDA, Michael. Towards the end of Isolationism: China's 
foreign policy after Mao. London, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1983, p.40.
4As put by Litwak, "On the periphery, the transitional and 
ambiguous nature of the Nixon Doctrine was evidenced in the 
awkward, uncoordinated manner in which the Administration 
conducted relations with those countries which were nominally 
targeted to be the recipients of any regional devolution of 
American power - Brazil, Zaire, Iran and Indonesia. Although 
this tentative, ad hoc approach to regional security questions 
might be attributed to the general state of flux within the 
international system, it is also evident that these matters 
were considered of secondary importance relative to the 
Administration's major diplomatic undertakings - the Vietnam 
negotiations, the opening to China, and SALT". LITWAK,R.S, 
QPtCiti/ p.137.
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a strategy of diversification whereby they "would become 
partially dependent on a variety of outside nations and 
external influences, rather than wholly dependent on a single 
power"5, namely the US. In addition some of those countries 
also adopted a much more autonomous foreign policy towards 
Washington, exemplified by several expropriations of US-owned 
properties and challenges to American operations6.
The period was also characterized by the so called "oil 
crisis" when, as a result of the October War (1973) between 
Egypt and Syria against Israel and of the letter's expansion 
beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines, the Arab oil-producing 
countries agreed to use oil as a weapon to put pressure on the 
governments considered unfriendly to their cause by cutting 
supplies of oil. In addition, between mid-October and end- 
December, those countries raised the price of crude oil from 
US$3 to almost US$12 per barrel7.
This situation only brought increased instability to 
the world economy, which already had its monetary system based 
on the dollar-gold standard since Bretton Woods (1944), hit by 
the US decision to stop the conversion of dollars into gold 
(August, 1971) in order to face its balance of payments 
deficit. In parallel, the beginning of 1970s was also a period
5SKIDM0RE, Thomas & SMITH, Peter H. Modern Latin America. 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, 2ed., p. 364.
6Idem, p.131 and 212.
7For an overview of the oil crisis, see the special issue 
of Deadalus. vol.104, n.4, 1975.
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when the Western European countries were in a moment of 
recession and high unemployment8, and when there was a re- 
emergence of protectionist sentiments in the US economy9 due 
to the country's trade balance deficits. The remarkable 
consequences for the international trade stemmed from the 
domestic economic problems of Europe and the US led to the 
members of GATT agreeing to start a new round of negotiations 
in late 1973 which lasted until 1979 (Tokyo Round).
This international setting of nascent multipolarity10 
comprised the scenario in which president Geisel took power, 
on March 15, 1974, and in which the foreign policy of
•'Responsible Pragmatism" was implemented. Moreover, those 
elements comprised sufficient reasons and favorable conditions 
for the inaugural government proposing - or, regarding some 
issues, just reinforcing - significant changes in foreign 
policy. The international recession which imposed substantial 
deficits on Brazilian trade balance, the weight of the oil 
prices on the national expenditures, to say nothing of the 
possibility of being included on the OPEC black list, etc, 
were convincing arguments for a redirection of the country's 
foreign policy towards new markets for its exports, new
BUCHAN,Alastair. The End of the Postwar Era - a new 
balance of world order. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, 
1974, p.47.
9Idem. p.71.
10LITWAK,R.S. op. cit. , p.124.
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sources of finance, technology, and energy11. In addition, the 
easing of tensions between Washington and Moscow provided the 
necessary environment in which peripheral countries like 
Brazil could move towards a more independent and nationalist 
foreign policy, as the detente allowed them to diversify their 
bilateral contacts within the international community, as well 
as to take a more independent stance on multilateral 
organisms.
Therefore, although I do recognize that since the late 
1960s Brazil was already well on the way in the redefinition 
of foreign policy which was implemented soon after the 1964 
coup12, as the disengagement from the US, and the move towards 
Western Europe, Japan, the Socialist and the Third World 
countries exemplified13, I claim that it was only during 
Geisel's government that a decisive redirection was actually 
executed. Likewise, although I do not ignore the fact that the 
origins of several attitudes taken during Geisel's government 
can be found in the years of "Independent Foreign Policy" 
(1961-64), it was only in his time that the fulfillment of 
those aims became feasible.
11HURRELL,Andrew James. Brazil and the Third World - New
directions In Brazilian Foreign Policy. Masters thesis,
St.Antony's College, University of Oxford, April 1982, p.7.
12For a very good analysis of Brazilian military foreign 
policy see HURRELL,Andrew James. The Quest for Autonomy: The 
Evolution of Brazil's Role in the International System. 1964-
1985. Ph.D.Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986, chapters 3 to 
7, pp. 65-283.
13Idem, p.196.
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These positive conditions for the implementation of a 
new and more independent pattern of foreign policy does not 
mean, however, that the new government was free from obstacles 
regarding the domestic receptivity towards the alterations in 
the ongoing foreign policy. On one hand, there was quite a 
favorable climate among the government constituencies 
regarding the need for making essential changes in foreign 
policy so as to keep on the path towards accelerated 
development. On the other, however, there were fears regarding 
to what extent those changes could bring threatening 
consequences to the Western approach taken by the military 
regime. To be more precise, according to the more conservative 
supporters of the regime, the diversification of commercial 
partners, the abandoning of the automatic alignment with the 
United States, and the building up of a closer relationship 
with’ the Third World could have led to an excessive 
ideological disengagement with possibly disastrous effects for 
what they regarded as the country's security14.
l4Assuming a view based on the NSD precepts, Tarcisio 
Padilha defined the country's security, or the national 
security as "the relative degree of guarantee, by political, 
economic, psychological, and military actions, that the State 
provides at a given time to the nation which it rules, for the 
realization or maintenance of National Objectives in spite of 
existing or potential opposition or pressures". I shall add 
that the "National Objectives" were understood as territorial 
integrity, national integrity, democracy, progress, social 
peace, and sovereignty, according to the NSD precepts.
COMBLIN, Joseph. £1 BQder militar en America Latina.
Salamanca, Ediciones Sigueme, 1978, p.50-68. PADILHA, Tarcisio 
Meirelles. "Seguranga Nacional", Seguranga e Desenvolvimento. 
v.20, n.147, 1971, pp.33-39, p.36. Or yet, taking a more
academic view of the issue, "national security (...) connotes 
the condition of preservation of national institutions and 
interests against all threats of any origin and hence is not 
merely military". SELCHER,Wayne. "The National Security 
Doctrine and Policies of Brazilian Government", in Parameters
ni
It is to the working out of this ambivalence that I 
shall turn next, by summarizing the political and economic 
scenario of Geisel's government.
2.Political and economic aspects of Geisel'g government
The choice of Geisel for the presidency could be 
considered the outcome of an effective military deal15, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had been chosen over 
different preferences held by some top rank military within 
the government16. By finally supporting his name, however, the 
military could avoid a more serious split among themselves17.
| In fact the steady erosion of military cohesion was on of the
\
| regime's main concern, because the latter was in itself deeply 
dependent on principles of unity, hierarchy and discipline 
among the military. Thus the new president should be able to 
halt the process of growing disunity among the Armed Forces, 
particularly threatened by the increase of power and autonomy
~ Journal of the US Army War College. v.II, n.l (s/d), pp.10- 
24, p.13. Bold in the original.
15SKIDMORE, Thomas. The Politics of Military Rule in
Brazil. 1964-85. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988,
p. 160.
I6SCHNEIDER,Ronald M. Brazil - Foreign Policy of a Future 
World Power. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, pp.63-
64.
17Idem. p.64.
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of action achieved by the so called "security and intelligence 
community" during the former governments.
In this sense/ as far as political aspects were 
concerned, Geisel's government had three main targets, all of 
them very much connected to each other. Firstly the new 
government intended to pave the way for the return to 
democracy18. That should be done, however, within a spirit of 
"revolutionary continuity", rather than as an interruption or 
as a rejection of the principles of 1964 's military action19. 
This proposal led to the adoption of a strategy of political 
decompression in the regime known as "Abertura" (Opening). 
Secondly it aimed at maintaining military support for the 
government, although trying to reduce the power of the hard­
liners20. Finally, Geisel intended to conclude the work of his 
predecessor regarding the eradication of "subversive" action - 
by then almost suppressed - as well as to prevent its 
resurgence21. It is worth noting that besides being an aim in 
itself, this concern about the alleged subversive threat was 
also viewed by the new government as a way of decreasing the 
role of the security community and of the military hard­
liners. By obliterating the "subversives", the new government 
would be able to attenuate the strength of the hard-liners and
,8SKIDMORE, T. op.cit. p. 163.
19"0 ponto sensivel", by Carlos Castelo Branco. Jornal do 
Brasil. August 14, 1974.
20SKIDMORE,T. op.cit. p. 162.
21Idem. p.163.
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their fight against the former; likewise, by avoiding the 
revival of an underground left-wing opposition, Geisel would 
avert the hard-liners antagonism towards his proposal of 
political liberalization. In other words, as long as Geisel 
was successful in extinguishing the alleged subversive
residue, he would leave little room for any criticism
regarding his control over the country; as well as narrowing 
the scope of action by the security forces.
In this sense, although detente allowed the peripheral 
countries to diversify their bilateral contacts within the 
international community, as well as to take a more independent 
stance on multilateral organizations, the incorporation of 
such political pluralism within the domestic milieu was 
neither immediate, nor painless. Indeed, the task of
converting an ideological foreign policy into a more pragmatic 
one had to face the remains of a regime very much based on the 
Cold War precepts. To the extent that these precepts were
basically shared by those who also supported some criticisms 
of Geisel's proposal of domestic political liberalization, the 
battle for implementing a new foreign policy also became part 
of the process of redemocratization, though in a less intense 
form. The episode which best exemplified this aspect of the 
problem is, undoubtedly, the dismissal of the Army Minister, 
General Sylvio Frota in October 197722.
In addition to those political targets, keeping up the
22See footnote n.133, Chapter II.
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economic rate of growth was very important to the new 
government. Amongst other reasons, because a high economic 
standard played an important role in giving legitimacy to the 
military regime. Lacking political support from the 
population, the regime had been sustained in power since the 
1964 coup through significant economic achievements, to say 
nothing about the repression of civil and political rights. 
Geisel was fully conscious of this fact, from which came his 
deep concern about the need to remain on the path towards 
development.
Hence, if OPEC had not quadrupled oil prices in late 
1973, and this fact had not considerably worsened the world 
economic recession, Geisel's government would have begun with 
good prospects. Amongst other figures of the so called 
"Economic Miracle" (1968/74J23, characterized by a remarkable 
economic expansion in spite of the continuous unfair 
distribution of wealth, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had 
risen at an annual average of 10%, whilst inflation had stayed 
at an average of 17%24. Based on those numbers, and 
notwithstanding the unpromising world economic environment, at 
the outset of his government Geisel optimistically predicted 
that the GDP would reach the figure of US$100 billion by 1977 
following his proposed "Second National Development Plan:
23A summary of the chief figures of the "Economic Miracle"
is in the M&DICI,Emilio Garrastazu entry of the FUNDA£AO 
GETtJLIO VARGAS. CPDOC. Dicion&rio Hist6rico-Biogr6f ico 
Brasileiro. 1930-1983. Rio, Ed. Forense Universitciria, 
FGV/CPDOC, FINEP. 4 vols., vol.3, p.2167.
24SKIDMORE,T. op.cit. . p. 138-9.
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1975-791,25.
Nevertheless the new prices of petroleum and other oil 
products established by OPEC, deeply affected Brazilian 
economic plans, since the country was dependent to the extent 
of 80% on external oil resources to satisfy its consumption 
average26. To mention just the first years, Brazil's oil 
import bill increased by 299% between 1973 and 197427. As a 
way of facing this problem in the short term, at the very end 
of the M6dici government Brazil redirected its foreign policy 
towards the Arab countries by reinforcing the decision to 
abandon its equidistant posture regarding the Arab-Israeli 
conflict when, during a visit of representatives of Arab 
League to Brazil on January 31, 1974, Foreign Minister M£rio 
Gibson Barboza expressed Brazilian sympathy for the 
Palestinian cause and called for an Israeli withdrawal from 
the occupied territories28. In so doing the government 
intended to avoid any threat of boycott from its regular Arab 
suppliers, as had been made against the US and the Netherlands 
in October, and later in November against Portugal, Rhodesia 
and South Africa, as part of the Afro-Arab deal.
25PRESIDENCIA DA REPtfBLICA. Ernesto Geisel. Discursos. 
Reuniao Ministerial de Encaminhamento ao Congresso Nacional do 
II PND. v.1, 10/09/74, pp.123-131, p.129.
26Amongst Brazil's most important suppliers were Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait and Iran, all OPEC members. 
SCHNEIDER, R. "Brazil - Foreign Policy..." op.cit.. p.24.
27VELOSO, Joao Paulo dos Reis. O flltimo trem para Paris. 
Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1986, p.220.
28HURRELL, A . J. "The Quest for Autonomy...", op. cit.. 
p.190.
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In parallel with the oil crisis the international 
system was facing a strong economic recession, which also 
imposed serious obstacles on Brazilian development plans. The 
adoption of strong protectionist policies by the developed 
economies deeply affected international trade, and 
notwithstanding the prospects of improvements with the 
decision to summon a new round of talks among the GATT 
members, in the short run Brazil had to face significant 
deficits in its balance of trade. It became even more 
difficult to get fair prices for the primary products usually 
exported by the less developed countries. Furthermore the 
terms of acquisition of manufactured products were severely 
affected due to the significant increase of their prices. This 
situation led to a remarkable disequilibrium in international 
terms of trade with serious consequences for the Third World 
countries.
In order to face those problems and to keep on the path 
towards development Brazil adopted an intensive policy of 
borrowing abroad29. Thanks to the abundance of capital held by 
the international finance system and its eagerness to recycle 
its petrodollars, Geisel's government could keep its balance 
of payments artificially healthy. By so doing, it was possible 
to achieve a reasonably high economic growth, although lower 
than during the former government. Between 1974 and 1978, the 
GDP grew at an average rate of 7% per year, in spite of the
29The same strategy was sought by other Latin American 
countries, with the exception of net oil exporters, such as 
Venezuela. SKIDMORE,T.E. & SMITH,P.H. op.cit.. p.365.
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fact that the annual inflation rate reached the figure of 
37.9%30. It is true, however, that "the need to maintain 
access to capital markets and to do nothing that might affect 
the country's credit rating is bound to have had an effect on 
the country's foreign policy"31. In other words, although 
energy vulnerability and the need to expand and develop new 
markets for exports have driven Brazil towards a Third World 
approach, the need for foreign currency which made Brazil very 
much dependent on the developed countries who controlled the 
international capitalist system led the country to maintain a 
high deference to the North.
The measures taken to attract foreign loans were 
several, including the cutting of the tax on remittances of 
interest abroad from 25% to 5%32. The negative consequences of 
this- decision were quickly demonstrated, nonetheless: from
1973 to 1979 Brazil's net external debt increased from 
US$6,156 million to US$40,215 million33. Indeed this strategy 
had all the characteristics of a time bomb, since it made the 
country's economy even more dependent and vulnerable to 
external influences. It is worth noting that since the foreign 
capital entering Brazil was mainly made up of loans rather
30SKIDMORE,T. op.cit. p.206.
31HURRELL, A . J. "Brazil and the Third World..." op. cit..
p. 67.
32SKIDMORE,T.E. op.cit. . p. 180.
33CASTRO,Antonio Barros de & SOUZA,Francisco Eduardo Pires 
de. A Economia Brasileira em Marcha Forgada. Rio de Janeiro, 
Paz e Terra, 1985, p.180.
122
than direct private investments, the export earnings were 
mostly committed to the payment of the debt interest and 
amortization34. According to Thomas Skidmore, "on balance, 
the debt-led growth strategy remained viable during the Geisel 
presidency. The Geisel policymakers had played for time and 
won. But Brazil's long term prospects were another matter"35.
In addition to the alternative of borrowing abroad, 
Geisel's government reinforced the former government's 
strategy of combining import substitution with an export- 
oriented economy, with particular emphasis on the 
diversification of markets. For it was imperative to look for 
new markets, besides the traditional ones. As long as the 
United States lost their position as the world economic pole 
and other Western countries became important economic centers, 
eventually Brazil could diversify its dependence. 
Simultaneously it was possible to benefit from the policy of 
detente sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, 
which abandoned the confrontation policy which had been in 
force since the beginning of the Cold War, and allowed greater 
flexibility regarding international relations. As for the 
import substitution proposal, the goal was to develop the 
national industry of capital goods so as to decrease the 
expenditures in hard currency.
^CLINE,William R. "Brazil's Emerging International 
Economic Role", in Riordan Roett (ed.) Brazil in the
Seventies. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1976, pp.63-87, p.71.
35SKIDMORE,T. op.cit. p.208.
123
Having shown the main political and economic aspects 
which comprise Geisel's government, I shall next turn to the 
most important features of the foreign policy of "Responsible 
Pragmatism", which constituted the country's external response 
to this environment.
3.The foreign policy of "Responsible Pragmatism^
The area of foreign policy was, perhaps, the most 
distinctive aspect of Geisel's government, in comparison to 
the former military governments36. At his first ministerial 
cabinet meeting in March 1974, President Geisel stated that,
"Dramatic changes on the world 
scenario - like the energy crisis, the 
shortage of food and essential raw 
materials in general, petroleum and oil 
products in particular, the instability 
of the international monetary system 
(...), the spread of the inflation around 
the world (...), the social and political 
tensions (...) which makes nations 
jittery (...) - will have serious
repercussions on the national situation.
(...) If we have, forcefully, to 
adapt ourselves to those external 
circumstances (...) we must not only 
improve the institutional mechanisms of 
development and security coordination,but 
also bear in mind the new goals and 
the new priorities which arise,naturally, 
from the more advanced stage of progress
36A comparison between Geisel's and the former military 
government's foreign policy in particular regarding Latin 
America, Asia, Africa and the United States is set out in the 
ensuing chapters.
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already reached by this nation"37.
Moreover, Geisel emphasized his readiness to make the 
necessary choices and possible realignments in the realm of 
foreign affairs so as to increase Brazilian foreign trade, and 
to guarantee the supply of raw materials and Brazilian access 
to the modern technology38.
These statements constituted the core of what President 
Geisel labelled the foreign policy of "Responsible 
Pragmatism", eventually supplemented by the adjective 
"Ecumenical". This label used to define the new government 
proposal was coined by Geisel himself during the first address 
to his cabinet mentioned above39. By "Pragmatism" was implied 
a policy without commitments to any ideological principles 
which could hold back the search for Brazilian national 
interests, whatever they were. Moreover it was presupposed 
that Brazil was prone to adapt itself to any potential change 
in the international system. As for "ecumenical" it was 
intended to describe a universal foreign policy that would 
take into account all global possibilities in the augmentation 
of Brazil's international relations40. Finally the adjective
37BRASIL. MRE. fresenha___de Politica Exterior, n. I,
mar/abr/maio/jun 1974, Brasilia,DF, p.8. My translation.
38Idem, p.9.
39Interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Monica Hirst and 
Maria Regina S.Lima. Rio, 10/05/79, CPDOC.
40NAZARIO, Olga. Pragmatism in Brazilian Foreign Policy: 
the Geisel years. 1974-79. Ph.D. thesis, University of Miami, 
Florida, May 1983, p.3.
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Mresponsible" constituted a key word and it was particularly 
addressed to the immediate constituency of the regime. As 
posited by a former advisor of Azeredo da Silveira, ambassador 
Souto Maior, the proposal of adopting a "responsible" foreign 
policy, as much as the proposal of launching a "slow and 
gradual" policy of political liberalization, was aimed of 
softening those policies' impact on the more conservative 
military regime supporters, by making both propositions more 
palatable41.
The main aspects of the new pattern of foreign policy 
were actually outlined before Geisel took over. During the six 
months before his investiture, Geisel prepared his 
governmental manifesto by calling into his office his 
ministers-to-be for talks about the new government political 
and economic blue-print42. At this point Azeredo da Silveira, 
the then Brazilian ambassador to Buenos Aires, was chosen to 
be the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Moreover he then 
exercised a strong influence on the contents of the new 
proposals for foreign policy43.
It is worth describing the basis of Silveira's views on
41 SOUTO MAIOR, Luiz A.P. "0 'Pragmatismo Responsdvel' " . in 
60 Anos de Polltica Externa Brasileira. Programa de RelagSes 
Internacionais, USP/IPRI, p.6. Forthcoming.
42"Geisel e seu Governo". Veja. March 27, 1974, p.20.
43STUMPF,Andr6 Gustavo & PEREIRA,Merval. A Segunda Guerra: 
sucessSo de Geisel. Rio, Ed.Braziliense, 1979. p.78-9; and 
interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Monica Hirst and Maria 
Regina S.Lima. Rio, 10/5/79, CPDOC.
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foreign policy. In general - although not exclusively - they 
came from the same bulk of ideas expressed by the former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, ambassador Joao Augusto de Aratijo 
Castro (1963-64), about Brazilian foreign policy. According to 
the latter, it was necessary to react against the superpowers 
policy of forcing the United Nations to perform a more 
technical role at the expense of its political one, as well as 
against the neglect of the North-South problems in favor of 
the East-West conflict, and moreover, against the attempt of 
freezing the world power structure, e.g, against a kind of 
condominium of power whose aim was to freeze the present 
distribution of power and wealth44.
In summary, for Aratijo Castro, Brazil's international 
policy should be defined as a way towards the elimination of 
all obstacles to its economic, technological and scientific 
development as well as the eradication of all impediments to 
the affirmation and the increase of its national power45. 
True, such a statement could be seen as no more than naivete,/ 
coming from a representative of a peripherical country. 
However, as with several other statements of this kind, I 
shall stress its purpose of keeping those issues on the 
agenda, or rather, of feeding the debate, instead of endorsing
^For a complete account of Aratijo Castro ideas, see 
AMADO,Rodrigo (ed). Aratiio Castro. Brasilia, DF, Ed.UnB, 1982; 
and CASTRO,Joao Augusto Aratijo. 0 Pensamento de Aratijo Castro. 
Relagoes Internacionais. Brasilia, l(l):50-59, jan/abr 1978.
45GRANDI,Jorge Alberto. Regime Militaire et Politique 
Exterieure du Brfesil: 1'Accord de Cooperation Nucleaire
Germano-Bresilien du 1975. Ph.D. Thesis. Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques de Paris, Paris, 1985. p.184-5.
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the status quo by adopting a well behaved silence.
However, as Jorge Grandi puts it, despite the fact that 
the political and theoretical bases of "Responsible 
Pragmatism" were already visible in diplomat Aratijo Castro's 
writings of the early seventies, "les id6es qu'ils expriment 
ne constituent une force politique et 6conomique susceptible 
d'intervenir dans les decisions ext^rieures qu'apr^s la fin du 
miracle 6conomique, la crise du p6trole, et la consolidation 
du changement dans la structure commerciale externe du Brasil. 
Ces trois facteurs se combinent durant Geisel, et produisent 
une base 6conomique sur laquelle pourra s'articuler le 
projet"46. In addition I claim that the process of decision 
making was the fourth factor making feasible the 
implementation of a new pattern of Brazilian foreign policy 
based on Aratijo Castro's ideas. With respect to this, I stress 
that I have no doubts that those economic factors favored the 
redirection of foreign policy, amongst other ways, by making 
the economic ministries support some of the attitudes which 
had been advocated mainly by Itamaraty since some years 
earlier47. That does not mean, however, that the economic 
ministers should be placed at the same level as Geisel/Azeredo 
da Silveira as chief decision makers. Yet, as Hurrell points 
out, the "economic ministries continued to place greater
•“Idem, p. 113-4.
47HURRELL,A.J. "The Quest for Autonomy...", op.cit.. 
p. 207.
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emphasis on relations with the First World"48 which, as I will 
demonstrate later on, was not always reinforced by the 
decisions taken by the government.
The chief aspects of "Responsible Pragmatism" can be 
summarized by glancing at the main political and economic 
attitudes taken towards the international system during 
Geisel's government49. First of all the change in the pattern 
of relationship with United States has to be noticed. Although 
maintaining a Western-oriented approach, Brazil discontinued 
the policy of automatic alignment with Washington. In the 
Foreign Minister's words,
"We refuse to consider that our 
national interests are necessarily 
contingent to those of other 
countries. For that reason we try to 
disavow the argument that invokes 
automatic alignment in the name of 
the supremacy of the interests of 
leader-nations m5°.
Notwithstanding the signature of a US-Brazilian 
Understanding Memorandum in February 197651, which was seen by
48Idem. p.207.
49For an overall view of the pattern of international 
trade between Brazil and the US, Latin America, Western 
Europe, Africa, Asia, Middle East and Eastern Europe see 
Appendix II.
50MRE.Resenha de Polltica Exterior. ("0 Brasil e a Nova 
Ordem Internacional"), n. VII, out/nov/dec 1975, Brasilia, DF. 
p.119. My translation.
5lThrough this Memorandum was established a system of 
reciprocal consultation regarding issues of mutual interest. 
BRASIL.MRE. Realizagoes do Governo Geisel. Relat6rio. 1974- 
1979, p.57.
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Silveira as having as its main objective the provision of "a 
framework for resolving divergences between the two countries 
so that they should not become causes of antagonism"52, 
serious differences between the two countries persisted 
throughout the period. Amongst them, the plethora of 
commercial problems due to Washington' s protectionist measures 
against Brazilian products53, which along with Brazil's effort 
to diversify its international markets, resulted in the 
continuation of the decrease in trade between the two 
countries54. In addition, in March 1977 Brazil broke with an 
agreement on Military Assistance with the US - which had been 
in force since 1952 -, thus allowing the country to develop 
its native arms industry as well as to strengthen its 
international arms trade. Moreover, Brazil broke its 
dependency upon North American nuclear policy when it did not 
accede to Washington's pressures against the agreement with
52SILVEIRA,A.Azeredo da. "A Politica Externa do Brasil", 
Diaiogo Econdmico. 252, November/December 1975, p.34, as 
quoted by HURRELL,A.J. "The Quest for Autonomy...", op.cit.. 
p. 213.
53Amongst other measures, the US decision to place 
Brazil's export of shoes under "countervailing duty" action, 
which meant the charge of additional tariffs allegedly to 
compensate for Brazilian subsidies to the exports.
^Whilst in 1968 Brazilian exports to United States had 
reached 33,3% of the total, by the end of Geisel's government 
it represented only 19,3%. As for imports, whilst in 1968 
Brazil imported 33% of its products from the United States, in 
1979 it imported only 17,9%. GRANDI,J. op.cit.. p.99-100. 
Nevertheless, the US continued to be Brazil's single most 
important trade partner in mid 70s. PERRY,William Contemporary 
BEazi.liaiL_.For-eian Policy: the international strategy of an 
emergent power. Foreign Policy Papers, 6, London, Sage Publ., 
1976, p.56. For the volume of trade between the Brazil and US 
from 1964 to 1979, see Table I, Appendix II.
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West Germany. Finally, Brazil stuck to its principle of not 
allowing any foreign intervention in its domestic affairs by 
reacting strongly to Washington's statements about human 
rights violation in Brazilian territory55.
As far as Latin American countries were concerned, a 
policy of strengthening Brazil's solidarity, only comparable 
to the policy towards Africa56, was enforced. Indeed due to 
the Brazilian need for expansion of its external markets and 
its energy sources, a policy of intensification in the 
cooperation with its neighbors became essential. As a result, 
between 1974 and 1979 trade with Chile increased in 224%, with 
Colombia in 282%, with Mexico in 216%, and with Uruguay in 
142%57. In 1974 Brazil and Bolivia signed a Treaty which, 
among other aspects, included Bolivian supply of gas to Brazil 
in exchange for Brazilian participation in the building of a 
gas pipeline. It is also important to mention the
55For a more complete account of the Brazil-US 
relationship, see FONTAINE, Roger. Brazil and US: toward a 
maturing relationship. AEI/Hoover Institute, Policy Study, 
n.14, december 1974 and "The end of a beautiful relationship". 
Foreign Policy. Fall, n.28, 1977.pp 166-74; GRANDI, Jorge.
op.cit.. pp.230-248; MOURA,Gerson & LIMA,Maria Regina S. 
"Brasil-Estados Unidos, do entendimento ao desentendimento". 
Semindrio sobre o Brasil e a Nova Ordem Internacional. 
Friburgo, 1978, paper; WESSON,Robert. The United States and 
Brazil, limits of influence. New York, Praeger Special 
Studies, 1981.
^According to Silveira's speech when he was sworn in, 
both regions should be seen as top priorities within the new 
government's foreign policy. BRASIL.MRE."Resenha de Politica 
Exterior", n.I, op.cit.. p.19-21.
57HURRELL,A.J. "The Quest for Autonomy...", op.cit.. 
p.249. For the volume of trade between the Brazil and Latin 
America from 1964 to 1979, see Table II, Appendix II.
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understandings between Brazil and Paraguay regarding the 
exploitation of the hydroelectric potential of the Parand 
River, by the creation of Itaipu binational public 
corporation, in addition to an increase of 300% in the trade 
between the two countries between 1974 and 197958. Finally, 
the efforts made by Geisel's government to develop a better 
relationship with Argentina should be mentioned59.
Contrary to a policy pursued by the former government, 
during Geisel's administration, some degree of Latin American 
multilateral policy was implemented. By way of example, in 
1975 Brazil signed the constitutive covenant of the Latin 
American Economic System (Sistema Econdmico Latino 
Americano/SELA) and adhered to the Antarctic Treaty. Besides 
that, in 1978 Brazil signed the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, 
which included Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guiana, Peru, 
Surinam and Venezuela60.
58Idem, p.248.
59"Surto Econdmico viabilizou diplomacia de Geisel", by 
Stanley Hilton. O Estado de S5o Paulo. July 22, 1979.
^For more details about Brazil and Latin America 
relationship, see BOND, Robert D. "Venezuela, Brazil and the 
Amazon Basis". Orbis. v.22, n.3, pp.635-650 and "Brazil's
relations with the Northern Tier Countries of South America", 
in W.A.Selcher (ed) Brazil in the International System: the 
rise of a middle power. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 
1981, p. 123-41; CAMARGO, Sonia de. "Caminhos que se juntam e 
se separam: Brasil e Argentina uma visSo comparativa".
Politica e Estrategia. vol.IV, n.3, Sao Paulo, Ed. Convivio, 
jul/set. 1986, pp.372-403; COSTA, Gino F. The Foreign Policy 
Qf_Brazil towards her Southern American Neighbors during the 
Geisel and Figueiredo Administrations. Ph.D. thesis, Queen's 
College, Cambridge, 1987; JAGUARIBE,Hdlio. "El Brasil y la 
America Latina". Estudios Internacionales. n.8, jan/mar 1975, 
pp. 106-36; MOURA,Gerson. "Brasil: uma nova politica latino- 
americana?". Brasil - Perspectivas Internacionais. ano III,
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As for the African continent, the need for new markets 
as well as the need for strengthening the relations with oil 
producing countries and the search for potential supporters 
for many political and economic demands on the international 
system led to the definitive abandoning of the full backing of 
Portugal's colonialism. In July 1974 Brazil recognized the 
Guinea-Bissau government, followed by the inauguration of 
diplomatic missions in Gabon, Sierra Leone, Mauritius and 
Guinea. In 1975 Brazil was the first country to recognize the 
Angolan government, besides having also recognized the 
government of Mozambique, Cape Verde and SAo Tom6 and 
Principe. In commercial terms it is worth noting that Afro- 
Brazilian trade increased by 500% between 1974 and 197861. 
Simultaneously Brazil sought to strengthen its contacts with 
Nigeria and Algeria, mainly due to the need for oil62.
n.7, mai/set 1975, PUC/RJ, pp.2-5; SILVEIRA, Antonio Azeredo 
da. "Brasil e a Am6rica Latina: interesses e divergfencias". 
Lecture delivered at Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 
4/03/75.
6,"Surto econdmico viabilizou diplomacia de Geisel", by 
Stanley Hilton. 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. July 22, 1979. For the 
volume of trade between the Brazil and Africa from 1964 to 
1979, see Table IV, Appendix II.
62For more information about Brazil's foreign policy 
towards Africa, see ABREU,Fernando J.M.de L'Evolution de la
Politique Africaine du Bresil. Memoire redige sous la
direction de M.le Professeur Georges Couffignal. University 
Pantheon Sorbonne (Paris I), novembre 1988; ANGLARILL, Nilda 
D. "Brazil's foreign policy toward black Africa". Revista de 
Estudios Internacionales. v.l, n.l, Spain, 1980, pp.93-106; 
DZIDZIENYO, Anani & TURNER,J.Michel. "African-Brazilian 
Relations: a reconsideration", in W.A.Selcher (ed) Brazil in 
the International System: the Rise of a Middle Power. Boulder, 
Colorado, Westview Press, 1981, pp.201-18; GRANDI,Jorge. 
op.cit., pp.252-64; GRANDSAIGNE, Jean de. "La Politique 
Exterieure du Bresil en Afrique Noire: essay de synthese". 
Tiers Monde: croissance, development, progress n.30, jan/mar 
1989. MARTINIERI, Guy. "La Politique Africaine du Bresil".
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The Middle East also had a special place in the new 
Brazilian stand on international affairs. The era of "the oil 
way of life" induced a remarkable redirection of Brazilian 
foreign policy. Brazil abandoned its even-handed position 
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, by reinforcing a more 
pro-Arab posture. The oil producing countries had already made 
it sufficiently clear to the importing countries that the 
guarantee of oil supply depended on the political stand 
towards this subject matter. Thus, besides the establishment 
of diplomatic relations with the Persian Gulf countries, 
Brazil re-stated its position in favor of Palestinian rights 
of self-determination and sovereignty63, though simultaneously 
recognizing Israeli rights to exist as a sovereign state64.
Problernes d'Ameriaue Latine (Notes et Etudes Documentairesl. 
Paris, v.48, n.4474, jul. 1978, pp.7-64; SELCHER,Wayne A.
Brazil's Multilateral Relations - between the first and the 
third worlds. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1978 and The 
Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Gainsville, 
Florida, University of Florida Press, 1974.
63BRASIL.MRE. Relat6rio. Departamento de Administragao, 
1974, p.79.
M0n this respect, it is worth mentioning the fact that 
the Brazilian decision predated the European Community's 
taking of the same stand by at least 3 years, when the 
European Council adopted a resolution recognizing the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, as well as the 
right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries (London, 29-30 June 1977). IFESTOS,Panayiotis.
European Political Cooperation - towards a framework ■
supranational diplomacy. Aldershot, Avebury, 1987, pp.418-59, 
p.441. As for more information about Brazilian foreign policy 
towards Middle East, see GRANDI,J. op.cit. pp.264-269; 
HARTOG,Carlos A.M. "0 Brasil e o Oriente M6dio", in Cadernos 
do IPRI# n.2, Brasilia, FundagSo Alexandre Gusmao, IPRI, 1989; 
LAFER,Celso. "Politica Exterior Brasileira - balangos e 
perspectives" in Dados - Revista de Cifencias Sociais. 22, 
1979, pp.49-64; NYROP,Richard (ed) Brazil - a country study. 
Washington D.C., Dept. Army, 1983; PERRY,W. op .cit.: 
SADKI,Florida. La Politique Arabe du Bresil. Ph.D.thesis, 
Paris III, 1983; SELCHER,W.A. "Brazil's Multilateral
i
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Likewise the existing low profile relations between 
Brazil and some European and Asian countries was the object of 
a deliberate revision, for which Brazil exchanged several high 
ranking visits. From then on Brazil sought to create a more 
regular and consistent pattern of relationship - mostly 
economic - with those countries. Japan and Western European 
countries were the main targets of this strategy65. The most 
significant political and economic step towards Europe, 
however, was the signature of the Nuclear Cooperation Treaty 
with West Germany in 197566. In summary, the so called 
"European option" undertaken by Geisel's government aimed at 
increasing "economic cooperation, access to sensitive 
technology in the nuclear and arms field and political support
Relations..", op.cit.: SILVEIRA, Antdnio F. Azeredo. "Politica 
Externa do Brasil". Lecture at Higher War College, September 
20, 1978, p.8; SCHNEIDER,R. "Brazil - Foreign Policy...."
op.cit.. For the volume of trade between the Brazil and Middle 
East from 1964 to 1979, see Table VI, Appendix I.
65These two regions have not received much attention from 
scholars of Brazilian foreign policy. For a discussion about 
Geisel's foreign policy towards Europe and Brazil-Asia
relationship in general, I suggest: GOES,Walder de. "Brasil se 
vuelve a Europa Occidental: perspectivas cambiantes". Wolf 
Grabendorff & Riordan Roett (eds). America Latina. Europa 
Occidental y Estados Unidos. Un nuevo tridngulo atlAntico?. 
Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1984; GOMES, 
Miriam S. A Opgao Europdia nos Marcos do Pragmatismo
RespQns6vel; a politica externa brasileira para palses.
europeus de 1974 a 1979. Masters thesis, Rio de Janeiro,
IRI/PUC, 1990 and SELCHER,W.A. "The Afro-Asian Dimension..."
op.cit.. For the volume of trade between the Brazil and 
Western Europe from 1964 to 1979, see Table III, Appendix II.
^For more information about Brazilian Nuclear Policy, see 
GRANDI,J. pp,cit,; LIMA,Maria R.S. de The Political Economy of 
Brazil Foreign Policy - Nuclear Energy. Trade and Itaipu. 
Ph.D. thesis, Nashville, Tenessee, Vanderbilt, august 1986; 
WROBEL,Paulo S. Brazil, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Latin 
America as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Ph.D. thesis, King's 
College, University of London, London, 1992.
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for its independent foreign policy"67.
As for the Asian countries, besides the important 
decision of recognizing the People's Republic of China in 
August 1974, the increase of trade with Japan should be noted. 
While during the period 1970-74 trade between the two 
countries reached the figure of US$753 million, between 1975- 
77 it was US$1,6 billion. Likewise Japanese investment in 
Brazil increased by US$500 million from 1974 to 197668.
Finally Brazilian policy towards Eastern Europe was the 
object of a significant improvement by strengthening 
diplomatic contacts and reinforcing the ongoing economic 
relations69, which were significantly stimulated by the period 
of detente70. Brazilian energy needs were also responsible for 
this* redirection on foreign policy71, as the purchase of 
Soviet diesel and crude oil, in addition to the use of Soviet 
turbines in Brazilian hydroelectric program, exemplified72.
67HURRELL, A. J. "The Quest for Autonomy...", op. cit. . 
p.232.
68"Surto econdmico viabilizou diplomacia de Geisel", by 
Stanley Hilton. 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. July 22, 1979. For the 
volume of trade between the Brazil and Asia from 1964 to 1979, 
see Table V, Appendix II.
wFor the volume of trade between the Brazil and Eastern 
Europe from 1964 to 1979, see Table VII, Appendix II.
70"A complicada aproximagao", VisSo, 24/02/75, pp.52-58.
7iHURRELL , A. J. "Brazil and the Third World...", op. cit..
p.49.
72HURRELL, A. J. "The Quest for Autonomy...", op. cit.. 
p.234.
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Likewise, it is worth noting the expansion of trade with 
Poland, with whom Brazil signed several trade agreements 
during Geisel'6 government73.
As for the multilateral aspects of "Responsible 
Pragmatism", I shall underline the main Brazilian proposal of 
contesting the freezing of international power and its 
frequent demands for a New International Economic Order, which 
Brazil did together with the Group of 77 in the United 
Nations. The Brazilian attitude in the multilateral fora was 
connected to an attempt to reinforce its need to participate 
more in the international system. In other words, by allying 
itself to other developing countries in the multilateral 
arenas, Brazil could guarantee support for its main demands 
regarding the international system such as a new international 
economic order, access to nuclear technology, revision of the 
UN Charter, control of population, etc74. Notwithstanding its 
combative posture in the international organizations - even 
adopting a strong Third World perspective -, Brazilian 
multilateral policy was also exercised to reinforce its 
position in bilateral relations with the developed 
countries75. In other words, multilateral diplomacy was often
73Idem, p.235-36.
74HURRELL,A. J. "Brazil and the Third World...", op ■ cit..
p. 34.
75SELCHER,W.A. "Brazil's Multilateral Relations...", 
op.cit..
137
used by Brazil "as an adjunct to its bilateral efforts"76.
Behind this policy and indeed as a way of implementing 
it, the new government had to make a significant shift in the 
emphasis on two features of the regime's doctrine, the 
binomial "security and development". From then on, as stated 
by Geisel himself, a "maximum possible development with 
minimum indispensable security"77 had to be pursued. As 
correctly noted by Nazario, the fulfillment of this objective 
was heavily dependent on the "capacity of the internal policy­
making structure of the Brazilian military to assimilate the 
necessary changes"78.
As mentioned in the last Chapter, the looseness of the 
NSD indeed allowed this kind of adaptation. By asserting that,
I
however, I am not claiming that there was not a significant j
; i
dispute regarding the quality and intensity of the change. In 
fact the decision to disengage Brazilian foreign policy from 
a rigid ideological stand met quite a lot of resistance from 
the more conservative supporters of the military regime, 
despite their recognition of the need for some changes so as 
to keep on the path towards economic development. By way of 
example, there were serious criticisms about what the
76HURRELL, A . J. "Brazil and the Third World...", op. cit.. 
p.104.
^"Diretrizes do Governo Geisel", President Ernesto 
Geisel's address to the first Cabinet Meeting, Brasilia, March 
19, 1974. BRASIL.MRE. "Resenha de Politica Exterior", n.I,
op.cit.. p.7.
78NAZARI0,0. op.cit. . p.20.
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conservative newspaper 0 Estado de S5o Paulo once termed 
"extremely pragmatic and excessively ecumenical attitudes"79.
In this sense, despite the nonexistence of actual 
external threats to the maintenance of the authoritarian 
military regime80, there was an important core of resistance 
among the hard-liners against the easing of the security 
aspect of the doctrine allegedly behind the foreign policy. 
Therefore a redirection of foreign policy strongly relied on 
the strength of Geisel's leadership and his abilities to deal 
with his constituencies. Due to the lack of debate on 
political issues beyond the decision arena, the analysis of 
the process of decision making is a crucial aspect to take 
into account.
4.Conclusion
In this chapter I aimed to portray the main aspects of 
the foreign policy of "Responsible Pragmatism". Moreover, I 
linked those aspects to major international issues, like
79"Nossa Perene Tradigao Diplomatics". 0 Estado de S5o 
Paulo. August 26, 1975.
“Olga Nazario points to the end of any real threat coming 
from the political situation of the neighboring countries to 
Brazil since the overthrow of Bolivian President Juan Jos6 
Torres in 1971 and of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 
1973, as well the emergence of anticommunist governments in 
the Southern Cone. NAZARIO,0. op.cit.. p.24-25.
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detente, oil crisis, recession, etc, to the extent that one 
can say that the change in Brazilian foreign policy was indeed 
a response to the new opportunities within the international 
system. However, that is not the same as saying that those 
developments are enough to explain the country's redirection 
on foreign policy81.
Indeed, what I have not scrutinized was the very fact 
that "any foreign policy change must overcome normal 
resistance in political, administrative, and personality 
structures and processes"82. As I have already stated, I do 
believe that to perform a change in the foreign policy course 
of any nation, some degree of action within the decision 
making process must be taken. Or since some degree of 
resistance within the government could be expected, "the 
presence of key individuals with the knowledge and the ability 
to circumvent normal (...) constraints"83, must also be taken 
into account.
81 In contrast to Holsti who considered a "foreign policy 
restructuring" to be when "governments seek to change, usually 
simultaneously, the total pattern of their external 
relations", I embrace a less radical viewpoint. Hence, as far 
as I am concerned, the attitudes taken during Geisel's 
government towards a less aligned relationship with 
Washington, as well as towards a less ideologized foreign 
policy regarding some Communist countries, such as the PRC, 
Guinea Bissau, Angola, etc., can indeed be considered a case 
of foreign policy restructuring. HOLSTI, K.J. "Restructuring 
Foreign Policy: a neglected phenomenon in foreign policy
theory", in K.J.Holsti (ed.) Whv Nations Realign. London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1982, pp.1-20, p.2.
82HERMANN,Charles F. "Changing Course: When Governments
Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy", International Studies 
Quarterly, March 1990, 34, 3, pp.3-21, p.8.
“idem, p.8.
In summary, although I regard the external and the 
internal environment as basic variables in the explanation of 
Geisel's foreign policy redirection84, I maintain that both 
had worked along with other source of foreign policy changes, 
e.g., the Geisel/Silveira partnership within the decision 
making arena. Therefore, although by taking those aspects into 
account I am regarding them as fundamental sources of 
explanation for the foreign policy contents of the period, it 
was within the process of decision making that these features 
could be actually converted into substantive attitudes.
Thus, in the following chapters I intend to demonstrate 
that, although the inter-bureaucratic dispute is not 
sufficient to explain foreign policy contents, it is indeed a 
necessary part of the explanation.
MFor an analysis of the Brazilian foreign policy 
redirection, particularly towards the Third World, as mainly 
determined by economic factors, see HURRELL,A.J. "Brazil and 
the Third World...", op.cit.. particularly chapter 2, pp.41- 
74.
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Appendix II 
(Table I)
Trade with the United States
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
1964/74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 1570 1802 2371 2605 3229 2940
Import 1878 4158 3618 2912 3250 3217
Source: Banco do Brasil-Cacex. Com6rcio Exterior, Exportayao# 
1976, 1978, 1979.
(Table II)
Trade with Latin America*
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
-
1964/74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 675 1685 1651 1890 1967 2579
Import 683 1023 1576 1925 1752 2242
Source: Banco do Brasil. Cacex. Com6rcio Exterior. Exportayao. 
1976, 1978, 1979.
♦Includes trade with LAFTA, Central American Common Market, 
Panama, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
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(Table III)
Trade with Western Europe
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
1964/74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 2666 4368 5526 6323 5339 5588
Import 2227 5234 4162 3599 3614 4067
1976, 1978, 1979.
(Table IV)
Trade with Africa 
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
1964/74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 159 538 493 650 715 651
Import 202 672 588 667 545 463
Source: Banco do Brasil. Cacex. Interc&mbio Comercial - 1953-
1976. vol.l, DEMAC/DIGRA, Agosto 1977; and Banco Central do 
Brasil. Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, vol.17, n.l, 
Janeiro 1981.
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(Table V)
Trade with Asia
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
1964/74
*
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 424 1192 1082 1449 1398 1591
Import 463 1644 1219 1126 1523 1512
Source: Banco do Brasil. Cacex. intercAmbio Comercial - 1953- 
1976. vol.l, DEMAC/DIGRA, Agosto 1977; and Banco Central do 
Brasil. Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, vol.17, n.l, 
Janeiro 1981.
* People's Republic of China and Oceania excluded.
(Table VI)
Trade with Middle East 
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
1964/74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 114 601 351 402 402 518
Import 545 3131 3926 3931 4131 5808
1976. vol.l, DEMAC/DIGRA, Agosto 1977; and Banco Central do 
Brasil. Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, vol.17, n.l, 
Janeiro 1981.
(Table VII)
Trade with Eastern Europe 
(US$ million/1979 constant prices)
1964/74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export 328 1027 1171 1042 820 976
Import 160 259 291 274 216 239
Source: Banco do Brasil. Cacex. JntefcAmbio Comercial - [933-
1976. vol.l, DEMAC/DIGRA, Agosto 1977; and Banco Central do 
Brasil. Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, vol.17, n.l, 
Janeiro 1981.
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Chapter IV
Brazilian policy towards Cuba <1964/1975)s a_sacred cow
This chapter aims to analyze Brazil's abstention in the 
vote on the lifting of sanctions against Cuba, during the XV 
and XVI Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers 
(Quito, November 1974 and San Jose, July 1975)*. I depart from 
the hypothesis that Brazil's final position did not denote 
compliance with the US stance on the subject; and that it was,/Jc 
thanks to Geisel and his Foreign Minister, that a milder 
position regarding the Castro regime could be adopted,
notwithstanding the opposition against it.
The need to review the argument that the Washington- 
Brasilia alliance was the major contributory factor in the 
explanation of the Brazilian decision is based on a single 
piece of evidence: in July 1975 Washington actually changed 
\ its position of hostili^iie^) towards Havana within the OAS by 
finally voting for a resolution aimed at normalizing relations 
between Cuba and the American continent. Nevertheless Brazil 
took a different stance, by abstaining in the vote. The 
analysis of the events related to Cuba during Geisel's
government demonstrates that the traditional Brazil-US
alliance was not strong enough to continue determining the
Brazilian position on this matter any longer. Likewise it
‘For the sake of clarity, a chronology of the chief events 
with a direct connection to Cuba is included at the end of 
this chapter (Appendix III).
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reaffirms the existence of indigenous aspects within Brazilian 
security concerns beyond those sponsored by Washington.
In addition, I intend to show why Brazil could not 
support the Cuban readmission to the inter-American system as 
a way to bolster the latter, since the reasoning for isolating 
Cuba in the early 60's had too much in common with the 
legitimacy and survival of Brazilian military regime. 
Nevertheless, despite not being able to avoid complying with 
the opposition from the more conservative elements of the 
government2, after all Cuba was still the "Achilles heel" of 
the military regime, Geisel and Silveira succeeded in taking 
a first step towards the normalization of relations with the 
Castro regime.
I will firstly address the main aspects of the Brazil- 
Cuba relationship within the inter-American system from 1959 
to 1964. Following that, I shall tackle this relationship 
during the military period. In the same section the role 
played by the Castro regime on Brazilian military ideology is 
assessed. A third section presents the new configuration of 
US-Latin America relations and its consequences for the
2In a report to a Senate Commission in 1979, Silveira 
stated that he had indeed tried to move towards the 
normalization of relations with Cuba, but pressures from the 
military against it were too high to be overcome. 
HURRELL,Andrew James. Brazil and the Third World - New 
Directions in Brazilian Foreign Policy. Masters thesis, 
St.Antony's College, University of Oxford, April 1982, p.89.
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assessment of the Castro regime in the outset of the 70's. In 
addition, this section also examines Cuban foreign policy at 
the time. The fourth section sets the scene for Geisel's 
stance towards Cuba, by scrutinizing Brazil's relationship 
within Latin America and with the United States. Following 
that a fifth section briefly summarizes the contemporary 
debate on Cuba within the inter-American system. Finally, the 
sixth section assess the several stages of the decision-making 
process which led Brazil to abstain in the vote on the lifting 
of sanctions.
1^Brazills_civilian governments assess the Castro regime
By and large, the civilian governments in Brazil 
between 1959 and 1964 (Juscelino Kubitschek, 1956-61; J&nio 
Quadros, 1961; and Joao Goulart, 1961-64) considered that 
the causes, not the consequences, of the political 
instability on the continent should be the main Latin American 
concern. As a result, those governments systematically 
opposed Washington's attempts to isolate and even to 
intervene in Cuba, by strongly supporting the principle of 
non-intervention as opposed to the notion of collective
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security as far as the Castro regime was concerned3.
3Since the beginning of the 20th century, when the 
Roosevelt corollary (1904), made the US interference in Latin 
American economy and politics almost legitimate, the Latin 
American countries underwent a fierce struggle to see the 
notion of non-intervention accepted as a precept of American 
international law. (McCALL,Richard. "From Monroe to Reagan: an 
overview of US-Latin American relations", in NEWFARMER,Richard 
(ed). From Gunboats to Diplomacy. Baltimore, The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1984, pp.15-34; MOLINEU,Harold. U.S.Policy
toward Latin America - from regionalism to. global ism. Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1986, p.15-19). Eventually, on the wave of 
president Franklin Roosevelt's (1933-1945) "Good Neighbor 
Diplomacy", the Seventh International Conference of American 
States (Montevideo, December 3-26, 1933), declared: "no state 
has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs 
of another" (Quoted by CONNELL-SMITH,Gordon. The Inter- 
American System. London, Oxford University Press, 1966. p.90). 
Three years later, during the Conference for the Maintenance 
of Peace (Buenos Aires, December 1-23, 1936), the precept was 
strengthened, despite having been attached to the first 
outlines of the principle of collective responsibility or 
collective security. In other words, notwithstanding the 
declaration considering intervention as "inadmissible", it was t 
suggested that depending on the case, a collective action from 
the American Republics could be recommended (CONNELL-SMITH,G. 
op.cit.. p.96-8). The outbreak of the Second World War and the 
US need to reinforce inter-American cooperation for 
strengthening the Western Hemisphere defence, led Washington 
to work towards the incorporation of the continent into its 
global strategy. Therefore, bilateral defence agreements 
between the US and some Latin American countries, of which 
those with Brazil and Mexico were the most meaningful, were 
signed (KRYZANEK, Michael J. U.S. - Latin American Relations. 
New York, Praeger, 1990, 2.ed., p.55). The end of the war and 
the emergence of the Communist threat over the Western 
Hemisphere led to the attempt to build up an inter-American 
defence system. The principle of collective security was then 
finally incorporated into the inter-American system, during 
the Inter-American Conference for the Consolidation of Peace 
and Security, (Rio, from August 15 to September 2, 1947).
There the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance 
(ITRA) was signed, stating in one of its most important 
articles that "an armed attack against an American state shall 
be considered an armed attack upon all, and each signatory 
undertakes to assist in meeting it by exercising the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" (CONNELL-SMITH,G. 
op.cit.f p.192). Subsequently, the Rio Treaty was reinforced 
by Military Assistant Programs signed between the majority of 
Latin American countries and the US from 1951 to 1958 (VARAS, 
Augusto. "Hemispheric Relations and Security Regimes in Latin 
America". VARAS, Augusto (ed). Hemispheric Security and U.S. 
Policy in Latin America. Boulder, Westview Press, 1989, pp.33-
However, whilst the Cuban revolution was used by 
Kubitschek to reinforce the reasoning behind Operation Pan 
America (Operagao Panamericana/OPA), the issue lacked the 
strength within his foreign policy framework, that it acquired 
in the following governments4. Indeed, it was only during the 
Quadros and Goulart governments that a policy towards Cuba 
which tried not to isolate the country from the rest of the 
continent, even exploring possibilities of reducing Cuban
65, p.48). Finally, the creation of the Organization of 
American States (1948), was sought to solve the stalemate 
resulted from the adoption of those two almost contradictory 
principles: nonintervention and collective security. In its 
Article 15 the OAS Charter restated the former principle, 
though adding a provision against the "collective 
intervention" which claimed that an intervention by any group 
of states should be opposed, unless that was done under the 
existing inter-American treaties, namely the Rio Treaty 
(CONNELL-SMITH,G. op.cit.. p.201-2). Altogether, the Rio 
Treaty - a hemispheric defensive alliance - and the OAS - a 
hemispheric institutional structure, provided the US with a 
military and a political mechanism for its global anti­
communist network.
4It is worth mentioning that the OPA had been proposed by 
Kubitschek in June 1958 as a program to ensure continental 
security by enhancing it economically. Furthermore the OPA 
connected the, political instability of the continent as a 
result of the underdeveloped conditions to the possibility of 
having the \Capitalist order subverted. Nevertheless, the 
proposal wasvy’initially ill-received by those supposed to 
guarantee its funding, namely the Eisenhower government (1954- 
60). Only later, when the counterinsurgency doctrine became 
the central US policy for Latin America, e.g, after the Castro 
regime became a real threat to US security, the Alliance for 
Progress, an initiative which contemplated some provisions 
present at the OPA proposal, was launched by president John 
Kennedy (1961-63), in March 1961. For an account of OPA, see 
SILVA,Alexandra de Mello e. "A Politica Externa de JK: 
Operagao Pan-Americana". Textos CPDOC. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, 
1992. And for the discussion on Cuba within the inter-American 
system during the sixties, see RABASA,Emilio O. "Cuba y el 
Sistema Interamericano - presencia de Mexico". Curso de 
Derecho Internacional. Washington, DC, Secretaria Geral 
0rganizaci6n de los Estados Americanos. 1986, pp.137-50.
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reliance upon the Soviet Union, was actually pursued5. It is 
worth noting that years later, Geisel's government would 
implement a similar rationale with regards to Angola. Turning 
back to the sixties, soon after the disclosure of the ill- 
fated US sponsored invasion of the Bay of Pigs (17-19 April 
1961 )6, Quadros condemned the attempt by asserting the 
principles of self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover he 
instructed the Brazilian representative to the UN to support 
a Mexican proposal calling upon the organization to 
investigate the episode7. Such a decision led the US 
government to ponder about punishing both countries through 
economic sanctions8.
Subsequently, at the VIII Meeting of Consultation of 
American Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este, January 22-31, 
1962) summoned to discuss the alleged Cuban violation of human 
rights and conducting of subversive activities on the 
continent, Brazil's main purpose was, according to the then 
Foreign Minister, to allow a Cuban return to the "democratic
5ROSENBAUN,H.Jon. "Brazil's Foreign Policy and Cuba". 
Inter-American Economic Affairs, v.23, n.3, Winter 1969,
pp.25-45, p.27-31.
6For an account of the episode see MORLEY,H. Morris. 
Imperial State and Revolution - the United States and Cuba, 
1952-1986. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987,, 
p. 135-46; and WYDEN,Peter. Bay of Pigs - the untold story. 
London, Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1979.
7STORRS,Keith L. Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy.
1961-1964 - background, tenets, linkage to domestic politics 
and aftermath. Ph.D. Thesis. Cornell University, January 1973, 
p.313.
fyORLEY,H.M. op.cit.. p.145.
149
American universe, by a natural evolution superior to 
political and ideological passions"9. In spite of Brazil's and 
other countries' efforts, Washington achieved all its goals 
against the Castro regime. In addition to the declaration 
stating that the principles of Marxism-Leninism were 
incompatible with those of the inter-American system which was 
unanimously approved, resolutions suspending trade in arms and 
instruments of war with Cuba, and expelling the Cuban 
government from the inter-American system, were also approved. 
Those two resolutions, however, were not supported by "the 
Six" - as the group of countries which opposed taking 
constraining measures against Havana was called (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico)-, who all 
abstained10. Despite this, Cuba was evicted from the OAS in 
February 14, 1962.
The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 19 62) provided some 
foundation to the thesis that Cuba represented a threat to the 
Western Hemisphere11. Thus when the OAS voted for a resolution 
supporting measures to secure the withdrawal of Soviet 
missiles from the island, the majority of Latin Americans gave 
full support to a possible armed intervention in Havana.
9DANTAS,San Thiago. Politica Externa Independente. Rio de 
Janeiro, Ed.Civilizagao Brasileira, 1962, pp.196-7, quoted by 
ROSENBAUN,H.J. "Brazil's Foreign...", op.cit. p.34.
,0CONNELL-SMITH,G. op.cit. . p. 178.
nFor an account of the episode, see ALLISON,Graham T. 
Essence of Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971; and 
DINERSTEIN,Herbert S. The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 
1962. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
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Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia however, still regarding the non­
intervention principle as a central inter-American precept, 
declared that the support for the withdrawal of Soviet 
missiles should not be taken to justify an armed attack 
against Cuba12.
Eventually, in December 1963 Venezuela appealed to the 
OAS Permanent Council against what she described as Cuban 
intervention and aggression, by means of supplying arms to 
Venezuelan terrorists13. The Goulart government supported the 
calling of a Meeting of Consultation and also the 
establishment of an Investigation Committee. The final 
Brazilian stance on the subject, however, would only be taken 
in July 1964 (XIX Meeting of Consultation), when the country, 
already under a military rule, became one of the most 
reliable, and perhaps also the most consistent, United States' 
ally in Latin America as far as Cuba was concerned.
As put by Parakala, while the civilian governments had 
used "their support to Cuba in order to assert their 
independence from and opposition to the United States and to 
emphasize the newly articulated Independent Foreign Policy"; 
the "military government, in contrast, used its opposition to 
the Castro regime to demonstrate its threat perception on the 
one hand, and to underline its ideological community with the
l2CONNELL-SMITH,G. op.cit. . p.32; M0RLEY,H.M. op.cit. .
p.186; and ST0RRS,K. op.cit.. p.337-8.
13CONNELL-SMITH,G. op.cit. . p. 185.
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United States on the other"14.
Although there are elements from other areas which 
perhaps could help to explain Brazil's fierce opposition 
towards Cuba post-1964, the actual core of Brazilian stance 
was, indisputably, of an ideological nature15. Thus, I shall 
point to the links between Brazilian military ideology and 
that of the US security policy towards the Western Hemisphere 
in correlation with the Cuban revolution (1959). By so doing
I intend to gather the elements so as, later on, to 
demonstrate why the continuous opposition to Cuba was a 
crucial factor in Brazilian foreign policy and, moreover, in
14PARAKALA, Prabhakar. Military Regimes. Security 
Doctrines, and Foreign Policy: Brazil. Indonesia_and Ghana. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics, London, 
1991, p.74.
15According to William Perry, it seems that Brazil's 
increasing sugar sales to the United States, after Cuba's US 
sugar quota was set at zero (December 1960), could have 
reinforced Brazil's ideological and security concerns, since 
a rehabilitation of Castro regime could have resulted in 
problems for Brazil in maintaining this important part of the 
international market for sugar. (PERRY,William. Contemporary 
Brazilian Foreign Policy: the international strategy of an 
emerging power. Foreign Policy Papers,6, London, SAGE 
Publications, 1976, p.48). In addition it is worth noting that 
the US had deliberately used the product as a bargaining tool 
with the sugar exporting countries. When the US government was 
still planning to launch a Cuban boycott, in early 1960, a 
State Department official, Douglas Dillon, suggested that the 
way to keep Latin American countries in line would be "payment 
of generous above-world-market prices for regional sugar 
imports, and consideration of increased economic assistance to 
the hemisphere". (M0RLEY,H.M. op.cit.. p.121-2). Note that 
during the government of Juscelino Kubitschek when Brazil was 
still sponsoring a mild stance with regards the Cuban 
revolution, Brazil had shown considerable interest in 
substituting Cuban sugar for the US market. 
(QUINTANEIRO,Tania. Cuba e Brasil: da Revolugao ao Golpe
11959t1964)___ uma interpretagSo sobre a politica externa
independente. Belo Horizonte, Editora UFMG, 1988, p.27-8).
the consistency of the military regime's outlook.
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2.The Brazilian military regime and the Cuban factor
Due to the US fears of having a repeat of the Cuban 
example on the continent, the emphasis on the internal threat 
to Latin American political stability was reinforced. In other 
words, the Cuban revolution bolstered the view that the Latin 
Americans should take care of their domestic political and 
social order, whilst the US Armed Forces would be in charge of 
the continental defense, as part of the broad idea of Western 
Hemisphere security, developed by the US since the 1930s. In 
this- sense, the Castro regime's support for revolutionary 
movements abroad was of great value in legitimizing US 
strategy. As a result Washington provided extended military 
aid to Latin America which was very much directed to fight 
internal subversion16. In addition, Washington launched the 
Alliance for Progress program (March 1961) in order to attack 
the underdeveloped conditions from which a revolutionary
16US military assistance to the region grew from U$65.58 
million per year between 1953-61 to U$172.3 million per year 
between 1961-64. M0LINEU,H. op.cit.. p.29. The US government 
also established a program of assistance and training to the 
military and police officers throughout Latin America. 
MORLEY,H .M . op.cit.. p.134.
movement could grow17. Nevertheless, this program, which 
intended to tackle underdevelopment in order to guarantee 
internal order and stability was gradually giving priority to 
security matters, as opposed to economic and social 
questions18.
By and large, those aspects helped to give the Latin 
American military forces the strength to stage coups, since 
the US commissioned the military class to execute the 
counterinsurgency policy, as well as providing the military 
with the instruments for its accomplishment19. In so doing, 
the counterinsurgency theory that made the combat against 
Communism a domestic issue, put the opposition to Castro's 
foreign policy for the continent at a much higher level of 
importance within the Latin American and Brazilian military 
dogma.
In addition, the Brazilian doctrine had as one of its 
basic concepts the idea of "ideological frontiers" as a 
complement to "territorial frontiers". By pointing to the
,7For an account of the Alliance for Progress, see 
SCHEMANN,Ronald L. (ed.) The Alliance for Progress - a 
retrospective. New York, Praeger, 1988.
l8MOURA,Gerson. Estados Unidos e America Latina. SSo 
Paulo, Ed. Contexto, 1990, p.56.
,9Argentinean non-support for the US position during the 
VIII Meeting of Consultation (Punta del Este, 1962) was, 
according to Connell-Smith, "a main factor in Frondizi's 
removal by military coup not long afterwards", CONNELL- 
SMITH, G. op.cit.. p.29. Likewise, Goulart's position towards 
the issue was also a strong point in justifying military 
intervention in Brazilian politics.
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existence of an ideological border separating the pro- 
Capitalist and pro-Communist countries, the concept of 
"ideological frontiers" was a crucial element of the regime's 
ideology, since the need for a defensive reaction against the 
international Communism was one of the raisons d'etre for the 
coup, according to its own makers20. In so doing, as Hurrell 
put it, the "notion of 'ideological frontiers' became the 
rationale for Brazil's advocacy of a permanent Latin American 
collective security system which would be able to override 
traditional notion of non-intervention and territorial 
integrity"21. In addition, according to the geopolitical 
aspects of the NSD, Brazilian geographical position should 
also determine Brazil's belonging to the Western bloc22. As 
president Castello Branco claimed, "the current Brazilian 
situation coincides with the wishes for Continental peace, and 
with'the collective security precepts, the latter so much a US 
responsibility"23. The dispatch of Brazilian troops to Santo
20LIMA, Maria Regina S.de Th§ Political Economy of
Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy. Trade and Itaipu. 
Ph.D.thesis, Nashville, Tenessee, Vanderbilt, August 1986,
p. 16.
2IHURRELL, Andrew James. The Quest for Autonomy: The
Evolution,of Brazil's Role in the International System. 1964- 
1985. Ph.D.Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986, p. 69.
22SILVA,Golbery do Couto e. Geopolitica do Brasil. Rio de 
Janeiro, Livraria Jos6 Olympio Editora, 1967, pp.95-138.
^BRASIL.MRE.Departamento de Administragao. A Diplomacia 
da Revolugao Brasileira (discurso de Sua Excelencia o Senhor 
Presidente da Reptiblica Marechal Humberto de Alencar Castello 
Branco no Pal6cio do Itamaraty). Divisao de Documentagao. 
Segao de Publicagdes. 1964. p.11. My translation.
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Domingo (1965)24, and the support for the creation of a 
permanent Inter-American Force were part of the same 
rationale, which claimed the political stability of Latin 
American continent against the International Communist 
Movement25.
However, before the association between the US security 
policy towards Latin America and the main aspects of Brazilian 
military doctrine leads to the conclusion that the latter was 
nothing else than a dependent variable of the former, I have 
to emphasize one point in addition to the previously outlined 
indigenous components of the NSD26. Considering the prior 
significance of Latin America as far as Brazilian security was 
concerned, "where the geographical proximity increases the 
impact of other countries' domestic political process on the 
Brazilian territory"27, Brazil's policy towards the region 
should not be regarded as purely determined by US interests. 
As correctly stressed by Lima, "such conduct responded rather
24It is worth noting that by sending contingents to the 
Dominican Republic, Brazil was helping US to disguise its 
actual unilateral intervention which had been launched before 
the formation of the Inter-American Peace Force under the 
auspices of the OAS. For an account of Brazilian participation 
in the episode see DULLES,John W.F.President Castello Branco 
- Brazilian reformer. College Station, Texas, A&M University 
Press, 1980, p.139; and CASTELO BRANCO,Carlos. Os Militares no 
Poder. v.l, Rio de Janeiro, Ed.Nova Fronteira, 1976, p.238-42.
25MOURA,Gerson. "Brasil-Cuba: enfim, o reatamento". Brasil 
- Perspectivas Internacionais. ano II, n.10, abr/jun 1986, 
PUC/RJ, pp.1-4, p.l
26See Chapter II.
27LIMA,M.R.S.de. "The Political Economy..." op.cit.. 
p.124.
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to the definitions of security of the military establishment 
and to a sort of survival instinct in view of the potential 
domestic political consequences of changes in the correlation 
of forces in the regional context, rather than either to a 
delegation of power from the United States or to the logic of 
expansion of transnational capital, albeit, in the final 
analysis, both state and corporate interests would benefit 
from such behavior"28.
Hence, based on the OAS Investigating Committee's full 
substantiation of Venezuelan charges against Cuba29, Brazil 
broke off diplomatic relations with Havana (May 13, 1964),
alleging among other reasons, that Cuba was attempting to 
export its revolution to other countries in the hemisphere30. 
In so doing, Brazil joined the group of 13 Latin American 
countries to sever diplomatic relations with the Castro regime 
- Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
Subsequently, during the IX Meeting of Consultation of 
American Foreign Ministers (Washington, July 21-26, 1964) - 
following the reports of the OAS Committee giving evidence of 
Cuba's sending of arms, training guerrillas, and seeking to
28Idem, p. 15.
^CONNELL-SMITH,G. op.cit.. p.185.
30BRASIL.MRE. Textos e Declaragoes sobre Politica Externa 
(de abril de 1964 a abril de 19651. 1965, p.50-51.
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overthrow the Venezuelan government31 -, Brazil reaffirmed its 
opposition against Castro, by supporting the resolution which 
imposed suspension of diplomatic and economic relations with 
Cuba. Moreover, Brazil proposed a Declaration expressing the 
hope that the Cuban people would free themselves from the 
tyranny of the Communist regime32. As for the so called group 
of "Six", only Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay opposed the 
resolution. Argentina, for instance, by this time under the 
moderate administration of Arturo Ilia (1963-66), though not 
sponsoring a strong pro-sanctions stance - she actually 
abstained - also joined the anti-Castro chain.
Later, between 1967-72, when the Brazilian military 
regime had to face revolutionary warfare and internal 
terrorism, supported - or just inspired - by the Cuban 
regime33, the rationale for advocating the isolation of Cuba 
became even more legitimate, as far as the ruling elite was 
concerned. Indeed, throughout those years Brazil backed all 
resolutions making the Cuban economic blockade more effective, 
to say nothing about its struggle to implement an inter- 
American crusade against "subversion" and "terrorism", both 
through OAS mechanisms, and bilaterally34.
3IRABASA,E. op.cit.. p. 141-2.
32STORRS,K.L. op.cit. . p.416.
33For an account of Brazilian armed struggle against the 
military regime, see QUARTIM,Joao. Dictatorship and Armed 
Struggle in Brazil. London, NLB, 1971, pp. 137-209.
^The efforts to exclude the right of "political asylum" 
from those who had been caught in subversive or terrorist 
actions, as well as the agreements signed with other
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The outset of the 70's, however, brought a new mood in 
international politics, with direct consequences for the 
assessment of the Cuban regime by the Latin Americans. The 
combination of variables involving the United States, Latin 
America and Cuba produced new prospects regarding the 
isolation of the Castro regime from the inter-American system. 
It is hard to present those events in a chronological or 
cause-effect sequence. Despite the fact that some events had 
indeed triggered others, they occurred almost simultaneously. 
Hence what follows should not be seen as an action-reaction 
chain of events. Rather, it should be seen as a selection of 
the main events which eventually led the majority of American 
Republics to face the Cuban issue from a more pragmatic 
viewpoint. However, as I shall demonstrate later on, as far as 
Brazil was concerned, this new international scenario was not 
enough to change its fierce opposition to the Castro regime.
3.The requirements for a reversal
The increasing US involvement with Southeast Asian and
conservative Latin American countries to combat terrorism in 
the continent date from the beginning of the 70s. LIMA,Maria 
Regina S. de. "As Relagoes Econdmicas e Politicas do Brasil 
com a America Latina: balango de uma ddcada". Paper delivered 
at the Conference Oportunidades e Limites da Sociedade 
Industrial Perifdrica: o caso do Brasil. Stanford-Berkeley 
Joint Center for Latin American Studies/IUPERJ, Nova Friburgo, 
18-20/07/83.
Middle Eastern affairs, as well as the policy of detente 
towards China and the USSR, led Washington to adopt a low 
profile policy towards Latin America. Following the end of the 
Alliance for Progress (1969), President Richard Nixon (1969-r 
74) plans to allegedly improve the US-Latin America
relationship were a far cry from Latin American aims. Indeed 
those plans were not only considerably distant from Latin 
American demands for improvements in US trade policy and 
foreign assistance programs, which had been formulated during 
a special conference in Vifia del Mar in early 1969; but, also 
from the suggestions made by Nixon's own special
representative to the region, Nelson Rockfeller35. As a 
result, the attitudes of defiance towards the US from the more 
progressive Latin American governments became stronger.
In fact, in the early 70's a nationalist upsurge 
epitomized by the governments of Jos6 Torres (1970-71) in 
Bolivia, Salvador Allende (1970-73) in Chile, Guillermo 
Rodriguez Lara (1972-78) in Ecuador, and Juan Velasco Alvarado 
(1969-75) in Peru spread over Latin America. As a result, a 
more autonomous foreign policy towards the US was adopted by 
those governments. By way of example, expropriations of US- 
owned properties and challenges to American capital
operations, such as the Peruvian decision to nationalize a
35For more details about the gap between the Latin
American requirements and Rockfeller's report ("Quality of 
Life in the Americas") and the actual proposition made by 
president Nixon, see SCHMITT,Karl M. "The United States and 
Latin America" in GRAY,Robert C & MICHALAK, Jr., Stanley J. 
American Foreign Policy since Detente. New York, Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1984, pp.114-147, p.118-20.
160
Standard Oil affiliate, to say nothing about Chile's various 
attitudes of defiance towards the US were carried out36. 
Nevertheless, "from the imperial state's vantage point, 
regional modifications in trade and industrialization were 
tolerable. But (...) a shift toward autonomy from the United 
States (...) was far less tolerable"37. In those cases, 
"covert actions and subversion to facilitate the 
disintegration of hostile regimes" were pursued38. The 
overthrow of Allende in September 1973 being the most obvious 
and successful example39.
Hence, expressing Washington's requirements of 
committing more attention to what was considered more 
important issues as far as US national interests were 
concerned, during the Nixon years Latin American issues were 
put in second place unless they touched upon the East-West 
conflict40. Indeed, the so-called Nixon Doctrine was based on
36SKIDMORE, Thomas & SMITH, Peter H. Modern Latin America. 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, 2ed., p.131 and 212; 
and FRANCIS,Michael J. "United States Policy toward Latin 
America during the Kissinger Years", in MARTZ, John D. (ed). 
United States policy in Latin America - a quarter century of 
crisis and challenge. 1961-1986. Lincoln, University of 
Nebraska Press, 1988, 28-60, p.42-54.
37MORLEY,H.M . op.cit. . p.246.
38Idem, p.244.
39For an account of US participation on Allende's 
overthrow, see FRANCIS,M.J. op.cit.. pp.42-50; PETRAS,James & 
MORLEY,Morris. The United States and Chile - imperialism and 
the overthrow of the Allende government. New York, Monthly 
Review Press, 1975; and SCHMITT,K.M. op.cit.. pp. 121-24.
40As Michael Francis recalls, "If a matter was perceived 
as having no East-West aspects or serious domestic political 
implications, it was handled within the foreign policy
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the central theme that Mthe United States will participate in 
the defense and development of allies and friends, but that 
America cannot - and will not - conceive all the plans, design 
all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all 
the defense of the free world. We will help where it makes a 
real difference and is considered in our interest"41. As put 
by the first State of the World message of the Nixon 
Administration, "We are not involved in the world because we 
have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. 
Our interests must shape our commitments rather than the other 
way around"42.
The seventies also gave rise to important alterations 
as far as Cuban foreign policy was concerned. Cuban support 
for revolutionary movements in Latin America, which had been 
an important element of Castro's foreign policy since the
bureaucracy (largely by the Department of State) (...). If 
somehow the issue had Cold War or domestic political 
significance, it received the attention of Kissinger and 
Nixon, and they were willing to play very rough (as in the 
case of Chile) or make substantial concessions (as in Panama), 
depending on what action they thought would be most effective. 
But in the cases in this second category, the goal of good 
relations with Latin American countries was not highly valued 
- the stakes were the competition with the Soviet Union and 
the political future of the Republican administration, and in 
these situations the sensibilities and sovereignty of the 
Latin American states were of little concern to the White 
House". FRANCIS,M.J. op.cit.. p.29.
41US PRESIDENT. US Foreign Policy for the 1970s; A New 
Strategy for Peace. 18 February 1970, p.5, quoted by LITWAK, 
Robert S. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine - American Foreign 
Policy and the Pursuit of Stability. 1969-1976. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.122-23.
42Pepartment of State Bulletin. LXVIII, N.1762, 2 April 
1973, p.395, quoted by LITWAK, R.S. op.cit.. p.85.
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inauguration of the regime43, was being gradually replaced by 
state-to-state relations44. By this time Africa and Indochina 
were Cuba's primary targets45. In addition, Castro was also 
determined to improve his relations with the USSR, which was 
at odds with former Cuban policy towards Latin America46. 
Concurrently, the new stance of some Latin American countries 
in their relationship with the US contributed to the 
implementation of a different pattern of relations with Cuba. 
From Castro's vantage point as long as those countries were 
prepared to pursue an anti-imperialist stance, Cuba could 
develop many forms of cooperation. As stated by Castro himself 
during his visit to Chile in November 1971, "We subordinate 
whatever other difference or whatever other problem exists 
[between Cuba and other governments] to the fundamental one: 
defiance of the dictates of the United States"47.
The combination of those factors created a "diplomatic 
space" for Cuba and Latin America to reexamine their
43Cuba had indeed supported by different means the 
potential focus for revolution in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Venezuela, among 
other countries. DOMINGUEZ,Jorge I. To Make a World Safe for
R.eVQlUtjpn - Cuba's foreign policy. Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1989, p.113-20.
“BRENMER,Philip. From Confrontation to Negotiation - U.S. 
relations with Cuba. Boulder, Colorado. Westview Press, 1988. 
p.17.
45DOMINGUEZ,J.I. op.cit. . p. 114.
46SMITH,Wayne. "Castro, Latin America, and the United
States", in MARTZ,J.D. op.cit.. pp.288-306, p.292-93.
47Quoted by DOMINGUEZ,J. I. op.cit. . p.225.
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relationship48. As a consequence, from 1969 to 1973 a 
significant improvement in Cuban economic and political 
relations with Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela, to say 
nothing of the Caribbean countries, was achieved49. Yet, as 
far as the inter-American system was concerned, the necessary 
majority to normalize relations with Havana was still missing. 
According to the Rio Treaty procedures, the lifting of 
sanctions against Cuba could only be implemented by the 
favorable vote of a two thirds majority of the American 
Republics50. The combination of those two aspects, e.g, the 
improvement of relations between some Latin American countries 
with Cuba and the maintenance of the continental condemnation 
of the Castro regime, was the breach of the ever-praised 
though not always actual - inter-American unity and ( 
solidarity.
Eventually a movement towards the improvement, (if 
normalization was too strong a description), of the 
Washington-Havana relationship was finally launched. Following 
a period when Nixon's particularly emotional stance against 
Castro was a trademark of US foreign policy towards Cuba51, 
and the negotiations over Cienfuegos harbor52, a slightly more 
positive relationship between the two countries was pursued.
48Idem, ibidem.
49Idem, p.224-26.
50MORLEY,H.M. op.cit. . p.249.
51 Idem, p.247-49; and FRANCIS,M.J. op.cit. . p.35.
52FRANCIS,M. J. op.cit. . p.35-36.
The signature of an important US-Cuba anti-hijacking agreement 
dates from March 1973. Subsequently, when president Gerald 
Ford came to power in August 1974, a move towards bringing 
detente to Latin America was finally made. In September the US 
government agreed to support a Colombian request for a Meeting 
of Consultation to discuss the Cuban issue. Moreover, 
President Ford was reported to have said that the US would 
abide by the majority decision within the inter-American 
system53.
Within this frame, Brazil's position, then under the 
Medici government (1969-74), was quite distinctive. On the one 
hand, by opposing any measure which could lead to Cuban 
readmission to the inter-American system, Brazil was complying 
with strong internal opposition to the Castro regime, 
basically sponsored by the more conservative military and 
particularly by those working in the security agencies who 
still saw the latter as a perpetrator of subversion in the 
continent54. Brazil could still count on Washington's 
opposition to Castro - albeit milder from 1973 - and on its 
rightwing continental fellows who, at this time, used to 
reinforce one another's conservative stances. By adopting such 
a policy, Brazil also guaranteed a safe-distance from the more 
progressive governments of Argentina, Chile, Peru, etc. On the
53MORLEY,H.M. oo.cit. . p.251.
^LIMA,Maria Regina S. de & MOURA,Gerson. "A Trajetdria do 
Pragmatismo - uma anfilise da politica externa brasileira". 
D adosRe v i s t a  de Ciencias Sociais. Rio de Janeiro, v.3, 
n.25, 1982, pp.349-63, p.360
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other hand, by doing so Brazil continued to be seen as playing 
the role of a US surrogate. Yet, this position was not as 
profitable as it used to be a couple of years before, both 
from the perspective of Brazilian interests regarding the 
issues under discussion by the international community, such 
as population growth, international trade, sea limits, 
environment, etc, about which Brazilian interests were far 
from US concerns55; and from the perspective of Brazil's 
increasing isolation from its neighbors and from other less 
developed countries. Nevertheless Brazilian opposition towards 
the Castro regime was of such intensity that even when 
Washington seemed to be prepared to lift the prohibition over 
US multinationals to negotiate with Cuba through their foreign 
subsidiaries, Brazil expressed its reservations to the 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger56.
Regarding Brazil's stance towards the US, four years of 
the Nixon administration with its low profile foreign policy 
towards Latin America and, moreover, of evidence that the US
55MARTINS,Carlos Estevam. "A Evolugao da Politica Externa 
Brasileira na DScada 64/74". Estudos CEBRAP.. N.12, 
abr/mai/jun 1975, PP.55-98, p.88.
56When Henry Kissinger told Brazilian Foreign Minister, 
M&rio Gibson Barboza, that the US was prepared to make some 
modifications in US licensing procedures (December 
1973/January 1974), the latter expressed Brazil's disagreement 
with the US viewpoint, by calling his attention to the 
possible consequences of such a decision for the fulfillment 
of the trade embargo against Cuba. Confidential sources. 
Eventually, in April 1974, Washington issued a license to the 
three US subsidiaries - Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler - 
to make a deal, mainly due to Washington's aim of preserving 
a good relationship with Buenos Aires. MORLEY,H.M. op.cit. 
p.275.
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did not retain the position of world hegemony any longer57, 
led the government to rethink its unconditional alliance. In 
addition, the oil crisis, and the increasing isolation within 
the continent, also helped to convince Brazilian decision 
makers that a significant shift in Brazilian priorities had to 
be made. A policy of diversification from the old partnerships 
should be pursued, both in relation to the First and the Third 
World. Regarding Latin America in particular, a policy of 
rapprochement ought to be formulated.
It is to Geisel's government and its assessment of this 
question that I shall now turn. I shall examine the new 
administration's view on the Brazilian-Latin American 
relationship, both from the perspective of state-to-state 
relations and from the perspective of the inter-American 
system. Further, I shall examine Brazil-US relationship within 
this period of peculiar adjustment of interests both from the 
US and from Latin Americans. Having analyzed those aspects, I 
will then assess Brazil's position towards Cuba's readmission 
to the OAS during the Quito and San Jose conferences.
57I had better qualify this statement. There is no doubt 
that Washington still had the capacity to influence the 
behavior of other states, particularly those which were 
traditionally in the US sphere as was the case of the Latin 
American countries. However, as put by Joseph Nye, "To 
understand what is changing, we must distinguish power over 
others from power over outcomes. What we are experiencing is 
not so much an erosion of our power resources compared to 
those of other countries (although there has been some), but 
an erosion of our power to control outcomes in the 
international system as whole". Joseph S.Nye, "American Power 
and Foreign Policy", New York Times. 7 July, 1976, quoted by 
LITWAK,R. op.cit.. p.75.
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4.Setting the scene for Geisel's stance towards Cuba
4.1.Brazil-Latin America
The improvement of relationships within Latin America 
was a strong point of Geisel's foreign policy58. Indeed, the 
choice of Azeredo da Silveira as Foreign Minister was, among 
other reasons, due to his experience with continental 
issues59. There are obvious reasons for such an interest in 
the continent. Geographically there is the fact that Brazil 
shares its borders with no less than 10 countries (ie, all 
except for Ecuador and Chile). Nevertheless, it was mainly due 
to the new government's intentions to expand its horizontal 
relations, especially concerning the diversification and 
expansion of Brazilian trade and energy suppliers, which 
actually counted as a source of Brazil's special concern for 
the continent60. As a result, Brazilian exports to and imports
58In Azeredo da Silveira words, "Our foreign policy aim is 
to harmonize Brazilian national interests (...) firstly with 
Brazil's neighbors". BRASIL.MRE. Broadcasted speech, 28/03/74. 
Resenha de Politics Exterior do Brasil, n.l, mar/abr/jun. 
1974, p.23. My translation.
59A former Ambassador to Buenos Aires (1969-74), Silveira 
had ALSO been delegate to CEPAL, OAS, and to several Latin 
American meetings like those held by the River Plate Basin 
countries.
“For an account of Geisel's foreign policy towards Latin 
America see, BOND, Robert D. "Venezuela, Brazil and the Amazon 
Basis". Qrbifi., v.22, n.3, pp.635-650 and "Brazil's relations 
with the Northern Tier Countries of South America", in 
W.A.Selcher (ed) "Brazil in the International..." op.cit.. p. 
123-41; SILVEIRA, Antonio Azeredo da. "0 Brasil em face da 
America Latina". Resenha de Politica Exterior do Brasil, ano 
II, n.6, 1975, p. 7-13; SILVEIRA, Antonio Azeredo da. "Brasil 
e a America Latina: interesses e divergSncias". Lecture
delivered at Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 4/03/75;
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from the Latin American Free Trade Association countries 
increased 206% and 307% in 1975 and 1979, respectively61* 
Regarding energy issues, I shall mention the signature of the 
Agreement on Industrial Trade Complementation with Bolivia 
(May 1974), which led to the sale of 240 million cubic feet 
per day of natural gas to Brazil62; and the improvements made 
on the Itaipu Dam project signed with Paraguay in April 
197363. In addition, it is worth mentioning the increase of 
contacts with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia, who 
respectively could provide Brazil with oil (both Venezuela and 
Ecuador), copper and coal in exchange for trade and technical 
cooperation64.
The political aspects behind Brazilian policy towards
JAGUARIBE,H61io. "El Brasil y la America Latina". Estudios 
Internacionalesr n.8, jan/mar 1975, pp. 106-36; CAMARGO,S.de 
& OCAMPO,J.M.V. op.cit.. pp. 70-85; and COSTA,Gino. The 
Foreign Policy of Brazil towards her South American Neighbors
during the Geisel and Figueiredo AdMinistrations. Ph.D.
Thesis, Queen's College, Cambridge, March 1987; and 
MOURA,Gerson. "Brasil: uma nova politica latino-americana?". 
Brasil - Perspectivas Internacionais. ano III, n.7, mai/set 
1985, PUC/RJ, pp.2-5.
61 BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL. Boletim do Banco Central do 
Brasil. Departamento Econdmico, Brasilia, vol.17, n.l, 
Jan.1981, p.186-87 and 190-91.
62MONETA, Carlos J. & WICHMANN,Rolf. "Brazil and the 
Southern Cone". in SELCHER,Wayne A. Brazil in the 
International System: the rise of a middle power. Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, pp.143-80, p.161.
63For an account of the whole process of negotiation 
around the dam, which also involved Argentina, see 
LIMA,M.R.S.de "The Political Economy...", op.cit.. p.348-408.
“NAZARIO, Olga. Pragmatism in Brazilian Foreign Policy; 
the Geisel years. 1974-1979. Coral Gables, Florida, University 
of Miami, Ph.D.thesis, may 1983, p.55.
the continent are also important. Geisel's administration 
sought to implement a more cooperative pattern of 
relationships within the region in order to break Brazilian 
isolation. The latter was the result of the Brazilian free­
rider stance, due to its high economic performance in the 
early 70's - known as the period of the "Economic Miracle"65. 
By way of example, in 1974 Brazil alone constituted 32.4% of 
Latin America's economic product66.
Yet, at the beginning of his administration, Geisel 
kept the same rationale as his predecessor who used to 
emphasize bilateral rather than multilateral contacts. In 
H61io Jaguaribe words, "regarding Latin American countries, 
Brazil had few to profit from, due to their similar or 
inferior economic and technological levels, which led the 
country to keep a strictly bilateral pattern of relationships, 
correct, but not too close, because a more effective 
multilateral pattern of relationships would impose, in the 
name of regional solidarity, duties on the country without 
profitable compensations"67. Indeed with regard to the OAS, 
for instance, few subjects attracted strong Brazilian 
participation. According to Selcher, Brazil used to see the
65LIMA,M.R.S.de. "As Relagoes Econfimicas. . ." op.cit. .
^orld Bank, World Bank Atlas. 1976, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank, 1977, quoted by SELCHER, Wayne A. Brazil's 
Multilateral Relations - between the First and the Third 
Worlds. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1978, p.245.
67JAGUARIBE, H£lio. Brasil: Crise e Alternatives,
Ed.Zahar, 1974, p.116, quoted by MARTINS,C.E. op■cit.. p.91. 
My translation.
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OAS "as an institutionalized multilateral channel for 
discussion and informational exchange, which provides dialogue 
opportunities but does not constitute a major podium"68.
Such a policy would be gradually abandoned throughout 
Geisel's administration, as several attitudes exemplified. 
Amongst them the signature of a constitutive covenant of the 
Latin American Economic System (Sistema Econdmico Latino 
Americano/SELA), which intended to create a regional trade 
alliance autonomous from the US69. In addition, the signature 
of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty in 1978, demonstrated 
Brazil's will to take part into the coordinated development of 
the eight countries bordering the Amazon River basin70.
4.2.Brazil—US
Brazil was not an exception in Washington's dismissive 
stance towards Latin America, notwithstanding the US having 
chosen the country for special treatment under the Nixon
68SELCHER,W. "Brazil's Multilateral...", op.cit.. p.249.
wIt is true that in the beginning Brazil tried to
undermine the creation of the System. (BAILY,Samuel. The 
United States and the Development of South America. 1945-1975. 
New York, New Viewpoints, 1976, p.156). By finally agreeing 
with its creation, however, Brazil supported an important 
Latin American initiative.
70BOND,R.D. op.cit. p. 130-33.
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Doctrine71. In addition, the relationship between the two 
countries was being aggravated by quite a lot of specific 
problems. By way of example, in July 1974 Washington decided 
not to guarantee processing nuclear fuel for the Brazilian 
reactors under construction by Westinghouse. Considering the 
oil crisis, US decision was "a hard blow to a country seeking 
to expand its nuclear capacity as a substitutive for high 
priced-oil"72, to say nothing of the wider discussion on the 
First World criteria of reliability. Likewise, the Washington- 
Brasilia relationship was also under stress due to the US 
protectionist policy against Brazilian policy of subsidies to 
exports73.
Indeed, Brazil's aims to enlarge its political and 
economic influence in Latin America in particular, and in the 
Third World in general, required the country's disengagement 
from the framework of the Nixon Doctrine. As long as Brazil 
complied with the US view on encouraging "emerging power 
centers" that shared fundamental interests with Washington, as 
part of the latter's rationale of relying on regional powers 
out of its preferential areas of interest to look after 
Western interests, the country had also to cope with the 
drawbacks of being "perceived as a preferential ally of the
7,For an analysis of the rhetorical benefits and the 
actual costs which stemmed from the alleged special place 
Brazil had within the Nixon Doctrine, see HURRELL,A .J. "The 
Quest for...", op.cit., p.165-69.
72FISHLOW, Albert. "Brazil: the case of the missing
relationship", in NEWFARMER,R. op.cit.. p.147-61, p.149.
73Idem, ibidem.
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United States and a mere surrogate of the metropolis' goals in 
those areas"74. That is the reason why since the beginning of 
Geisel's government it was stressed that Brazil was prepared 
to fight for its own interests even if they were contradictory 
to Western objectives, which obviously meant, US interests. In 
Azeredo da Silveira's words, "Brazil will not ally itself to 
interests that do not represent Brazil's own interests (...) 
We have enormous Western affinities, and those must be 
enlarged, but, they will always be so, always, as a result of 
a Brazilian national decision"75.
It is within this framework that the discussion about 
the lifting of sanctions against Cuba emerged in the first 
year of Geisel's government. During the second meeting 
gathering Latin American representatives to discuss with Henry 
Kissinger the means to create a new pattern of relationship 
between them (Washington, April, 1974)76, the Cuban question
74LIMA,M.R. S .de. "The Political Economy...", op.cit., 
p. 15. It is well known the strong negative impact Nixon's 
remarks that "as Brazil goes, so will go also the rest of the 
Latin American continent", during president M6dici visit to 
Washington in December 1971. Quoted by PERRY,William, op.cit.. 
p. 53.
75SILVE IRA, Antonio Azeredo da. Broadcasted speech,
28/03/74. Resenha de Politica Exterior do Brasil, n.l,
mar/abr/jun. 1974, p.24. My translation.
76The first meeting had been held in Tlatelolco, Mexico 
(February, 1974). This initiative became known as the "New 
Dialogue" which although able to stimulate the works on the 
reorganization of the Inter-American system, and to raise 
important aspects of the US-Latin America relationship, did 
not go so far as to reach any solution for the latter. 
Following the adoption of the Trade Reform Act by the Ford 
government (1974-76), in December 1974, which by increasing US 
protectionism directly affected Latin American exports, all 
Latin American countries suspended talks as a protest against
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was raised and a resolution proposing consultations about the 
issue was approved by consensus. It was expected that the 
question would be actually discussed only in Buenos Aires in 
March 1975, after the consultations had been made. 
Nevertheless, the movement in favor of the normalization of 
relations with Cuba, along with the need to reorganize the 
inter-American system, speeded up the events.
As I shall demonstrate, the consecutive XV and the XVI 
Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American 
Republics, respectively in Quito and in San Jose, approached 
the question in distinct ways. While at Quito a 
straightforward action towards the lifting of sanctions was, 
without success, attempted, later, at San Jose, the strategy 
was to separate the discussions on the reform of the Rio 
Treaty (in order to make it more in line with the new 
international political configuration of the continent) from 
the discussions about the Cuban embargo. The analysis of those 
events will give special attention to Brazil's stance.
what they considered "discriminatory" provisions in favor of 
the developing countries. For an account of this initiative, 
see STEPHANSKY,Ben S. " 'New Dialogue' on Latin America: the 
cost of policy neglect". HELLMAN,Ronald & ROSENBAUN,H.Jon 
(eds) Latin America; the search for a New International Role. 
New York, Sage Publications, 1975, pp.153-66.
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5 . Cuba and the Inter-American system - defining means and-finfla
It is hard to distinguish what were the means and what 
was the end as far as the debate on the Cuban readmission to 
the inter-American system and the reorganization of the latter 
were concerned. Talking about the XV Meeting of Consultation 
(Quito, 1974) which had been called only to discuss Cuban 
readmission to the system, Costa Rican Foreign Minister, 
Gonzalo Facio, stressed that the major aim of the conference 
was "to save the Rio Treaty"77. The reason for this confusion 
was the disregard for the mandatory resolution of the IX 
Meeting of Consultation (1964) imposing economic and 
diplomatic embargo on Cuba78, which led to discrediting the 
instrument used to enforce the hemisphere solidarity, namely 
the Rio Treaty. Theoretically the lifting of the embargo 
should be agreed on by at least a two thirds majority of the 
American Republics, since it had been implemented according to 
Article 17 of the ITRA. Therefore, it was necessary to take 
some steps either to reformulate the rules in order to 
legitimate the breach, ex post facto; or, conversely, to get 
the majority of the states to vote in favor of the readmission
^"Facio quer conciliagao". Jornal do Brasil. 10/11/74
78By 1974, when the XV Meeting was called, seven countries 
had in distinct ways and with different levels of intensity 
normalized their relations with the Castro regime - Argentina, 
Panama, Peru, Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad Tobago -, 
besides Mexico who had never actually broken relations with 
Cuba. In addition, at least other 4 countries had already 
given signs that they were also prepared to restore diplomatic 
relations with Cuba - Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Ecuador.
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of Cuba to restore the integrity of the law. Regardless of the 
course finally taken, preserving the inter-American system, 
and moreover the Rio Treaty, was an imperative.
The first of Washington's attempts to probe Brasilia's 
position about Cuban readmission to the system date from the 
arrangements for the Tlatelolco Conference (February, 1974) 
between Latin American representatives and Henry Kissinger, 
coinciding with M6dici's last month of government. Whereas 
Washington was interested in probing Latin America's position 
due to the positive domestic atmosphere in the US towards the 
normalization of relations with Havana79, the M6dici 
government's opposition to any change of policy regarding the 
issue, and the imminent change of government, led Brazil to 
avoid discussing the question80.
Regarding the position of the incoming government, I 
should mention that Cuban issue had been discussed by Geisel 
and Azeredo da Silveira during their meeting to outline the 
new government's foreign policy. Then, Argentinean 
requirements for exporting products from US subsidiaries to
^ORLEY,H.M. op.cit.. p.279-85; and BRENMER,P. op.cit.
p. 18.
“"Niet Cuba". Veja. 20/02/74, p.24; and RAMOS,Ana Tereza 
L. Cronoloqia da Polltica Externa do Brasil. IRI/PUC-RJ, 1985, 
mimeo, no page. It is worth mentioning, however, that as far 
as the Inter-American system strength was concerned and, 
moreover, the US-Latin America relationship, Brazil adopted a 
much more cooperative posture. As long as the Cuban issue 
stayed out of the negotiations, the M6dici government was 
ready to collaborate in the success of the "New Dialogue". 
Confidential sources.
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Cuba had been examined. In comparison to M6dici's opposition 
to the deal81, Geisel agreed with Silveira about Washington's 
lack of right to intervene in the question - an aspect pointed 
out by Silveira as evidence of the similarity of opinions on 
foreign policy between the president and himself82.
Geisel's positive stance towards Argentinean exports to 
Cuba, could be seen as a governmental move towards the 
normalization of trade relations with Havana. However, as the 
preparations for summoning the XV Meeting of Consultation will 
show us, the improvement of Latin American relations with the 
Castro regime did not move the Brazilian ruling class to do 
the same. Geisel's stance on the multinationals issue can 
therefore be interpreted as a personal position towards a 
rapprochement to Havana, and a governmental stance against US 
interference in domestic affairs.
In April 1974 Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela 
addressed a resolution to the Permanent Council of the OAS 
proposing the calling of a Meeting of Consultation to vote on 
the lifting of sanctions against Cuba83. A Commission had to
8,See footnote n.56.
82Interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Maria Regina 
S.Lima and Monica Hirst. Rio, 15/5/79, and 7/06/79.
MIt is interesting to note that the same country which 
had triggered the movement towards the embargo against Cuba in 
the sixties, e.g, Venezuela, was then, under the rule of 
President Rafael Caldera (1970-74), adopting a foreign policy 
towards Central American and Caribbean countries based on the 
so called "ideological pluralism". VIDIGAL, Armando A.F. 
"Brasil-Cuba: uma an&lise polltico-estrat6gica". Polltica e 
Estrat6gia. vol.Ill, n.2, abr-jun. 1985, pp. 167-188, p.178.
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be firstly formed to evaluate the conditions of the 
international political system which had led to the sanctions 
in 1964, to check whether the latter were still the same so as 
to justify the maintenance of the embargo. The immediate 
Brazilian reaction was to issue a note arguing that the 
Commission should not take into account the new international 
situation, but rather the elements which indeed had justified 
the embargo, e.g. the external behavior of the country in 
question84. In so doing, Brazil managed to introduce the 
principle of non-intervention as a requirement for the 
reexamination of the issue.
It is worth stressing the difference between the 
Brazilian and the majority assessment of the question in Latin 
America. Whilst the latter examined the question from the 
perspective of the collective security precept in correlation 
with the Cold War, and therefore had to be re-interpreted in 
line with detente; Brazil turned back to the non-intervention 
principle - viewing Cuba as an interventionist country -, 
precisely because the new international configuration and its 
consequences for the principle of collective security no 
longer met the requirements of the Brazilian military regime. 
For reasons I will discuss later on, it was imperative to keep 
Brazilian opposition towards the Castro regime. It did not 
really matter that Brazil was perhaps the least vulnerable 
country to outside interference from the continent. What
"0 Brasil e a questao cubana". 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. 
19/09/74; and SELCHER,W. "Brazil Multilateral...", op.cit.. 
p.253.
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really mattered was that, since the international environment 
of detente tended to play down the image of Cuba as a threat 
to the continent, e.g, as an issue to be discussed through the 
principle of collective security, Brazil turned back to the 
principle of non-intervention as a way to keep up its 
opposition to Cuba's readmission to the inter-American system.
In so doing Brazil gave clear evidence of its 
subsequent position. By initially supporting the summoning of 
the Meeting, it intended to demonstrate its solidarity towards 
Latin America. On the other hand, it did so by presenting a 
demand which, supposedly, would make it more difficult for any 
other country which might have had problems with Cuban 
interventionism to vote in favor of the sanctions lifting, 
especially considering the fact that, officially, Castro had 
not eliminated the aim of exporting of revolution from his 
foreign policy. Nevertheless, since the contemporary Latin 
American inclination to normalize relations with Havana was 
less bound by historical reasons, than by a clear-cut 
political wish to bring detente into the continent, the 
Brazilian strategy of introducing the criterion of non- 
intervention to assess the Cuban embargo, was in fact a cover j; 
for its own position.
Eventually in mid-september the Permanent Council voted 
unanimously for the XV Meeting of Consultation to be held in 
Quito on November 1974. Then came the phase of Brazilian 
decision makers pondering the alternatives involved.
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6-t The process,of... decision-making
6.1 Brazil identifies and weighs its alternatives (XV Meeting 
of Consultation.)
Geisel's government had to think through several issues 
in order to reach its decision. Among the most important were: 
the US and the Latin American position; Brazilian economic 
interests; and Brazilian military view on the subject.
As far as the US was concerned, it is important to 
analyze the statement made by president Ford saying that 
Washington was planning to abide by the majority decision85, 
since it had adopted a position of not influencing the other 
OAS members. Thus exempting itself from pointing the way to be 
taken, Washington put Brazil in a delicate situation. During 
the preliminary conversations between Geisel and Silveira, it 
was settled that from then on Brazil would no longer play the
role of the Latin American leader in a anti-Cuban chain. In
. r ^Silveira^words, if the US intended to condemn Cuba, they 
should do so by themselves, and not through the Brazilian 
delegation86. The only reason for Brazil not completely 
changing its policy towards the Castro regime, was due, 
according to Silveira, to the Brazilian commitment to some of
Corley,h.m. op.cit.. p.251.
“interview with Azeredo da Silveira, by Maria Regina S. 
de Lima and Monica Hirst. Rio, 18/05/79. CPDOC.
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its Latin American neighbors87. By doing so, Brazil was trying 
to escape from the uncomfortable position of being a US 
instrument in the maintenance of Cuban isolation. 
Nevertheless, if Washington really was prepared to follow the 
main trend, and if Brazil, in its turn, had commitments that 
did not allow it to do the same, in the end Brazil would 
retain its image of an important link in the anti-Castro 
chain.
the Castro regime and the Brazilian aim to improve its links 
with the region, Brazil had to be aware of the effects of its 
stance on its continental fellows.
countries were those who had the most determined position
towards the lifting of sanctions. Or, , towards the \fi
restoration of the integrity of inter-American system and the 
efficacy of the Rio Treaty, as long as they were the most 
vulnerable countries in the continent. Notwithstanding 
Geisel's plans to cultivate better relations with Latin 
America, Brazil still kept a low profile as far as Central 
America and the Caribbean region was concerned88. As for
88For a general account of the Brazil-Caribbean and 
Brazil-Central American relationships, see HIRST,Monica. Q 
Brasil e o Caribe: os primeiros passos de aproximagao. Paper 
delivered to the Conference "America Latina e o Caribe". 
Bogota, Associacion Nacional de Instituiciones Financeiras de 
Colombia, 27-28 Maio 1982; and CAMARGO,Sonia de. "0 Brasil em 
face da America Central e do Caribe - a hist6ria de uma
Hence, considering the new Latin American mood towards
Along with Colombia and Venezuela, the Central American
87 Idem.
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Mexico, in particular, with whom it had always been important 
to cultivate a cordial relationship, there was nothing 
innovative in its position towards Cuba. Mexico was the only 
Latin American that never broke off relations with Havana. 
Notwithstanding Brazil's fierce opposition to Castro after 
1964, Brazil-Mexico relations had never really been harmed as 
a result of this difference, perhaps because although Cuba had 
a particular role in Mexican foreign policy, the latter was 
related to Mexico's relationship with the US, rather than with 
Latin America.
Otherwise, those South American countries sponsoring 
the end of the embargo, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, 
to name the most prominent, had a strong effect on Brazilian 
foreign policy. However, although Brazil had interests in 
maintaining cordial relations with all of them, the bilateral 
contacts of the time were still able to hold a good 
relationship. Hence, although such a unified policy could be 
very profitable as far as avoiding Brazilian isolation was 
concerned, its absence did not seem to add any extra 
constraint to Brazil's relationship with those countries.
Conversely, those countries defending the maintenance 
of the sanctions - Bolivia, Chile89, Paraguay, and Uruguay -
aus6ncia". Polltica e Estrat6gia. vol.Ill, n.2, abr-jun. 1985, 
pp.231-45.
89Then under the government of general Augusto Pinochet 
(1973-90) who broke off relations with Havana soon after he 
seized power (September, 1973).
182
were for many reasons at the top of the Brazilian list of 
interests. Besides having similar conservative military 
regimes - with the exception of Uruguay whose government 
despite its extreme conservatism was civilian -, those 
countries had significant economic links with Brazil90. As 
mentioned above, the commitment to these countries "whose 
cooperation and solidarity Brazil needed"91, was considered a 
strong point of Geisel's policy towards Cuba. In addition, 
Brazilian concern about Southern Cone security and, the 
historical competition between Brazil and Argentina in the 
influence over the River Plate Basin countries - Bolivia,
^Bolivia - who in the end also abstained from voting - 
was one of the largest beneficiaries of Brazilian aid in Latin 
America, and therefore the government in power (Colonel Hugo 
Banzer, 1971-78) was very much pro-Brazilian - President 
Banzer was almost deposed when he considered selling more 
Bolivian oil and natural gas to Argentina rather than to 
Brazil. Furthermore, in May 1974 Brasilia and La Paz signed an 
agreement envisaging the construction of a massive pipeline 
that would carry natural gas to Sao Paulo. (FERGUSON,Yale H. 
"Trends in Inter-American Relations: 1972-mid-1974",.
HELLMAN,Ronald G. & ROSENBAUM,H.Jon. (eds). op.cit.. pp.1-24, 
p.7). Chile, by its turn, had strong connections with the 
Brazilian arms industry. (NAZARI0,0. "Pragmatism..." op.cit.. 
p.53). As for Paraguay, the agreement towards the construction 
of the world's largest hydroelectric plan on the Parand River, 
had an important role in the Brazilian appraisal. (NAZARI0,0. 
"Pragmatism..." op.cit.. p.50 and FERGUSON,Y.H. op.cit. p.7). 
Finally, whilst Brazilian trade with Uruguay was not only high 
but also very steady, with the other three countries there was 
a significant upward mobility (between 1970 and 1975 
Paraguayan, Bolivian and Chilean imports from Brazil 
increased, respectively from 6,1% to 16,3%; 6,1% to 17,0%; and 
3,1% to 5,3%, of their total imports). (International Monetary 
Fund, Direction of Trade Annual. 1968-72 and 1971-77. quoted 
by LIMA,M.R.S.de. "Relagoes Econdmicas e...." op.cit.).
91 Interview with Azeredo da Silveira, by Maria Regina S.de 
Lima and Monica Hirst. Rio, 18/05/79. CPDOC.
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Paraguay and Uruguay92 -, where both countries moved on a 
pattern of balance of power politics, was still a point to 
stimulate Brazilian solidarity with them as opposed to 
Argentinean support for Cuban readmission.
Regarding the broader issue of strengthening the inter- 
American system, Geisel's government could rely on the 
peculiarity of the situation. As long as the proposal to end 
the embargo against Cuba meant to restore the continental 
unity with a strategy of making the majority of the countries 
join together with those who had sponsored an "illegalM stance 
- e.g., those who had disobeyed the inter-American resolution 
-, rather than by enforcing the rule or even by punishing the 
"outlaws”, Brazil could rest comfortably knowing that it had 
always been a straight follower of the system's regulation.
Purely economic reasons, or rather, the lack of them, 
also played a role as far as Brazil's stance was concerned. By 
and large, Brazil had almost nothing to gain economically from 
a change in its position towards Cuba93. When the lifting of 
sanctions was discussed in Quito, the international market for
92LIMA,M.R. S .de. "The Political Economy..." op. cit.. 
p.356-77; and JAGUARIBE,H61io. "Brasil-Argentina: Breve
An£lisis de las Relaciones de Conflicto y Cooperacidn". 
Estudos Internacionales. n.15, January/March 1982, pp.9-27.
93Even before Brazil had joined the American Republics on 
the economic embargo against Cuba the rate of Brazil-Cuba 
trade was very low and intermittent. VASCONCELOS,L.L. "Urn 
repasse sobre as relagoes Brasil-Cuba". Contexto 
Internacional. v.13, n.2, julho/dezembro 1991, PU/RJ, pp.187- 
203, p.191.
184
sugar was very good. Thus, as some OAS analysts were reported 
to have said, the lifting of sanctions, would not cause any 
significant alteration in the international market. The 
consumers would benefit from the increased competition, and 
the producers could also count on the consumption increase at 
the time to leave their quotas untouched94. It is in this 
sense that the president of Brazilian Sugar and Alcohol 
Institute, general Alvaro Tavares do Carmo, declared that he 
did not see any lasting damage to Brazilian sugar trade if the 
OAS approved the lifting of sanctions against Cuba95.
Yet, if Brazil did not have anything to lose, it seemed 
that it did not have anything to gain either, since the 
economies of Brazil and Cuba were not yet complementary, but 
still competitive. Hence, whilst the economic aspects 
constituted a factor in the reinforcement of the position 
regarding, for example, the restoration of diplomatic 
relations with Beijing, they did not play any role as far as 
Havana was concerned. It is worth recalling an episode 
involving the president of the Brazilian Exporters 
Association, Giulite Coutinho, who would take part, even if 
marginally, in the game that eventually led to the restoration 
of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China 
(PRC)96. Following the Argentinean decision to export products
^•'Havana, urn fraco mercado". 0 Estado de S5o Paulo.
10/11/74.
95"Brasil, Cuba e o agOcar". Visao. 23/09/74, p. 15.
%See Chapter V.
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from US subsidiaries to Cuba, and the subsequent US 
permission, Coutinho was reported to have said that Brazilian 
entrepreneurs were interested in normalizing relations with 
Havana. Contrary to what eventually happened regarding his 
comments on the Chinese market, his statements on Cuba did not 
get any positive response from the Brazilian ruling elite. On 
the contrary, the then Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
Severo Gomes, stated that Coutinho's declarations expressed 
solely a personal opinion97.
Regarding this, Nazario argues that "resumption of 
relations with Cuba (...) was rejected by the military regime 
on grounds that the socialist island did not offer either the 
energy resources or the substantial markets needed by Brazil, 
two considerations which had gone far to ease the concern of 
military hardliners over ideological issues"98. Indeed 
ideology was the first and decisive aspect in justifying the 
decision not to vote for the lifting of the sanctions. As 
claimed by Souto Maior, "the continuing lack of relations with 
Cuba embodied the most evident concession made by the foreign 
policy area to a domestic policy injunction"99. And that leads 
us to the examination of the military view on the subject, an
97"Cuba continua fora dos pianos oficiais". 0 Estado de 
Sao Paulo. 14/05/74.
98NAZARI0,01ga. "Brazil's Rapprochement with Cuba: the 
process and the prospects". Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs, v.28, n.3, Fall 1986, pp.67-86, p.67.
"SOUTO MAIOR, Luiz A.P. "0 ' Pragma t i smo Res pons A v e l . in 
60 Anos de Polltica Externa Brasileira. Programa de Relagfies 
Internacionais, USP/IPRI, p.27. Forthcoming. Emphasis added. 
My translation.
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issue of crucial importance to be considered by President 
Geisel.
I have already stressed the significance of the 
National Security Doctrine as far as the appraisal of the 
Castro regime is concerned. The vote in favor of the lifting 
of sanctions would give the Castro regime a certificate of 
good behavior, to the extent that it would nullify the reasons 
why the embargo had been implemented in 1964, e.g., the Cuban 
policy of interventionism. Hence this vote could lead to a 
debate about some important aspects of Brazilian military 
doctrine, such as the "revolutionary warfare" and the 
"ideological frontiers" concepts. Although decisions such as 
the restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC would do 
a good job in reducing the importance of "anti-Communism" as 
a basis for the military regime, a too sympathetic stance 
towards the Castro regime would probably increase the level of 
controversy regarding Geisel's "pragmatic" foreign policy. 
Indeed, contrary to the Chinese case, the Cuban threat was 
more associated with the disruption of the regime from within 
due to the larger number of people who took up arms against 
the dictatorship belonged to groups identified with the Cuban 
regime. In addition, as long as the resumption of diplomatic 
relations with Beijing turned out to be less simple than 
imagined, due to the "unexpected" military resistance100, the 
strong opposition against the Castro regime along with the 
scant advantageous from a rapprochement, seemed not to
,00See Chapter V.
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recommend to provoke the regime supporters with another 
dissatisfaction. At the end of the day, as put by one of 
Silveira's advisers, "the Cuban question was not sufficiently 
important to justify the work necessary in convincing the 
opponents"101.
Moreover, in Lima's words whilst for global issues 
"Brazilian behavior could be ruled by pragmatic realism in the 
defense of the interests of the state", since they did not put 
"the political survival of the regime (...) at stake", there 
was "a clearcut reason so as to explain why this postulate 
[e.g., the ideological frontiers concept] kept on being 
applied for Latin American countries (...). in Latin America, 
where the geographical proximity increases the impact of other 
countries' domestic political processes on the Brazilian 
territory, the policy of 'ideological frontiers' appeared to 
be a more effective way of maintaining the political- 
ideological equilibrium of the region"102. Hence, President 
Geisel could not disregard the anti-Castro stance as an 
important element in legitimizing Brazilian military rule when 
weighing the alternatives at stake. Likewise the importance 
for the military in Brazil of cultivating a pattern of 
solidarity with other military regimes in the continent as a 
means of giving one another a sort of legitimacy should also 
be appraised.
101 Interview with Luiz Augusto Souto Maior, former Head of
Minister Azeredo da Silveira cabinet. Rio, 5/12/91.
102LIMA,M.R. S. "The Political Economy...", op.cit.. p. 124.
188
Having examined all those aspects, I shall move on to 
the actual stage when the decision was finally taken.
6.2.Not much to choose
In the days before the Quito Meeting, some newspapers 
speculated on the likely position to be taken by the Brazilian 
delegation103. By and large the expectations were for a 
Brazilian abstention, which in the end proved to be correct. 
Yet, the available data suggests that, notwithstanding 
abstention being the most likely and even expected position, 
this decision was the product of a cautious reflection within 
the decision arena.
The main rationale behind the view which favored the 
lifting of sanctions was to avoid Brazil's isolation within 
the OAS, a position very much in harmony with the new foreign 
policy towards Latin America, sponsored by Geisel and his 
Foreign Minister. In addition, this stance was also based on 
the need to strengthen the inter-American system. Last, but 
not least, this position faced the rationale of the Castro 
regime itself of decreasing its potential threat in exchange
i°3..Brasil se abstem e nSo vai reatar". O Estado de S5o 
EaillQ, 18/10/74; "Cuba", Jornal do Brasil. 24/10/74; "Cuba na 
pauta de Geisel e Silveira", O Estado de Sao Paulo. 29/10/74.
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for more cordial state-to-state relationship.
Conversely those who were against the end of the 
embargo were guided by matters of national security. Or, 
rather, by a certain view about it. According to the Brazilian 
Constitution of 1967 and the Constitutional Amendments of 
1969, the concept of national security was associated with the 
military regime's concerns about internal subversion. That was 
opposed to the previous Constitutional text of 1946 where the 
concept of national security was basically related to foreign 
aggression104. As pointed out by Alves, the Constitution of 
1967 "changed this definition to conform to the Doctrine of 
Internal Security with its theory of psychological warfare and 
the enemy within",05. Needless to say that those alterations
were made during a period when the military security and
intelligence community was very powerful within the 
government. Hence, the opposition to any sympathetic attitude 
towards Cuba was mainly based on the role played by the former 
Cuban support for Latin American revolutionary movements on 
the legitimization of Brazilian military regime. In spite of
the lack of evidence that Havana still supported this policy
for the continent, the essence of internal security in the 
regime's doctrine was too strong to allow a more flexible
,04See BRASIL. ConstituigSo. Constituigao da Repfiblica 
Federativa do Brasil. (1967). 7a ed. Brasilia, Senado Federal, 
Subsecretaria de Edigoes T6cnicas. Margo 1982, p.82-2; 
BRASIL.Constituigao. Constituigao da Repftblica Federativa do 
Brasil - Ouadro Comparativo. Brasilia, Senado Federal, 
Subsecretaria de Edigoes T6cnicas. 1991, p.282-87; and 
ALVES,M.H.M. op.cit.. p.77.
I05ALVES,M.H.M. o p .cit. . p.77.
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position towards Cuba.
Analyzing Brazilian foreign policy under the military 
regime, Lima argued that the dismissive US stand towards Latin 
America and the presence of non-friendly neighbors in the 
continent led the armed forces to perceive the need to 
strengthen the country's military and industrial capabilities 
for the regime survival106. I would like to add that, 
likewise, part of the ruling elite perceived that it was also 
necessary to keep one of its most traditional enemies as such 
so as to protect the whole military ideology. In other words, 
Cuba became a useful icon for the regime's endurance. 
Therefore, notwithstanding Geisel's intention to decrease the 
strength of the hardliners within the government107, the 
belief in a Cuban threat to the continent, particularly held 
by the intelligence community as a legitimizing force for the 
existence of the military regime, was still too strong to be 
simply ignored. In fact, by drawing an analogy to Arno Mayer's 
conclusions about the relationship of domestic crisis and 
foreign war in Europe since 1870, "this over-reaction [towards 
the Castro regime] was anchored in, collaborated with, 
energized by, and ultimately benefitted the established ruling 
classes, interest, and institutions"108.
106LIMA,M.R.S.de. "As Relagoes econdmicas. .." op.cit..
107See Chapter III.
108MAYER, Arno J. "Internal Crisis and War since 1870". in 
BERTRAND,Charles L. (ed). Situations Revolutionaires en
ELurPpe,-- 1917-1922; Allemagne, Italie. Autriche-Hongrie.
Montreal, Centre Interuniversitaire d'Etudes Europeennes, 
1977, pp. 201-38, p.202.
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Finally, the remarkable military presence in the 
Brazilian representation to the OAS gives little room for 
doubting that within the Organization the Cuban issue was 
handled by ideological rather than by pragmatic reasons. 
According to the January 1975 OAS Directory from a staff of 
22, the Brazilian delegation had 11 military officers and 
three attaches, some of them assigning the OAS work with the 
Joint Brazil-US Military Commission, the Brazilian Purchasing 
Commission, and the Inter-American Defense Board"109.
Eventually a compromise was produced: abstention and 
explanation of vote. The process leading to this outcome is 
hard to reconstruct. Although having had access to the 
testimonies of several key actors who took part in the 
process, the delicacy of the issue seems to have blurred their 
version of the facts. Still, it is possible to sketch a 
tentative scenario about what actually happened.
According to one of Silveira's closest advisers, there
109SELCHER,W. "Brazil's Multilateral...", op.cit.. p. 249. 
The significance of the Inter-American Defense Board in 
enhancing Brazilian military attachment to the protection of 
the continent against Communist aggression should be 
pinpointed. The Board had been established by the III Meeting 
of Cpnsultation (Rio de Janeiro 15-28 January 1942), in order
"to study and recommend to the American governments measures 
necessary for the defence of the continent". (CONNELL-SMITH,G. 
op.cit.. p. 121). Moreover, its aim was "to give the Latin 
Americans a sense of participation in a joint effort [along 
with Washington] to ensure the security of the hemisphere" 
(Idem/ p.122). Hence, due to the Doctrine intimate connections 
with the US security policy for Latin America; and as long as 
the NSD still was the main guideline for Brazilian ruling 
elite, particularly for the military, the outstanding presence 
of military men within the OAS had contributed remarkably to 
the maintenance of Brazilian opposition to Cuban readmission.
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was a strong inclination towards voting for the lifting of 
sanctions within the Itamaraty110. Likewise, there is 
information about a similar stance advocated by part of the 
ruling elite, Geisel included111. Indeed, Geisel supported a 
position that could soften - but not exactly obliterate - the 
opposition to Cuba, due to his belief that, as a result, a 
decrease of Cuban interventionist policy would follow112. In 
spite of this favorable atmosphere, it has already been stated 
that a change on the assessment of the Cuban issue was not 
considered profitable enough, considering the likely damages 
the latter could cause for the implementation of the whole 
policy of Responsible Pragmatism. Indeed, according to a top 
diplomat in Silveira's cabinet, issues like the recognition of 
the PRC, and the approach to the former Portuguese colonies 
such as Angola, were the highest priorities in respect of 
which the sacrifice of a possible change towards Cuba was 
justified113.
Hence, the position in favor of the lifting of 
sanctions which was about to be taken, was replaced by a vote 
for abstention, following the advice of the Head of the
,,0Interview with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, General 
Secretary of Itamaraty under Azeredo da Silveira. Rio, 
12/11/91.
m G6ES,Walder de. 0 Brasil do General Geisel - estudo do 
processo de tomada de decisSo no regime militar burocr&tico. 
Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1978, p.38-9.
112Interview with Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti, former sub­
head of Azeredo da Silveira's cabinet. SSo Paulo, 14/02/92.
113Confidential source.
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Military Staff, General Hugo de Abreu114. The argument then 
presented to Geisel was, in Abreu's own words, that "to the 
extent that the subject was not of real interest for the 
country, Brazil need not remain in favor of the maintenance of 
the embargo, but on the other hand there was no good reason 
for antagonizing the dominant military opinion, which I knew 
would be against any sympathetic attitude towards Cuba"115. 
Indeed, still according to his testimony, the National 
Security Council, through its General Secretariat, issued a 
report against the end of the embargo, based on the "internal 
opinion of the country" (sic)116. Translating this statement 
from the military jargon, it meant the opinion of the military 
class.
Abreu's interference leads us to conclude that, on this 
occasion the ultimate decision was in the military class' 
hands. Nevertheless, two crucial aspects should not be 
forgotten. Firstly that the very fact that made Geisel abstain 
as opposed to his alleged pro-lifting stance, was the question
that he, as well as Silveira, were prepared to compromise with I
i
the regime's more conservative wing regarding Cuba, for the 
sake of his most ambitious and likely more politically and 
economically profitable plans towards the PRC and Angola. And, 
secondly, that the maintenance of the abstention when the
ll4ABREU,Hugo. 0 Outro Lado do Poder. Rio de Janeiro, 
Ed.Nova Fronteira, 1979, p.168.
I15ldem, p.50. My translation,
p.49.
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lifting of sanctions was again examined by the OAS in San 
Jose, invites the analyst to make a different appraisal of 
this internal negotiation, as I shall do later on.
In so doing the Brazilian abstention in Quito pleased 
both internal demands and external aims. Internally, the 
abstention answered the strong resistance towards too soft a 
stance on the Castro regime, and in so doing it was consistent 
with the very well known military inflexibility117. As put by 
a high ranking diplomat "a discrete position had the advantage 
of not leading to any internal fray. Moreover, regardless of 
the final result, either pro-Washington or pro-Havana, it 
would not damage any significant Brazilian interest"118.
Externally, as Schneider put it, the abstention had the 
advantage of "if readmission is going to happen anyway, Brazil 
should not risk incurring the diplomatic costs of holding out 
against a growing hemisphere consensus"119.
Regarding the broad effects of Brazilian decision, I 
claim that Brazil compelled both the US and those Latin 
Americans who were either against or in favor of the 
maintenance of the embargo, to resolve their differences among
117Interview with Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. S3o Paulo, 
14/01/92.
,18Interview with Luiz A.P. Souto Maior. Rio, 5/12/91. My 
translation.
n9SCHNEIDER,Ronald M. Brazil - Foreign Policy of a Future 
World Power. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1976, p.101.
themselves, without Brazilian mediation.
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6.3.Brazil explains its position
Eventually the XV Meeting of Consultation was held 
between November 8-12, 1974. Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela voted for the 
end of the embargo. Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay voted against 
it; and the remaining six countries - Bolivia, Brazil, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the US abstained. As a result 
the resolution was not approved since it lacked the necessary 
two thirds majority.
The decision to add an explanation of Brazil's 
abstention allowed Azeredo da Silveira to stress the country's 
belief in the non-intervention principle, saying that no 
evidence that Cuba had substantially changed her international 
behavior had been presented to the Meeting. Consequently there 
was no reason to lift the embargo. Nevertheless, due to the 
fact that, during this Meeting, the lifting of sanctions 
against Cuba and the reinforcement of the inter-American 
system were intermingled, Brazil had decided to abstain. In 
Azeredo's words, "we do not want a negative vote from Brazil 
on the resolution to contribute to the reinforcement of the
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current divisions within the inter-American system which would 
lead to the weakness of the latter and of the OAS"120.
It is also worth emphasizing that Brazil stressed its 
views on the difference between the two questions. For, Brazil 
stated that although it was conscious that the continuous 
breaching of Resolution I (1964) imposing sanctions against 
Cuba was damaging the Rio Treaty, the Quito Meeting should not 
be seen as the place to discuss the ITRA reform. In other 
words, Brazil refused to incorporate the thesis that the 
lifting of the sanctions against Cuba was the means to 
reinforce the inter-American system. Both questions should be 
handled on different occasions. As Azeredo put it, "For a 
significant number of governments (...) the continuous 
breaching of an ITRA obligation was contributing to the 
weakening of the Treaty (...). The Brazilian government 
understands and shares such concern. Yet, Brazil does not 
think the solution is to revoke the resolution which has been 
breached. If it is correct that the ITRA needs alterations and 
reinterpretations in order to adjust it to the present world, 
here is not the forum for that. The subject has been studied 
in Washington, in the Special Committee of the OAS, and it is 
there that should be solved"121. Finally, as Azeredo da 
Silveira declared to the press, although all abstaining 
countries had understood the importance of saving the inter-
,20BRASIL.MRE. Resenha de Polltica Exterior do Brasil, n.3,
out/dez. 1974, pp.25-27. My translation.
121 Idem, ibidem. My translation.
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American system, they were not convinced that to do so it was 
necessary to make concessions to Cuba without any 
compensation. Therefore, he continued, in abstaining those 
countries intended to show that they considered the reasons of 
Coloinbia, Costa Rica and Venezuela correct - the authors of 
the resolution proposing the lifting of sanctions - but they 
did not see any guarantee that the end of the embargo would 
lead to any significant alteration in the Cuban relationship 
with the American countries122.
Brazil's deliberation about the decision taken in Quito 
actually took place during the subsequent Meeting of 
Consultation. Then, on the one hand, the consequences of the 
government's continuous opposition to a more sympathetic 
stance regarding Cuba for the strengthening of the inter- 
American system would be finally solved. And on the other, the 
progress - albeit discreet - towards normalizing Brazil-Cuba 
relationship would be sanctioned. In addition, Brazil would 
manage to rule out any remaining suspicions of having actually 
defined its position according to Washington, although both 
abstained in Quito.
122"Silveira acha justo o adiamento", Jornal do Brasil. 
12/11/74.
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6.4.Brazil upholds its decision (XVI Meeting of Consultation)
The Quito Meeting only emphasized the need for 
reorganizing the inter-American system, instead of actually 
solving the problems caused by the different positions held by 
the American Republics towards the Castro regime. By way of 
example, at the end of the conference the 12 countries who had 
voted in favor of the lifting of sanctions issued a 
Declaration pointing to the anachronistic mechanism of the 
ITRA voting procedures whereby the majority had their will 
bypassed by the minority123.
As a result, during the V OAS General Assembly 
(Washington, May 1975) a conference to discuss proposed 
alterations in the Rio Treaty was called, to be held on July 
16 to 25, 1975 in San Jose da Costa Rica124. Amongst other
points, article 17 concerning the two thirds majority to 
revoke any coercive measure taken by the American States 
against a certain State was to be discussed.
Although a crucial step in the easing of the lifting of 
sanctions against Cuba, the introduction of the simple 
majority vote, would not yet be enough to immediately bestow 
this outcome. It would still be necessary to wait for about 2
123"0timismo causou derrota de Cuba, by Milano Lopes. Q
Estado de Sao Paulo. 13/11/74.
124RABASA,E. op.cit. . p. 145-7.
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years to have the alterations implemented. Therefore, during 
the above mentioned Conference to examine the Rio Treaty, the 
Mexican delegation presented a resolution summoning a new 
Meeting of Consultation. Its purpose was to introduce a 
mechanism allowing the normalization of American-Cuban 
relations l^ eforl the inter-American system. This resolution 
stated that "the Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign 
Ministers (...) decides (...) to leave the ITRA member-states 
free to normalize or to conduct its relations with the Cuban 
Republic at the level and in the form that each State 
considers appropriate"123.
Before examining the results of this Meeting of 
Consultation, I shall firstly point to the Brazilian stance 
with regards to the ITRA reform. At first Brazil opposed the 
calling of the conference to execute the alterations in the 
Rio Treaty, since there were obvious attempts to connect those 
alterations to the lifting of sanctions against Cuba126 - 
Brazil had indeed abstained in the vote to call the meeting. 
However, when the conference took place, Brazil finally backed 
the proposal to introduce a simple majority system of voting 
in place of the two thirds quorum127. It was imperative not to 
isolate itself even further from the Latin American community.
,25"A novidade desse encontro: v£rias decisdes", Jornal da 
Tarde. 22/07/75. My translation.
,24"Caso Cubano", Jornal do Brasil. 30/05/75.
,270nly Chile and Paraguay voted against the proposal. 
"Dominicanos votarao a favor de Cuba", Jornal do Brasil. 
24/7/75.
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Particularly if Cuban readmission to the inter-American system 
was not directly associated with the vote, as had happened 
during the Quito Meeting.
As for the XVI Meeting of Consultation (San Jose, 
1975), I shall stress that only a few - but significant - 
things had changed since the XV Meeting (Quito, 1974). The 
majority of Latin Americans were still very much in favor of 
the normalization of relations with the Castro regime. 
Argentina, for instance, that had recently left a conservative 
military dictatorship behind, and was now under the 
controversial Peronist administration (Juan Perdn, Oct/1973- 
July/1974 and Maria Estela Per6n (July/1974-March/1976), 
signed a series of economic agreements with Havana. Washington 
in its turn was sending new signs of flexibility regarding the 
issue. In March 1975, Henry Kissinger gave a speech playing 
down Washington's apprehension regarding Cuban action in Latin 
America128. Among other aspects, one reason explains the new US 
stance regarding the debate. The canceling of the third 
meeting to discuss the so called "New Dialogue" between the US 
and the Latin American countries demonstrated the difficulties 
encountered on the road to improving their relationship. 
Washington seemed to have seen that a softening of its 
position towards Cuba, would be a strategy to please the Latin 
Americans. Since it was feasible to abide by the American 
Republics majority without actually changing its unilateral
,28Speech delivered in Houston, Texas, March 1, 1975,
quoted by MORLEY,H.M. op.cit.. p.252.
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position towards Havana, Washington gave indications that she 
was going to vote in favor of the Mexican proposal for 
"Freedom of Action"129.
Finally the XVI Meeting of Consultation took place in 
San Jose in July 29, 1975. Then by 16 votes in favor, 3
against (Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay), and two abstentions 
(Brazil and Nicaragua), a resolution stating the non­
intervention principle and declaring all ITRA state-members 
free to conduct their relations with Cuba, was finally 
approved.
7.Conclusion
Compared with Quito, four countries changed their votes 
in San Jose: Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti and the US. From the 
vantage point of Bolivia, Guatemala and Haiti, they considered 
that by doing so they were not giving the Castro regime any 
sort of "certificate of international good behavior"130. As for 
the US, its vote in favor of the Mexican resolution did not 
mean the end of the US embargo on Havana since Washington had 
actually imposed its sanctions on October 20, 1960, with the
129"A novidade desse encontro: vdrias decisdes", Jornal da
Tarde. 22/07/75.
130RAMOS,A.T.L. op.cit. .
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general authority of the 1948 Export Control Act, rather than 
by the American multilateral organization131. Washington's new 
attitude contributed in enhancing its image in the eyes of the 
majority of Latin Americans. As put by a State Department 
official, "The thing that's changed is U.S.policy in the OAS. 
U.S. bilateral policy has not changed"132.
In so doing Brazilian decision to stick to abstention 
shows that whereas in the past "Cuba's political and military 
role in the region and its strategic implications were 
perceived in the same way by the Armed Forces of Brazil and 
its counterparts in the United States"133, in the mid-70's the 
remaining Brazilian military opposition as opposed to a more 
flexible United States position with regards Cuba, indicated 
that Brazil's stance was not determined by Washington's 
interests.
Moreover, I claim that the option of pleasing, or 
rather, of not provoking the regime's constituencies, most of 
whom favored the maintenance of the opposition against Cuba, 
should not be seen as merely a compliance with the regime's 
ideology. In fact, the decision to abstain in the vote cannot 
be disregarded. In this sense, although the abstention was a 
compromise made by Geisel towards the more conservative 
segment of the regime, it was also a step forward to a more
i31M0RLEY,H.M. OD.cit. . p.121.
132Idem, p.252.
I33C0STA,G. op. cit. . p. 36.
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flexible attitude towards the issue. This hypothesis is 
confirmed when we examine the repeat of the abstention during 
the San Jose meeting.
By abstaining again, Brazil did not return to its 
traditional combative position against Cuba. Indeed, the 
arguments given by Silveira when he explained Brazilian vote 
during the Quito meeting were based on the idea that the 
lifting of the sanctions against Cuba and the reinforcement of 
the inter-American system should be handled on different 
occasions. Not being so, Brazil would abstain in order not to 
vote against the ITRA reform. In so doing, as long as at San 
Jose both questions were handled separately, Brazil could 
indeed vote in favor of the ITRA reform and against the 
lifting of sanctions, if it wanted so. By not doing so, the 
repeat of abstention reveals that 1)during the Quito meeting 
the position in favor of the lifting of sanctions was 
encapsulated by abstention for the sake of other aims of the 
"Responsible Pragmatism"; and that 2)although the repeat of 
abstention in San Jose should not be seen as evidence that the 
country was not bound by ideological considerations any 
longer134, after all by abstaining the government was still 
complying with the internal opposition to the Castro regime, 
it shows that a milder stance towards the issue, closer to how 
Geisel and Silveira appraised it, was finally incorporated to 
the country's foreign policy.
I34NAZARI0,0. "Pragmatism..." op. cit.. p. 46.
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Therefore, I stress that the attitude of restraint from 
a clear-cut change on the Brazilian stance, taken at the very 
moment when Geisel decided on the issue, after having gone 
through the stages of definition of the problem, and the 
identification and the weighing of alternatives, was a crucial 
element in the explanation of the final decision. In other 
words, although Souto Maior was correct when he said that 
"apparently those who were in charge of our foreign policy did 
not consider that the potential diplomatic gains were enough 
to compensate for the domestic drawbacks stemming from the 
resumption of relations with Cuba"135, the compromise around 
the abstention made feasible the adoption and endurance of a 
less dogmatic position towards Havana, without causing too 
much harm to the Brazilian regime's stability.
I35MAI0R, L.P.S. op.cit.. p.26. My translation.
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Chronology
* January, 1959 - Cuban Revolution
* October 20, 1960 - US implement an embargo against Havana, 
by the general authority of the 1948 Export Control Act.
* January 3, 1961 - US sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.
* 17-19 April 1961 - Ill-fated US sponsored invasion of the 
Bay of Pigs.
* January 22-31 1962 - VIII Meeting of Consultation of 
American Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este) to discuss the 
alleged Cuban violation of human rights and conducting of 
subversive activities in the continent. A declaration stating 
that the principles of Marxism-Leninism were incompatible with 
those of the inter-American system was unanimously approved. 
Moreover, resolutions suspending trade in arms and implements 
of war with Cuba, and expelling the current Cuban government 
from the inter-American system, were also approved. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico abstain.
* February 14, 1962 - Cuba is evicted from the OAS.
* October 1962 - The Cuban Missile Crisis.
* December 1963 - Venezuela appeals to the OAS Permanent 
Council against what she described as Cuban intervention and 
aggression, by means of supplying arms to Venezuelan 
terrorists.
* May 13, 1964 - Brazil breaks off diplomatic relations with
Cuba, alleging among other reasons, that Cuba was attempting
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to export its revolution to other countries of the hemisphere.
* July 21-26, 1964 - IX Meeting of Consultation (Washington) 
following the reports of the OAS Committee giving evidences of 
Cuban sending of arms, training guerrillas, and seeking to 
overthrow the Venezuelan government. A resolution suspending 
diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba is approved. 
Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay voted against.
* March 1973 - US and Cuba reach an agreement on anti­
hijacking measures.
* February, 1974 - First meeting between Latin American 
representatives and the US Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, to discuss the relationship between them 
(Tlatelolco, Mexico).
* April, 1974 - Second meeting gathering Latin American 
representatives and Henry Kissinger towards the creation of a 
new pattern of relationship between them (Washington). On this 
occasion the Cuban question is raised and a resolution 
proposing consultations about the issue is approved by 
consensus.
* April 1974 - Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela address a 
resolution to the Permanent Council of the OAS proposing the 
calling of a Meeting of Consultation to vote the lifting of 
sanctions against Cuba.
* April 1974 - Washington issues a license to three US 
subsidiaries - Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler - to export 
to Cuba through their Argentinean subsidiaries.
* September 1974 - The Permanent Council of OAS votes 
unanimously for the call of the XV Meeting of Consultation to
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be held in Quito on November 1974.
* November 8-12, 1974 - XV Meeting of Consultation (Quito) 
summoned to discuss Cuban readmission to the inter-American 
system. Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Venezuela voted for the end of the embargo. 
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay vote against it. The remaining six 
countries - Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and 
the US abstain. As a result the resolution is not approved 
since it lacked the necessary two thirds majority.
* December 1974 - Following the adoption of the Trade Reform 
Act by the US government, which by increasing US protectionism 
directly affected Latin American exports, all Latin American 
countries suspend talks on the MNew Dialogue" as a protest 
against what they considered "discriminatory" provisions in 
favor of the developing countries.
* May 1975 - during the V OAS General Assembly (Washington) a 
conference to execute proposed alterations in the Rio Treaty 
was called to be held on July 16 to 25, 1975 in San Jose de 
Costa Rica. Amongst other points, article 17 determining a two 
thirds majority to revoke any coercive measure taken by the 
American States against a certain State would be discussed. 
Brazil abstains in the vote to summon this meeting.
* July 16 to 25, 1975 - Conference to execute the alterations 
in the Rio Treaty. Except for Chile and Paraguay who vote 
against the proposal, all countries back the proposal 
introducing a simple majority system of vote in substitution 
to the two thirds one. During the Conference, the Mexican
208
delegation presents a resolution summoning a new Meeting of 
Consultation. Its purpose is to introduce a mechanism allowing 
the normalization of American-Cuban relations before the 
inter-American system, called "Freedom of Action".
* July 29, 1975 - XVI Meeting of Consultation (San Jose) when 
by 16 votes in favor, 3 against (Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay), 
and two abstentions (Brazil and Nicaragua), a resolution 
stating the non-intervention principle and declaring all ITRA 
state-members free to conduct their relations with Cuba, is 
finally approved. By so doing, the embargo imposed against 
Cuba in 1964 is immediately nullified.
Chapter V
The resumption of diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China
Chapter IV claimed that despite anti-Communism being a 
central element in the military regime, Geisel's government 
succeeded in the implementation of a slightly more pragmatic 
stance towards the Castro regime. In so doing I shall ask if 
the same has happened towards other foreign policy issues 
involving Communist regimes. And if so, how that was possible, 
since Geisel's government was supposed to be a continuation of 
the "revolutionary process" inaugurated by the military coup 
in 19641, in which anti-Communism was a central 
characteristic. The decision to restore diplomatic relations 
with the People's Republic of China (PRC) taken just three 
months before Brazil abstained in the vote to lift sanctions 
against Cuba, on August 15, 1974 is a case to be scrutinized.
I have already mentioned the view stressing that 
whereas for global issues "Brazilian behavior could be ruled 
by pragmatic realism in the defense of the interests of the 
state", since they did not put "the political survival of the 
regime (...) at stake", in "Latin America, where the
lGeisel's speech on the ceremony of sworn in, 15/03/74, 
pp.27-30, p.29-30, in BRASIL. PRES I DfiNC IA DA REPtJBLICA. GEISEL, 
Ernesto. Discursos. v.l, Brasilia (DF), Assessoria de Imprensa 
e Relagdes Ptiblicas da Presid6ncia da RepHblica, 1975.
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geographical proximity increases the impact of other 
countries' domestic political processes on the Brazilian 
territory, the policy of 'ideological frontiers' appeared to 
be a more effective way of maintaining the political- 
ideological equilibrium of the region"2. Although this 
assumption is correct as far as Latin America is concerned, 
the creed of the existence of a "pragmatic realism" for global 
issues overrode the actual opposition Geisel had to face in 
order to accomplish certain decisions, such as the 
normalization of relations with Beijing.
Likewise, there is no doubt that Beijing's readmission 
to the United Nations (October 1971), and Washington's 
rapprochement to the PRC as illustrated in the signing of the 
"Shanghai Communique" (February 1972)3 very much contributed 
to the easing of relations between the US and the PRC, and as 
a result to a new approach towards Beijing from most Western 
countries. However, Brazil's stance towards the US as taken by 
the Geisel government onwards did not automatically attach 
Brazil to US foreign policy. Indeed, as far as Beijing was 
concerned there were those who believed that Brasilia should 
restore diplomatic relations before Washington did so. As 
Azeredo da Silveira put it, if Brazil had restored its 
diplomatic relations with the PRC one day after the US, the
2LIMA,Maria R.S. de The Political Economy of Brazil 
Foreign Policy - Nuclear Energy. Trade and Itaipu. Ph.D. 
Thesis, Nashville, Tenessee, Vanderbilt, August 1986, p.124.
3YAHUDA, Michael. Towards the End of Isolationism: China_'_s 
Foreign Policy after Mao. London, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1983, p.40.
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decision would have lost much of its importance4.
It is also true that Brazil's policy of diversifying 
its dependence and of searching for a stronger position within 
the international system also accounts for the decision to 
normalize Brazil's relationship with the PRC. Indeed, the 
economic and political potential exhibited in the Chinese 
domestic market and Chinese position within the international 
community, turned the PRC into a very promising partner for 
Brazil. Nevertheless, although this fact was already clear to 
Brazilian decision makers during the M6dici administration 
(1969-74), that was not enough to move this government towards 
the resumption of diplomatic relations with Beijing. Moreover, 
even during Geisel's government this fact was not sufficient 
to convince the entire government about the advantage of 
normalizing relations with the country. The years when the PRC 
adopted a foreign policy of encouraging revolution wherever 
possible5 had to be overcome by the Brazilian authorities if 
the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries was to be implemented.
It is the hypothesis of this chapter that the above
interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Monica Hirst and 
Maria Regina S. Lima. Rio, 15/05/79. CPDOC.
5HARRIS,Lilian Craig & WORDEN,Robert L. "China's Third 
World Role", pp.1-13, p.3 and HAMRIN, Carol Lee. "Domestic 
Components and China's Evolving Three Worlds Theory", pp.34- 
52, p.40, in Lilian C.Harris e Robert L.Worden (eds), China 
and the Third World - champion or challenger? London & Sidney, 
Croom Helm Limited, 1986.
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mentioned factors - which will be discussed later on - can 
indeed explain the feasibility and convenience of Brazil's new M 
foreign policy towards China. In other words, it seems that by 
and large the effects of geographical distance on the impact 
of other countries political processes on Brazilian politics, 
the Beijing's readmission to the un and the Western's
rapprochement to the PRC, and Brazil's policy of diversifying 
its dependence were crucial for the restoration of diplomatic 
relations with Beijing. Nevertheless, although there were 
internal and external elements stimulating and justifying a 
change in the course of Brazilian foreign policy, the analysis 
suggests that, although necessary, those elements were not 
sufficient to endorse the restoration of diplomatic relations 
with Beijing. The truth is that the more conservative
supporters of the regime had to be removed or have their power 
neutralized, as an essential requirement to the accomplishment 
of the rapprochement. I claim that it was necessary to 
intervene in the process of decision making so as to achieve 
such a result. Hence President Geisel had to take the power of
veto away from those who supposedly could prevent a change in
the Brazilian position.
In order to examine this question I will firstly set 
out the historical background of the Brasilia~Beijing 
relationship from the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 to 
the end of M6dici's government in March 1974, when the two 
countries made the first signs towards the restoration of 
diplomatic relations. Subsequently I shall discuss the
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international scenario of the 1970s that brought the 
rapprochement of Western countries to the PRC to the agenda, 
as well as scrutinize alleged advantages and shortcomings for 
Brazil in taking the same step. Then, the process of policy 
making, from the appraisal of the question to the endorsement 
of the decision to resume diplomatic relations with Beijing 
will be examined. In so doing, e.g., by looking inside the 
"black box", my aim is to explain the state behavior looking 
at the unit's behavior, since I claim that neither the 
international system can wholly explain Brazilian state 
behavior; nor can the Brazilian decision be explained from the 
perspective that sees the state as a single agent responding 
rationally to the situation.
ltHistorical Background <1949-1969)
The proclamation of the PRC on October 1, 1949, did not 
immediately affect Brazil's relationship with Beijing which, 
although amicable, was characterized by a very low profile6. 
Although the Brazilian Ambassador to China left the country
6The only two significant agreements signed by the two 
countries were those that substitute the current Commerce and 
Maritime Agreement of 1881 by a new and larger Friendship 
Agreement, in 1943; and those signed in 1946, after the visit 
of First Lady Mrs.Chiang Kai-shek to Rio de Janeiro, 
concerning Cultural Relations. RODRIGUES, Jos6 Hon6rio. 
Interesse Nacional e Polltica Externa. Rio de Janeiro, 
Ed.CivilizagSo Brasileira, 1966, p.131.
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for Japan two months after the Chinese Communist Party took 
over the control of the Chinese mainland, he alleged security, 
rather than political reasons in doing so7. In addition, 
despite Chiang Kai-shek resuming the presidency of China on 
March 1, 1950 in Taiwan, Brazil kept its representative to 
China in Tokyo until late 19528. Despite Brazilian lack of 
support for the seating of Beijing in the UN at the expense of 
Taipei, it was only in December 1952 that the Brazilian 
Ambassador finally reassumed his position as Brazilian 
representative to the Chinese government9. He was then in 
Taipei. From then on Brazil was clearly and totally committed 
to Nationalist China.
The main reason for Brazil finally taking this attitude 
can be ascribed to the US involvement in the Korean War. In 
spite of Gettilio Vargas' (1951-54) resistance to the US 
pressures for Brazilian participation in the Asiatic 
conflict10, his government could not avoid taking an 
unequivocal position against the government of Beijing, since 
Brazil was strongly committed to the United States within the 
Cold War framework.
Confidential source.
8RODRIGUES, J.H. op.cit.. p.132.
Confidential source.
l0For more information about this episode see D'ARAUJO,
Maria Celina S. Q SegundP Governo Vargas. 1951-54 -
democracia. partidos e crise politics. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar 
Editores, 1982, pp. 148-59; and CHEIBUB, Zairo Borges. £ 
Guerra da Cor6ia e as Relagdes Brasil-Estados Unidos. 1951- 
1953. Niter6i, Departamento de Cifincias Sociais, Universidade 
Federal Fluminense, 1980, paper.
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However, President J&nio Quadros' aim of pursuing a 
pattern of foreign policy less attached to a Western approach 
in general and to the United States in particular, in addition 
to his plans to enlarge Brazilian commercial partners11, 
prompted the search for a better relationship with Beijing at 
the outset of the 1960s. As a result, this government decided 
to modify the position held since 1951 of opposing the 
inclusion of the question of Beijing's readmission to the 
United Nations on the agenda12, and supported the resolution 
presented to the XVI General Assembly to do so13. As much as 
other decisions on foreign policy taken under Quadros' 
government, the latter faced domestic opposition. According to 
some critics it was not advisable to be identified with an 
"expansionist" country which would probably not become a very 
profitable commercial partner, at the expenses of a more 
trustworthy relationship with Taiwan14. As for those whose 
argument was concerned not with the convenience of changing 
the Brazilian position regarding the two Chinas, but rather 
with the appropriate time to do so, the suggestion was to wait 
for the time when this question could be solved without the 
need to expose the country to any misleading interpretation of 
its stance regarding the Cold War15.
"RODRIGUES,J.H. op.cit..p.135.
12Idem, p. 150.
13"0 Brasil quer que a ONU estude a admissSo da China". Q 
Estado de Sao Paulo. 23/02/61.
,4"As Duas Chinas", by M.Paulo Filho. O Globo. 25/02/61.
"Confidential source.
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As part of President Quadros' decision to strengthen 
Brazilian ties with the PRC, he authorized his deputy, Joao 
Goulart, to go to Beijing escorted by a large group of 
officials and private sector representatives (August 1961). 
Once there, JoAo Goulart signed a Trade and Payments Agreement 
with Beijing, which led to the visit of a commercial 
delegation to Brazil in 196216. In addition, he declared to 
the press that Brazil was going to vote in favor of the 
proposal supporting the admission of Beijing to the UN which, 
however, in the event Brazil did not do17.
Eventually the overthrow of President Joao Goulart 
(March 1964), who had taken over the presidency as a result of 
Quadros' renunciation in August 1961, led to a radical change 
in the position regarding the PRC. Together with all the other 
steps taken by the new military regime to expurgate the 
Independent Foreign Policy which Goulart had continued after 
Quadros, Chinese officials in charge of setting up a 
commercial representation and of preparing a Chinese economic 
and trade exhibition in Brazil, as well as journalists from 
the Hsinhua News Agency (nine in total), were arrested accused 
of espionage and subversive activities on national 
territory18. Indeed, there were even those who claimed that
16RODRIGUES, J.H. op.cit. . p. 136-7.
17Idem. p. 148-9.
I8Despite several messages sent both by Chinese government 
and Chinese organizations, as well as by several newspapers 
all over the world, the Brazilian government took five weeks 
to make public the alleged evidence for the accusations 
against the Chinese officials. Amongst other items were a
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the strikes held during 1963 in Brazil, were organized and 
inspired by the Chinese Communist Party19. By adopting such a 
policy towards the PRC as part of the Cold War inspired 
foreign policy of the military regime20, the new government 
halted the path towards the normalization of relations between 
the two countries21.
In the following years the Sino-Brazilian relationship 
did not change. Indeed, the lack of international inputs in 
favor of a reassessment of the Chinese regime aggravated by 
the years of Cultural Revolution (1966-68), and the
letter giving instructions to them about who to contact in 
Brazil for the interest of the revolution, a guide explaining 
how to prepare and use invisible ink, and a pistol with a 
silencer. Following that, the Chinese were sentenced to 10 
years in prison, in December 1964. This led Beijing to issue 
its strongest complaint to the Brazilian government against 
what it considered a frame-up against the Chinese. In April 
1965", they were finally expelled from Brazil by a presidential 
act. Idem, p.140 and 154; MAnti-China Outrage in Brazil". 
Peking Review. April 24, 1964. vol.VII, n.17, pp.9-12; "In
Solidarity with Chinese Victims in Brazil". Peking Review. May 
1, 1964, vol. VII, n.18, pp.23-25; "Forgery in Brazil". Peking 
Review. May 29, 1964. vol.VII n.22, pp.11-13; "China protests
to Brazilian Authorities". Peking Review. January 1, 1965,
vol. VII, n.l, pp.22-23.
l9RODRIGUES, J.H. op.cit.. p. 154. For an account of the 
actual Chinese influence on Brazilian political parties and 
organizations, which was basically restricted to the Communist 
Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil/PC do B), a 
dissident group of the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Brasileiro/PCB), see QUARTIM,Joao. Dictatorship and 
Armed Struggle in Brazil. London, NLB, 1971, pp.137-209.
20MARTINS, Carlos Estevam. "A EvolugSo da Politica Externa 
Brasileira na D6cada 64/74". Estudos CEBRAP. n.12, abr/mai/jun 
1975, pp.55-98, p.58, 66 and 68.
2,For an example of Beijing's account of the Brazilian
military coup see Renmin Ribao Observer editorial published on 
April 30, 1964 and translated by Peking Review. "Lessons from 
the Reactionary Military Coup in Brazil". Peking Review. May 
8, 1964, vol.VII, n.19, pp.29-32.
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maintenance of the same Brazilian pattern of foreign policy 
did not move the Castello Branco (1964-67) and the Costa e 
Silva governments (1967-69) to take any steps towards the 
improving of relationship with Beijing. However, the outcome 
of US rapprochement to the PRC and the increasing similarities 
between Beijing and Brasilia on some important international 
issues, paved the way for a possible change in Brazil's 
position towards the Chinese Communist regime. It is to those 
two aspects that I will now turn.
2.Beijing and the international relations in the 197Qa
As I have mentioned in the preceding chapters, several 
adjustments in the international arena were taking place at 
the beginning of the 1970s. Amongst them, the dramatic 
reversal of the relationship between the PRC and the US, and 
those countries relationship with the USSR, are points to be 
highlighted. Indeed, the worsening of Beijing's relationship 
with Moscow, which was intensified after the invasion of 
Prague (August 1968) and the clashes on the Sino-Soviet border 
(March 1969), led the PRC to approach the United States as a 
way of inhibiting Soviet expansionist threats22. In so doing 
Beijing could improve its position in Asia, and reestablish
22SUTTER, Robert G. China-Watch: toward Sino-American
reconciliation. Baltimore & London, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978, p.83-102.
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the balance of power in the region. Moreover, the fulfillment 
of the post-Cultural Revolution plans for the modernization of 
the Chinese economy was strongly dependent on the enlargement 
of the PRC foreign relations.
Likewise Washington's movement towards Beijing also had 
Moscow as a "hidden actor". Since the Korean War, US policy 
towards the PRC had been based on a strategy of isolationism 
and containment23. Once the tension in the Sino-Soviet 
relationship became irreversible in the late sixties, 
Washington saw the rapprochement to Beijing as a means for 
pressuring Moscow into collaborating with their plans for 
detente24. In addition, Washington's rapprochement to Beijing 
was a product as well as a cause of the Vietnamization program 
embraced by the Nixon government, e.g., the process of 
disengagement of American forces from Indochina. Indeed, "the 
American pursuit of a rapprochement with China was regarded by 
Nixon and Kissinger as the necessary complement to their 
policy of politico-military retrenchment in Asia. (...) Thus 
the improvement of relations on the great power level, in this 
case China, was perceived as fostering the stable regional 
conditions so as to permit an orderly devolution of American
23FREEDMAN, Jr., Charles W. "The Process of Rapprochement: 
Achievements and Problems". Gene T.Hsiao & Michael Witunski 
(eds). Sino-American Normalization and its Policy 
Implications. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983, pp.1-27,
p. 1.
24BARON, Michael. "The United States and China", in Robert 
C.Gray & Stanley J.Michalak,Jr. (eds). American Foreign Policy 
since Detente. New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984, 
pp.38-53, p.40-41.
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power to nascent 'middle powers'"25. In other words, US 
extrication from Indochina was the basis for a new pattern of 
relationship with Beijing, as much as the latter was a 
requisite for the success of the US disengagement. It is 
within this framework that we shall view Washington policy 
towards Southeast Asia, which ambiguously combined significant 
escalation of air war over North Vietnam, and military 
incursion in Cambodia and Laos, with the strength of the South 
Vietnamese Army as a counterbalance for US combat forces 
disengagement26.
Hence, after a period of initiatives taken by both 
sides towards a new pattern of relations27, the US and the PRC 
signed the "Shanghai Communique" during Nixon's visit to 
Beijing in February 1972. In this joint statement, despite 
their differences on issues such as the political status of 
Taiwan, to say nothing about ideological divergences, both 
sides committed themselves to not seeking hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific region as well as to opposing any attempt at such 
a policy by any country or group of countries28.
Another important event in the period concerns the
25LITWAK, Robert S. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine - 
American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969- 
1976. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.133-34. 
Italics in the original.
26Idsm, p.117-35.
27FREEDMAN Jr.,C. op.cit. p.2-6.
28YAHUDA,M. op.cit. . p.40.
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change of the Chinese stance towards the Third World. Indeed, 
trying to take advantage of the split with the Soviet Union 
and to avoid likely isolation due to the policy of detente 
between the latter and the United States, the PRC sought to 
become closer to the Third World countries through a 
nationalist posture rather than through socialism29 or through 
professed support for what she considered wars of national 
liberation, as she used to do until the late 1960s30. In 
summary, by definitively abandoning her policy of support for 
revolutionary movements around the world31, the PRC increased 
its chances of achieving a rapprochement with Western 
countries.
There are no doubts that the new US policy towards 
China together with the ensuing PRC readmission to the UN 
(October, 1971), helped to legitimize Beijing's government in 
the eyes of Western countries. In fact, between October 1971 
and December 1972, a group of 23 countries recognized Beijing 
to the detriment of Taipei32. As far as Brazil is concerned, 
in addition to the likely influence this scenario might have
29HAMRIN, Carol Lee. "Domestic Components and China's 
Evolving Three Worlds Theory", op.cit.. p.41.
30For more information about the different phases of 
Chinese foreign policy see YAHUDA,M . op.cit. p.25-43.
3IHARRIS,L.C. & WORDEN,R.L. "China's Third World Role". 
o p .cit.. p.3.
320n this order, Belgium, Peru, Lebanon, Rwanda, United 
Arab Republic, Island, Cyprus, Malta, Mexico, Argentina, 
Greece, Guiana, Togo, Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Maldives, Madagascar, Luxembourg, Jamaica, Zaire, Chad, 
Australia, and New Zealand.
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had in its appraisal of Beijing, I shall also examine more 
closely the variables which touch upon Brazilian interests. 
Indeed, despite ideological differences, it is possible to 
point to the somewhat similar stances taken by Brazil and the 
PRC regarding issues in the international agenda.
3.Brazil and China in the 1970s
It is worth noting that both Brazil and the PRC used to 
embrace, even if only as a platitude, the three Ds'principle - 
Disarmament, Decolonization and Development - as a precept of 
their foreign policies33. In addition, it is possible to trace 
a correspondence between the two diplomacies by comparing 
Brazilian condemnation of the freezing of world power, e.g, 
against a kind of condominium of power whose aim was to freeze 
the current distribution of power and wealth34, and the 
Chinese anti-hegemony posture adopted against North-American
330n the Brazilian side, these principles were firstly 
addressed in 1963 in the XVIII UN General Assembly by 
Ambassador Aratijo Castro. ARAtfJO CASTRO,Joao Augusto de. 
"Desarmamento, Descolonizagao e Desenvolvimento", in 
AMADO,Rodrigo (org.). Aratijo Castro. Brasilia, Ed.UnB, 1982, 
pp.25-42. On Chinese side, see KIM,Samuel. China, the United, 
and World Order. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979, 
p.169-70.
^ARAtJJO CASTRO,Joao Augusto. "O Congelamento do Poder 
Mundial". Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos.33. Janeiro 
1972, p.7-30; and ARAtfJO CASTRO,J.A, . "The UN and the freezing 
of the international power structure", International 
Organization. 26, 1972, pp.158-66, p.163.
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and Soviet world policies35. Furthermore, it is also possible 
to draw a connection between the Chinese thesis of self- 
reliance (which could be read as "China's policy of not 
becoming attached to any nation or bloc of nations"36), and 
the Brazilian thesis of not being a "satellitable" country, 
that is, the position of not being committed to any country 
beyond Brazil's so called national interests37.
Regarding both countries' stances on particular issues 
under debate by the international community during the 
seventies, their views on nuclear policy, sea law, environment 
and human rights are worth noting.
With regards to the nuclear issue, the Chinese position 
was similar to Brazil's, despite the PRC having nuclear 
capability since 196438. Like Brazil, the PRC had refused to
35SMITH, Sarah-Ann. "China's Third World Policy as a 
Counterpoint to the First and Second Worlds", in Lilian
C.Harris & Robert L.Worden, op.cit.. pp.53-74, p.71.
36Idem, p.79.
37According to Silveira's words, in broadcasted/speech,^ 
28/03/74". BRASIL.MRE. Resenha de Polltica Exterior, n.l/ 
mar/abr. 1974, p.24.
38In this respect, it is worth noting that Beijing tried 
to give other Latin American countries, who unlike Brazil had 
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, her assurance regarding 
the absence of any intentions of employing her nuclear
capabilities against them: "Sensing among the Latin American 
countries strong support for and apprehension about China's 
stand on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the then Foreign 
Minister Chi P'eng-fei issued an official statement on
November 14, 1972, declaring: 'China will never use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin 
American countries and the Latin American nuclear weapon-free 
zone, nor will China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile,
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sign the Non-Proliferation Nuclear Treaty (NPT) using the 
argument that this treaty had been "designed only to disarm 
the non-nuclear countries while maintaining the arms of the 
fully equipped nuclear countries"/ according to an official 
Chinese statement at the United Nations39. Moreover/ along 
with Brazil the PRC adopted an apparently contradictory 
position simultaneously opposing the NPT while strongly 
supporting the nuclear-free zone thesis40. In spite of the 
different motives which led Brasilia and Beijing to embrace 
this position, at the end of the day such a stance 
simultaneously constituted a positive attitude taken in favor 
of the arms control and disarmament issues and a 
counterbalance to their strong opposition to the NPT.
Likewise China's stance on the issue of territorial 
waters was similar to that of Brazil. Based on her own
install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in 
this zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery 
carrying nuclear weapons to traverse the territory, 
territorial sea or territorial air space of Latin American 
countries'". PR, n,47 (November 24, 1972), p.7. Quoted by
KIM,Samuel. "China, the United..." op.cit.. p. 168.
39UNDo c . A/C. 1/PV.2095 (21 Nov.1975), p.38. Quoted by
Idem/ p.172.
40For Brazilian nuclear policy see GRANDI,Jorge Alberto. 
Regime Militaire et Politique Exterieure du Brfesil: 1'Accord 
de_ Cooperation Nucleaire Germano-Bresilien du 1975. Ph.D. 
Thesis. Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Paris, 1985; 
LIMA,M.R.S. op.cit.: and WROBEL,Paulo S. Brazil, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and Latin America as a Nuclear Weapon- 
Free Zone. Ph.D. Thesis, King's College, University of London, 
London, 1992. As for Chinese position towards this issue see, 
KIM,S. "China, the United Nations...", op.cit.. p.172-3 and 
WORDEN,Robert L. "International Organizations: China's Third 
World Policy in Practice", in Lilian C.Harris e Robert 
L.Worden, op.cit. pp.75-99, p.86-7.
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Declaration Regarding Territorial Waters issued in 1958, the 
government of the PRC strongly supported the sea reform law 
embraced by all Latin American coastal countries, which 
claimed a 200-mile limit for territorial waters. In so doing 
Beijing embraced the struggle against the so called maritime 
hegemony of the superpowers, in calling a United Nations 
Conference on the Law, finally held in Chile in 197441.
Another important aspect concerning the two countries 
agreement on the international debate was related to the 
environmental issue. During the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment (Stockholm, June 1972), both countries 
strongly supported those theses arguing that the environmental 
problems of less developed countries stemmed mainly from their 
economic underdevelopment. Hence they should firstly develop 
their economies, build their modern industry, and safeguard 
their sovereignty and independence to solve their own 
environmental problems. Moreover, Brazil and the PRC came 
together when both strongly opposed the allegation that the 
population growth was, by itself, a cause of environmental
4,For more information about Chinese policy of sea, see 
GREENFIELD, Jeanette. China and the Law of the Sea. Air, and 
Environment. Sijthoff J Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
1979,pp.51-81; WORDEN,Robert L. "International 
Organizations...", in Lilian C.Harris & Robert L.Worden (eds), 
op.cit.. pp.75-99, p.87; and KIM,Samuel. "China, the UN...", 
op.cit. p. 169. And for Brazil sea policy, see ARAtfJO 
CASTRO,Luiz Augusto. 0 Brasil e o Novo Direito do Mar. Mar 
Territorial e Zona Econdmica Exclusiva. Instituto de Pesquisa 
em Relagdes Internacionais, FundagSo Alexandre de GusmSo, 
Brasilia (DF), 1989; and MORRIS, Michael. International
Politics_and the Sea: the case of Brazil. Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press, 1979.
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deterioration42.
A further similarity regarding the position of both 
countries on the international agenda might have strengthened 
Brazil's interest in becoming closer to the PRC. According to 
Beijing's policy of keeping a good relationship with General 
Pinochet government (1973-90) due to her interest in building 
up an anti-Soviet coalition43, and also due to her own 
problems on the subject, the PRC refused to support any UN 
resolution against Chilean human rights abuse44. This Chinese 
position would also have benefitted Brasilia since the latter 
was a potential target for criticism from the international 
community due to the systematic violations of human rights, in 
addition to favoring the Brazilian military regime because of 
its similarities to the rightwing military Chilean government.
It is within this scenario that the first signs of a 
possible change in Brazilian stance were signaled. Indeed, 
despite the strong anti-Communist stance that characterized 
the government of President M6dici, a sort of "behind the 
scene" reappraisal of Beijing's position in the international
42For Chinese policy see KIM, Samuel S. "China, the UN..." 
op.cit.. p.489; and GREENFIELD, Jeanette, op.cit.. p.205-27. 
As for Brazilian stance, see ARAtJJO CASTRO, J.A. "Environment 
and Development: the case of the less developed countries". 
International Organization. 26, n.2, Spring 1972, pp.401-16; 
SANDERS,Thomas G. "Development and Environment: Brazil and the 
Stockholm Conference, in American University Field Staff (East 
Coast South America Series), XVII, n.7, June 1973.
43YAHUDA, M. op.cit.. p.41.
^KIM^. "China, the UN..." op. cit.. p. 169.
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system was inaugurated. However, as I shall demonstrate, this 
was not yet enough to move Brazil towards a real change in its 
stance towards Beijing.
4.On the direction of a change
Behind the stance of maintaining opposition to 
Beijing's readmission to the UN, a movement towards a new 
assessment of the question and, possibly, towards a future 
rapprochement can be identified during the M6dici government. 
As a matter of fact, this reappraisal can be chiefly assigned 
to the studies made by Itamaraty which took the leadership to 
redirect Brazilian foreign policy. From 1969 to approximately 
1971, the Brazilian Consulate in the British colony of Hong 
Kong produced a series of reports about Beijing's domestic 
politics and the consequences on her foreign policy45. The so 
called "Hong-Kong Reports" asserted that despite the 
ideological radicalism sponsored by the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-68), Beijing's government had backed down from its 
former objective of sponsoring revolutionary movements around 
the world. Moreover, the reports pointed to the fact that with 
the end of the internal factional conflicts within the Chinese 
decision making arena, the way towards the adoption of a 
policy of developing relations with other countries regardless
^Confidential source.
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of their ideological stance, had been opened.
As far as Brazil was concerned, the report of May 1971 
pointed to the possibility of Beijing planning an 
implementation of a rapprochement policy towards Brasilia, as 
part of its new international strategy46. In addition, the 
report described the PRC's interests in Latin America, 
claiming that Beijing should not be seen as a threat to the 
political stability of the continent any longer.
Likewise, Itamaraty was also trying to "lay to rest the 
ghosts" of the conservative military in Brazil's domestic 
arena47. By giving lectures at the Higher War College and by 
publishing articles in the Revista do Clube Militar (a 
periodical issued by and mainly for the military class), 
Itamaraty intended to "prepare the ground" for the resumption 
of diplomatic relations with Beijing48. By way of example, 
Counsellor Bettencourt Bueno, who had been working on Asian 
issues for some time, once noted that even the more strongly 
anti-Communist countries would have to evaluate their national 
interests and to abandon their purely ideological position
46Confidential source.
47Interview with Italo Zappa, former Head of the Asia, 
Africa and Oceania Department of Itamaraty. Rio, 10/02/92.
480 Estado de Sao Paulo. 31/03/74; BUENO, Carlos Antonio 
Bettencourt. "O Panorama AsiAtico". Revista do Clube Militar. 
nov-dez. 1973, pp.8-9, p. 9; "0 Conflito Leste-Oeste:
NegociagSo e ConfrontagSo". Revista do Clube Militar. jan-fev. 
1973, pp.6-7; and "Politica Exterior na Reptiblica Popular da 
China". Revista do Clube Militar. jan-fev. 1974, pp.6-9.
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towards Beijing due to the new situation49. On another 
occasion, Bettencourt pointed to the Chinese decision of 
abandoning her policy of support for revolutionary movements 
around the world as evidence of the different stance taken by 
Beijing in her international relations50.
The consequences of this campaign on the actual 
official stance taken by the government about Beijing are hard 
to establish. Some steps were indeed taken towards a more 
sympathetic behavior towards the Chinese government. 
Nevertheless, the MAdici government did not move towards an 
actual rapprochement to China. As a result Brazil displayed 
rather contradictory behavior. At least two episodes 
illustrate this fact.
The first alteration to be noticed in the Brazilian 
position is related to its attitude towards China's 
readmission to the UN51. At the XXVI General Assembly (1971), 
when the PRC was finally readmitted to the organization, 
Brazil decided not to co-sponsor the North American "important 
question" resolution as it had been doing since 1961. In other 
words, Brazil did not back the US strategy of hampering the
49BUENO,C.A .B. "Panorama Asi&tico", op.cit.. p.9.
50BUENO,C.A.B. "Politica Exterior na Republica...", 
op.cit.. p.9.
51 It is worth noting that although President JAnio Quadros 
had supported the inclusion of the issue of the PRC's 
readmission to the UN into the agenda, the Brazilian 
delegation voted against the resolution on seating Beijing and 
removing Taipei during the XVI UN General Assembly (1961).
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admission of Beijing through the resolution which considered 
the decision to change the representation of a country an 
"important question". By doing so, according to Article 18 in 
the UN Charter, the only way to carry out the change was with 
a two thirds majority which the PRC did not have52. To a 
certain extent the Brazilian decision not to support the
prospects of this resolution then being accepted. Indeed, if 
we look to the Third World stance on the issue, the support 
for Beijing increased from 5% in 1955 to 23% in 197053. 
Therefore, although the Brazilian government maintained its 
opposition to seating Beijing in the UN at the expense of 
Taipei, in contrast to other Latin American countries (Peru, 
Chile, Mexico and Ecuador)54, it sought to save itself from 
the vulnerable position of co-sponsoring a resolution 
predestined to fail55.
On the eve of this UN debate, however, when Brazil 
opposed the readmission of Beijing, the Brazilian Counsellor 
to Hong-Kong, Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti, was authorized by
52WANG, Kuo-Chang. United Nations voting on Chinese 
representation. Taipei, Institute of American Culture. 
Academia Sinica, 1984, p.59-61.
53Idem, p.85.
MId.em , p.94.
55By finally getting the necessary two thirds majority to 
reject the "important question" resolution - 59 against, 55 in 
favor (including Brazil), and 15 abstentions - it was finally 
possible to proceed to the simple majority vote which accepted 
Beijing readmission to the UN - 76 in favor, 35 against and 17 
abstentions. Idem, p.136-7.
North-Xmerican strategy can be explained by the negative
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the government to join a private commercial mission on its 
trip to the PRC. The mission was led by the entrepreneur 
Hordcio Coimbra, President of Cia. Cacique de Cafd Soltivel, 
who Counsellor Holanda Cavalcanti knew from the time he used 
to work at the Brazilian Institute of Coffee (Instituto 
Brasileiro do Cafd/IBC)56. The presence of the Brazilian 
diplomat in the delegation had a strong significance, since he 
joined a mission which had been invited to take part at the 
half-yearly Canton Fair by the official Chinese organization, 
the China Export Commodities Fair (October/November 1971 )57. 
In this sense, although Holanda Cavalcanti had gone on the 
trip as a "special guest", e.g., without diplomatic 
qualification, it is indisputable that this episode denoted a 
Brazilian interest in examining the possibilities of a 
rapprochement with Beijing.
After Hordcio Coimbra's pioneering mission, a second 
one was sent to China in the following year (October, 1972). 
Led by the president of Association of Brazilian Exporters 
(Associagao Brasileira dos Exportadores), businessman Giulite 
Coutinho, this mission was strongly supported by the then 
Secretary of Planning Joao Paulo dos Reis Veloso58.
“interview with Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. Sao Paulo, 
14/01/92.
57"O Pragmatismo Sorridente". Veja. 21/08/74, p.28.
“SILVA, Ricardo L.P. da "Relacionamento Brasil-China: uma
dimensao histdrica". Ensflio? de Histdria Diplomdtica do
Brasil. 1930-1986. Cadernos do IPRI, n.2, Fundagdo Alexandre 
de Gusmdo, Brasilia, IPRI, 1989, pp.193-200, p.197; Interview 
with Jodo Paulo dos Reis Veloso. Rio, 27/03/92.; and "0 Brasil 
e a China Comunista". Jornal do Brasil. 1/10/72.
\
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In fact, Brazilian entrepreneurs strongly supported a 
rapprochement with Beijing59. Their pursuit for new markets 
concurred with the governmental policy of enhancing Brazilian 
exports. As a result - and also as a consequence of the US 
indication of wanting to improve their relationship with the 
PRC60 - the General Secretariat of the National Security 
Council issued a report authorizing the lifting of the 
prohibition on Brazilian vessels from docking at Chinese 
harbors and vice-versa. By this time it was understood that as 
long as those activities were properly controlled, they would 
not threaten Brazilian "national security"61.
Nevertheless, those economic initiatives towards the 
PRC were not entirely endorsed by all Brazilian decision 
makers. By way of example, the then Finance Minister, Delfim 
Netto, declared that economic relations with China "l)were not 
practical because the Communist Chinese economy is controlled 
by the state and 2)were not possible because the two countries 
do not have political relations"62.
In addition, there was a strong position in favor of
59SILVA,R. op.tCitt / p. 197.
“in July 1969, Nixon eased travel and trade restrictions 
towards the PRC. COHEN,Warren I. America's Response to China -
 history of Sino-American relations New York, Columbia
University Press, 3rd edition, 1990, p.196.
6,Confidential source.
62JOHNSON,Cecil. "China and Latin America: new ties and 
tactics". Problems of Communism, 21, n.4, July-August 1972, 
p. 64.
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the maintenance of relations with Taiwan. Indeed, at the same 
time Giulite Coutinho was on his mission to the PRC in October 
1972, an official mission led by the Brazilian Chief of Staff, 
General Artur Duarte Fonseca, went to Taipei63.
Despite the commercial and political attractions, the 
ideology of national security still did not allow the 
normalization of relationship between Brazil and the PRC. As 
reported by the press, the decision to resume diplomatic 
relations with Beijing was still dependent on a "green light" 
coming from Paldcio do Planalto (the presidential office), 
which was not switched on during M6dici government64. 
Actually, even when Geisel took over and announced his plans 
to diversify and make Brazilian international relations more 
pragmatic65, the political and economic prospects of a 
rapprochement with Beijing were not yet sufficiently positive 
to prompt the change. The analysis of the process which 
finally led to the resumption of diplomatic relations with the 
PRC, reveals that it was indeed within the decision arena 
where the last bastion of resistance against a change on 
Brazilian relations with China had to be overcome. Hence, the 
resumption of relations between Brasilia and Beijing can be
“Confidential source.
“"Revolugao busca linha diplom&tica coerente", by Luiz 
Barbosa. Jornal do Brasil. 19/01/76.
“President E.Geisel speech during the 1st Cabinet 
Meeting, 19/03/74", in BRASIL.PRESIDfiNCIA DA 
REPtJBLICA. GEISEL, Ernesto. Discursos. v.l, Brasilia (DF), 
Assessoria de Imprensa e Relagoes POblicas da Presidfencia da 
Republics, 1975, pp.31-60, p.37-38.
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actually explained by the perspective which "sees the state's 
behavior as the outcome of bargains (and other manoeuvre) 
among bureaucratic agencies"66, e.g., within the second debate 
proceeding "bottom-up" (nation State vs. bureaucracy).
5.The moment of decision
According to the analyses presented so far, Brazil's 
decision to restore diplomatic relations with the PRC was 
taken after president Geisel obtained the approval from the 
majority of the National Security Council members67. Hence, it 
might be assumed that it was the latter who ultimately defined 
the course of Brazilian foreign policy regarding the two 
Chinas. Moreover, that they had done so based on the tenets of 
the National Security Doctrine to the extent that the Council 
was supposed to assist the president in the formulation of 
Brazilian policy of national security based on this Doctrine's 
precepts68. However, a more rigorous examination of the
“HOLLIS,Martin & SMITH,Steve. Explaining and
Understanding International ReJ.atlQ.Dg.. Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1990, p.9.
67ABREU,Hugo de. O Outro Lado do Poder. Rio de Janeiro, 
Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1979, p.40; and GOES, Walder de. 0 Brasil 
do General Geisel - estudo do processo de tomada de_decisao no 
regime militar burocr3tico. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Nova 
Fronteira, 1978, p.32.
68Decree-Law n.200, 25/02/67, cited by the entry Conselho 
de Seguranga Nacional. in FUNDA£AO GETtJLIO VARGAS. CPDOC. 
Dicion6rio Hist6rico-Biogr6fico Brasileiro. 1930-1983. Rio,
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developments which led to this decision suggests that the 
consultation of the NSC members actually functioned as a form 
of "ritualizing" a decision already taken. Hence, it is in the 
preceding stages of the decision making process where we 
should search for the explanation of the decision which indeed 
inaugurated the "Pragmatic" foreign policy of Geisel's 
government.
The first official sign given to Geisel government from 
a Chinese representative regarding Beijing interest in 
Brazilian recognition of the Communist government was made in 
March 1974. During an official ceremony on neutral ground - a 
party at the Greek Embassy in Moscow - a Chinese official 
expressed to a Brazilian diplomat the interest of his 
government in expanding and developing its relations with 
Brazil beyond the commercial field69. Almost as an answer to 
this message, the Brazilian government authorized a group of 
governmental representatives to go to Beijing and Canton, on 
official duty, as part of a second commercial mission led by 
the entrepreneur Giulite Coutinho - April 10-15, 1974. Among 
them was the then substitute Head of the Africa, Asia and 
Oceania Department of Itamaraty (1973/74), counsellor 
Bettencourt Bueno70. On this occasion, in addition to the
Ed. Forense Universitdria, FGV/CPDOC, FINEP. 4 vols., vol.2, 
p.897-98.
69Confidential source.
70The other two envoys were Victor Nogueira de MagalhSes 
from the Planning Secretary and Omar Montealegre from the 
Industry and Commerce Ministry. "Imprensa chinesa destaca 
visita dos brasileiros". Jornal do Brasil. 14/04/74.
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gratitude expressed by Bueno to the Chinese Prime Minister 
Deputy Li-Hsien-nien for his support of the thesis of Latin 
American denuclearization, and the Latin American demand for 
stretching the extension of territorial waters to 200 miles71, 
he also handed over an official invitation from the Brazilian 
government for a Chinese commercial mission to come to 
Brazil72. Moreover, he suggested that Beijing should include 
a representative from the Foreign Ministry on the mission in 
order to study reciprocal interests73. Finally, Itamaraty's 
instructions to Bettencourt included the suggestion that he 
stressed that his visit to Beijing should be understood as 
part of Brazilian efforts towards the establishment of the 
necessary conditions for the resumption of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, in the event of the 
subject being raised74. Beijing's answer was, as expected, 
very positive. According to its new strategy of normalizing 
its relations with the international community, Beijing 
reasserted Chinese interests in restoring diplomatic relations 
with Brasilia75. Obviously it would be necessary for Brazil to 
deny Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the Chinese
71 "Brasil e China estudam reatamento de relagdes". Jornal 
do Brasil. 15/04/74.
72SILVA, R.P.L. op.cit. p.197.
73Confidential source.
74 Idem.
75Confidential source.
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people76.
Itamaraty's instructions to Counsellor Bettencourt date 
from April 2, 1974. Nevertheless, Azeredo da Silveira's report 
to Geisel, in which he suggested the restoration of diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, dates from April 9, 197477. This gap 
could lead us to believe that Itamaraty was instructing 
Bettencourt to initiate negotiations with Beijing towards the 
restoration of diplomatic relations before, or even without, 
Geisel's consent. In other words it might suggest that 
Itamaraty took action on such a delicate subject on its own. 
This was indeed a conceivable hypothesis, given that Itamaraty 
had taken a decisive position on the issue since the previous 
government. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the relative 
autonomy of the Foreign Ministry, the latter did not have 
sufficient independence to take such a step without consulting 
the president in the first place. In this sense, what actually 
happened was that since the issue had already been settled by 
Geisel and Azeredo da Silveira as usual78, it was necessary to 
formulate a document in which the reasons for taking this 
decision were displayed in order to obtain endorsement from
76Although this statement could be seen as unimportant 
since neither Taiwan nor the PRC accepted the thesis of two 
Chinas, it is indeed worth noting that for a certain period of 
time the alternative was under examination by some Brazilian 
authorities as a means of downgrading the impact of the 
resumption of diplomatic relations with Beijing would have on 
the Brazilian military class. Interview with Geraldo Holanda 
Cavalcanti. S5o Paulo, 14/01/92.
^Confidential source.
78Interview with Azeredo da Silveira, by Maria Regina
S.Lima e Monica Hirst. Rio, 10/05/79. CPDOC.
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the other members of the government.
In fact the discussions on the subject between Geisel 
and Silveira took place at the end of 1973/beginning of 1974, 
when the latter was called by the President-elect for 
deliberations in Geisel's office in Rio79. Then Geisel seemed 
to be quite aware of the advantages of the rapprochement with 
Beijing due to the similarities between the two states' 
foreign policies80. It is in this sense that it is possible to 
understand the fact that when ambassador Ramiro Saraiva 
Guerreiro, arrived from Geneva (he had been Head of Brazilian 
permanent representation since 1969, to take over the post of 
General Secretary of Itamaraty, on April 8, 1974, he was told 
by Azeredo da Silveira that the resumption of diplomatic 
relations with the PRC had already been decided. Moreover, 
according to what Silveira told Guerreiro, the decision had 
been taken in terms "not open to further discussion"81.
79Idem; "Decisao vem da posse de Geisel". Jornal do 
Brasil, 16/08/74; "Politica Externa". Jornal da Tarde. 
30/01/79.
“interview with Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. Sao Paulo, 
14/01/92.
8,As Guerreiro put it, "Net varietu". Interview with 
Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro. Rio, 12/11/91.
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6.Forging the consensus
After the decision was actually made/ the stage of 
deliberations about how to make it consensual then started. 
Supporters of the decision attempted to create a positive mood 
for its implementation/ by strongly emphasizing the economic 
aspects associated with the resumption of relations with 
Beijing. Hence, despite the political advantages to be derived 
from a change of Brazilian position towards the PRC, the 
economic aspects favoring the rapprochement had to be 
particularly emphasized as a means of avoiding opposition. In 
Azeredo da Silveira's words, "We had to emphasize the economic 
angle in order to make the resumption more palatable. However, 
the problem was exclusively political. The economic [effects] 
would come in time. (...) the intention was political"82.
It is during this phase that an inter-ministerial 
committee was created. Made up of the Ministries of Industry 
and Commerce, Transport, Communications among others, the 
group's aim was to gather elements, opinions and data which 
"supposedly, would lead to a better evaluation of the benefits 
of resuming commercial relations with the PRC"83. The creation 
of this group was intended to provide a more solid
“interview with Azeredo da Silveira, by Monica Hirst e 
Maria Regina Soares de Lima. Rio, 15/05/79. CPDOC.
“interview with Ambassador ftalo Zappa, former Head of 
Africa, Asia and Oceania Department of Itamaraty under Azeredo 
da Silveira (1974/77). Rio, 10/02/92; and Jornal do Brasil. 
17/08/74.
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justification for a decision which had indeed already been 
taken. As a top diplomat put it, "the unrevealed aim was much 
more ambitious. What did occur was the restoration of 
diplomatic relations (...) Nonetheless, this sort of procedure 
is... let's say, an artifice (...) when it is aimed at 
underpinning a certain decision"84. This being so, the 
conclusion reached by this inter-ministerial group was that 
the prospects of boosting the commerce between the two 
countries were gloomy85. Even so the strategy of stressing the 
economic advantages of having a closer relationship with 
Beijing seems to have been rather efficient86.
As part of this process of making the restoration of 
diplomatic relations with Beijing a consensual decision, 
Geisel himself addressed the National Security Council. He had 
the report prepared by Azeredo da Silveira mentioned above, as 
well as Counsellor Bettencourt's account of his mission to 
Beijing. That was in May 1974s7. In so doing Geisel tried to 
secure the endorsement of the military class for a decision 
previously made using the formal instruments of the decision
Confidential interview.
“interview with Ambassador Italo Zappa. Rio, 10/02/92.
“At the interview with the Head of Armed Forces Staff 
during Geisel's government, General Antonio Jorge Correa, he 
asserted that the commercial aspect had carried a lot of 
weight in the final decision. In fact, this feature was 
responsible for the reevaluation of the anti-Communist aspects 
involved in the subject, since the maintenance of such a 
stance could deprive Brazil of "gaining access to a high 
valuable market". Rio, 18/03/92.
87ABREU,Hugo de. op.cit. . p.41.
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making process88.
In opposition to Geisel's apparently optimistic 
expectations based on the fact that the Chinese question was 
gradually becoming accepted by the military class - remember 
the note from the General Secretary of the NSC, allowing 
Chinese vessels to dock in Brazilian harbors and vice-versa - 
three military members, from a total of 10 military and 11 
civilians, of the National Security Council voted against the 
restoration of diplomatic relations with Beijing89. In order 
to secure military support for his decision, president Geisel 
then decided to persuade them through a special envoy90. 
Nevertheless, the decision lacked unanimous approval: the Army 
Minister, General Sylvio Frota maintained his opposition91.
“LIMA, Maria Regina S.de & MOURA,Gerson. "A Trajet6ria do 
Pragmatismo - uma an£lise da politica externa brasileira". 
Dados - Revista de CiAncias Sociais. Rio de Janeiro, 25(3), 
1982, p.349-63, p.360; "Politica Externa", Jornal da Tarde. 
30/01/79.
“Minister of Navy, Azevedo Henning; the Head of the Air 
Force Staff, Brigadier Paulo Ribeiro Gongalves; and Minister 
of Army, Sylvio Frota. Confidential interview;"CSN - Urn super 
minist6rio, mas aparece pouco", Jornal do Brasil. 22/08/82; 
and Interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Maria Regina S. Lima 
and Monica Hirst. Rio, 7/06/79.
^It is presumed that Geisel commissioned the Head of his 
Military Staff, general Hugo de Abreu, to do so, since he was 
the link between the presidency and the military class. 
However, the sources are not definitive on this aspect. Idem, 
ibidem; and interview with Walder de G6es. DF, 19/11/91.
^Confidential interview. On October 12, 1977, when Frota 
was sacked from the government due to his difference^* with /H 
Geisel, he issued an open letter in which he confirmed his 
opposition to the restoration of diplomatic relations with 
Beijing, saying: "The resumption of diplomatic relations with 
the People's Republic of China, who embraces precisely 
antagonistic values to ours, was done under conditions against 
our sovereignty and by so doing this decision constituted the
242
There is no precise account on how the final consensus 
was eventually reached, or rather, compelled. It is said that 
when Geisel was informed about the persistence of the veto, 
e.g., That the necessary unanimity was still missing, he 
instructed the Head of the Military Staff, General Hugo de 
Abreu, to tell the members of the NSC that he, Geisel, was not 
asking their opinion about the subject, but just ordering them 
to sign the minute of a supposed National Security Council 
meeting which would have approved the restoration of 
diplomatic relations with Beijing92. In its turn the Jornal da 
Tarde gave a different and even more dramatic version. This 
journal says that "during a meeting held between Geisel and 
his more influential colleagues, he banged his fist on the 
table and finished the conversation saying: 'I am not here to 
ask you for permission, but rather to notify you that Brazil 
is going to restore diplomatic relations with Communist 
China"93. Despite these different versions, it is clear that 
what had been initiated as an attempt of tranquilly getting 
the NSC members' endorsement for a decision already taken94, 
turned into an imposition from the president.
first step of the socialist escalation towards the domination 
of the country". My translation. Veia. 19/10/77, p.22.
92Interview with Walder de G6es. DF, 19/11/91.
93"Politica Externa". Jornal da Tarde, 30/01/79. My 
translation.
MIt is worth noting that these consultations a posteriori 
seemed to have been a routine during Geisel's government. 
Interview with JoAo Paulo dos Reis Veloso. Rio, 27/03/92. 
Interview with Colonel Kurt Pessek, assistant to General Hugo 
de Abreu at the Military Staff cabinet. DF, 21/11/91.
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Finally, Brazil resumed diplomatic relations with 
Beijing, recognizing the People's Republic as the sole and 
legitimate representative of the Chinese people. In addition, 
Brazil decided to take note of Beijing's position affirming 
that. Taiwan was an inextricable part of the territory of the 
PRC; as well as agreeing that the restoration of relations 
between the two countries was based on the Five Pacific 
Coexistence Principles of Chinese foreign policy95. This note, 
dated August 15, 1974, followed the arrival of the Chinese 
commercial mission to Brazil led by the External Commerce 
Minster's Deputy, Chen Chieh, on August 7, 1974, who actually 
had been counting on the Brazilian decision being announced96.
7.Conclusion
It is not the aim of this thesis to claim that the
95BRASIL.MRE.Resenha de Politica Exterior do Brasil, ano 
1, n.ll, Brasilia, MRE, jul/ago/set. 1974, p.71. The five 
principles were: mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference 
in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, 
and peaceful coexistence.
^Interview with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, by Asp&zia 
Camargo, Monica Hirst e Leticia Pinheiro. Petr6polis, 
23/03/85; and interview with Chen-Chieh conducted by Vejaf 
when after being asked if the Chinese delegation came to 
Brazil conscious of the imminence of the restoration of 
relations, he answered that the dialogue towards this step had 
been initiated when Counsellor Bettencourt went to Beijing in 
April 1974 Veja. 21/08/74, p.27.
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anti-Communist stance embraced by Brazilian military regime 
since the 1964 coup was of such intensity that the country 
could not have amicable relations with Communist regimes. 
Indeed, since the first military government, trade relations 
with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe were developed 
significantly97. Rather, my aim was to appraise the elements 
which overcame the opposition towards the expansion of 
Brazilian relations with other Communist regimes.
I have argued that since the beginning of 1970s some 
aspects enhanced a new stand towards the PRC, and pointed to 
the international reassessment of Beijing shown by her 
admission to the UN, and to the effects of the US 
rapprochement on the Western countries. In addition, I 
examined the political and economic aspects that favored the 
normalization of relations between Brasilia and Beijing.
In spite of those good prospects, a redirection of the 
Brazilian stance towards Beijing was still rejected by an 
important and powerful faction of the government, namely the 
more conservative military men for whom China was still a 
threat to the stability of the regime. By way of example, when 
Brazil restored diplomatic relations with the PRC, military
^For a brief account of Brazilian trade relations with 
the Communist bloc, see HURRELL,Andrew J. The Quest for 
Autonomy: The Evolution of Brazilys Role in the International 
System. 1964-1985. Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford, University of Oxford, 
1986, p.87, 117-18, 174-76.
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writings still expressed their opposition to this conduct98. 
Indeed, this opposition was not only expressed in intellectual 
statements, but as I have shown, in the actual positions taken 
within the decision arena.
Despite this fact, Geisel succeeded in changing the 
policy towards Beijing. Therefore, it is my hypothesis that 
Brazil's decision to restore diplomatic relations with Beijing 
cannot be correctly explained either only within the first 
debate proceeding "top-down" (International system vs. nation 
state) or within the second debate also proceeding "top-down" 
(nation state vs. bureaucracy). Indeed, neither the Western 
countries' positive stance towards Beijing, nor the supposed 
benefits a closer relationship with Beijing would bring about, 
were enough to make the resumption of diplomatic relations 
feasible. Indeed, this study showed that there was serious 
resistance within the decision arena to be crushed in order to 
proceed to its implementation.
98MYIAMOTO, Shiguenoli & GONgALVES,William da Silva. 
"Militares, Diplomatas e Politica Externa no Brasil p6s-64". 
Primeira Versao. n.36, IFCH/UNICAMP, 1991, p.11.
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Chronology
* October 1, 1949 - The People's Republic of China is 
proclaimed.
* November 24, 1949 - Brazilian ambassador to China leaves the 
country for Japan.
* March 1, 1950 - Chiang Kai-shek resumes the Presidency of 
China in Taiwan.
* December 18, 1952 - Brazilian ambassador notifies Itamaraty 
that he had reassumed his position as Brazilian representative 
to the Chinese government, in Taipei.
* August, 1961 - Brazil declares its supports for the 
resolution presented to the XVI General Assembly to include on 
the agenda Beijing's readmission to the United Nations.
* August, 1961 - Brazilian vice-president, Joao Goulart, goes 
to Beijing escorted by a large group of government officials 
and private sector representatives. Once there, he signs a 
Trade and Payments Agreement with Beijing.
* April, 1964 - Nine Chinese officials are arrested on the 
accusation of performing espionage and subversive activities 
in Brazil.
* April, 1965 - The Chinese officials arrested one year 
earlier, are expelled from Brazil.
* October, 1971 - Brazilian Counsellor to Hong-Kong, Geraldo 
Holanda Cavalcanti, joins a private commercial mission to the 
PRC, led by the entrepreneur HorAcio Coimbra.
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* October 25, 1971 - The XXVI General Assembly approves the 
PRC readmission to the UN. Brazil votes against.
* February, 1972 - Nixon's visit to Beijing where he signs the 
"Shanghai Communique".
* October, 1972 - A second Brazilian private mission is sent 
to China led by the president of Association of Brazilian 
Exporters (Associagao Brasileira dos Exportadores), the 
businessman Giulite Coutinho.
* October 1972 - An official mission led by the Brazilian 
Chief of Staff, general Artur Duarte Fonseca, goes to Taipei.
* October, 1973 - The General Secretariat of the National 
Security Council issues a report authorizing the lifting of 
the prohibition on Brazilian vessels from docking at Chinese 
harbors and vice-versa.
* March, 1974 - During a ceremony at the Greek Embassy in 
Moscow, a Chinese official expresses to a Brazilian diplomat 
the interest of his government in expanding its relations with 
Brazil beyond the commercial field.
* April 10-15, 1974 - A commercial mission led by the
entrepreneur Giulite Coutinho goes to Canton.
* April 2, 1974 - Itamaraty gives instructions to Counsellor
Bettencourt to take the necessary steps towards the
rapprochement with Beijing.
* April 8, 1974 - The Foreign Minister's Deputy, Ambassador
Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, is told by Azeredo da Silveira that 
the resumption of diplomatic relations with the PRC had 
already been decided.
* April 9, 1974 - Azeredo da Silveira's report to Geisel
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suggests the restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC.
* May, 1974 - Geisel consults the National Security Council 
about the resumption of diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
Three military members vote against. After some negotiations, 
Geisel compels the Council to endorse his decision.
* August 7, 1974 - A Chinese commercial mission led by the 
External Commerce Minster's Deputy, Chen Chieh, arrives in 
Brazil.
* August 15, 1974 - Brazil and the PRC restore diplomatic 
relations.
Chapter VI
The recognition of Angolan Independence
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On November 11, 1975, the date agreed between Portugal 
and the Angolan groups, Angolan independence was declared and 
Brazil recognized the government installed in Luanda. In so 
doing, Brazil automatically recognized the Cuban-Soviet backed 
government of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola/Movimento Popular de LibertagSo de Angola (MPLA). In 
spite of the alterations in Brazilian foreign policy proposed 
by President Geisel, of which a policy of significant 
rapprochement to the African continent was a landmark1, this 
decision was a breakthrough in the pattern of Brazilian 
foreign relations. Indeed, for a government which did not 
follow their regional partners on the lifting of sanctions 
against Cuba, and had to impose the normalization of relations 
with Beijing over the internal military opposition, it is hard 
to believe that the decision in favor of a Cuban-backed 
government had been taken without a good deal of internal 
conflict.
True, there were strong forces that favored and indeed 
made feasible the taking of such a step. As far as domestic 
interests are concerned, the Brazilian need for new
Minister Azeredo da Silveira's broadcasted speech, 
28/03/74, in BRASIL.MRE.Resenha de Politics Exterior do 
Brasil. ano I, n.l. Brasilia, DF, Junho 1974, p.23-24.
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international markets, and for guaranteeing oil supplies must 
be taken into account. Therefore, it was crucial for Brazil to 
free itself from years of support for Portuguese colonialism 
by adopting an indisputably pro-independence stance so as to 
enhance its relations with African countries. Likewise, the 
fact that Washington seemed to be prepared to accept Brazilian 
policy towards Luanda, also might have encouraged Geisel to go 
ahead with his plans of recognizing Angolan independence 
regardless of the group in power. Nevertheless, I argue that 
it is indeed in the analysis of the decision making process 
that we can find a complete account of the episode, since it 
was there where the final obstacles were overcome.
Firstly this chapter aims to give a brief account of 
the political, economic and strategic reasons behind the 
Brazilian policy towards African colonialism from the end of 
World War II to the inauguration of Geisel's government. Then 
the role of Africa within Geisel's foreign policy of 
"Responsible Pragmatism" will be examined. Finally, the 
process which led to the final decision to recognize Angolan 
independence, which comprises an overview of Brazilian 
interests in doing so, will be scrutinised.
As I will be working from a decision making 
perspective, once again I will have to deal with the problems 
related to the reliability of sources or even to the complete 
lack of sources. This problem is particularly serious because 
the decision under analysis in this chapter touches upon the
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involvement of Cuban troops in the Angolan civil war, a fact 
surrounded by great controversy. As Sola Soremekum put it, 
"how much reliability do we have on sources in an atmosphere 
so charged with propaganda, rumors, false and genuine news and 
opinions, all mixed together? (...) Another problem which 
bothered observers was that of the chronology of events. (...) 
no one should really be surprised that dates of events could 
become tools of political and diplomatic manoeuvre. At such, 
some of the dates of events were conveniently distorted by 
their adversaries. The result had been that for the present 
few researchers could answer seemingly simple questions [like] 
(...) When did the Cubans first come into Angola in small 
batches, and in larger groups? (...) "2.
In addition, as far as Brazilian public sources are 
concerned, any question associated with Havana used to be 
immediately classified. Therefore, what follows is an attempt 
to retrieve the significance of the decision making process 
for the contents and for the enforcement of a certain 
decision, rather than a complete assessment of all steps taken 
during the whole process3. Although I am aware that some 
important information might be missing, I argue that the 
available material is sufficient to appraise the importance of 
the decision making process for the explanation of the final 
outcome.
2SOREMEKUM,Sola. Angola: the road to independence. lie- 
Ife, Nigeria. University of Ife Press Ltd, 1983, p.177-78.
3For the sake of clarity a chronology of events is 
included at the end of this chapter (Appendix V).
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1.Brazilian Foreign Policy towards African Colonialism - a 
historical perspective. 1946-1974
From the end of World War II, when the decolonization 
issue reached the international agenda, to the inauguration of 
Geisel's government, Brazil's position towards the question 
was very ambiguous, since it was a mixture of: 1)condemnation 
of the economic exploitation of the colonies and its 
consequences for the less developed countries; 2)general 
declarations in favor of autonomy and self-government; and 
3)actual support for the colonial powers, based on the need to 
constrain the alleged Communist expansion and of endorsing 
Luso-Brazilian friendship4.
* Although always present in Brazil's stance on the issue, 
these aspects had different weight throughout the period. For 
instance, during the governments of Eurico Dutra (1946-51) and 
Gettilio Vargas (1951-54), in spite of advocating the principle 
of independence, Brazil actively supported the colonial powers 
by voting against or abstaining from voting on anti- 
Colonialist resolutions in the United Nations (UN) sessions. 
In order to balance these contradictory positions, 
declarations in defence of "the creation of an atmosphere of 
patient moderation and tolerance within which the
4For an analysis of those elements on the Brazilian 
position towards African colonialism from 1946 to 1960, see 
PINHEIRO,Leticia. Agao e Omissao: a ambiguidade da politics 
brasileira frente ao processo de descolonizagao africana^ 
1946-1960. Rio de Janeiro, Masters thesis, IRI/PUC, 1988.
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administering powers themselves would best promote the 
eventual autonomy of colonial people"5, were repeatedly 
stated.
The reasons behind such a policy were both the
commitment to an international anti-Communist policy bound by 
Brazil's relationship with the United States6, and the strong 
attachment to European values in general, and Portuguese in
particular, held by Brazilian elites. Indeed, the impassioned
belief of the existence of a so called "Luso-Brazilian
Community" which linked Brazil to its former master by means 
of a "traditional friendship", induced the idea that Brazil 
should cooperate with Portugal in its "civilizing mission"7. 
According to this view Brazil was itself the best and most 
successful example of Portuguese colonial policy. In so doing, 
as Selcher put it, "for Brazil to join the anticolonialist 
chorus condemning Portugal would be [as far as the supporters 
of such belief were concerned, the] equivalent to its
sSELCHER,Wayne. The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian 
Foreign Policy. 1956-1972. Gainesville, The University of 
Press of Florida, 1974, p.145.
6For an analysis of United States role in the Brazilian 
foreign policy from 1946 to 1954, see MOURA,Gerson. Q 
alinhamento sem recompensa: a polltica externa do ooverno
Dutra. Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC/FGV, 1990; and HIRST,Monica. Q 
Pragmatismo impossivel: a polltica externa do secrundo governo 
Varoas (1951/1954). Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC/FGV, 1990.
7For a complete account of the "Luso-Brazilian Community", 
see FREYRE,Gilberto. O mundo que o Portugues criou. Rio de 
Janeiro, Jos6 Olympio Editora, 1940; and FREYRE,Gilberto. JM 
brasileiro em terras portuguesas. Rio de Janeiro. Jos6 Olympio 
Editora, 1953.
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rejection of the valuable Portuguese heritage it enjoys"8.
From this period dates the signature of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Consultation (November 16, 1953) between Lisbon 
and Rio de Janeiro. In this agreement the two countries agreed 
to consult each other in advance on international matters of 
common interest. Furthermore, the Treaty stated that both 
parties would give a special treatment to each other's 
nationals, making them equal to their own, as far as 
commercial and financial aspects were concerned. Moreover, 
both countries would provide free entry and exit for their 
nationals and would make themselves "to study, whenever 
opportune and necessary, means of developing the progress, 
harmony and prestige of the Luso-Brazilian Community in the 
world"9.
As far as the economic aspects were concerned, African 
colonialism basically portrayed the role of a potential 
competitor with Brazil in terms of the exports of primary
8SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian...". op.cit.. p.63.
9BRASIL.MRE.Divisao de Atos, Congressos e Confer&ncias
Internacionais. Brasil-Portugal: Tratado de Amizade £
Consulta. Colegao de Atos Internacionais, n.357. Rio de 
Janeiro, Servigo de Publicagoes do Ministdrio das Relagoes 
Exteriores, 1955, quoted by Idem, p.149. It is worth noting, 
however, the existence of the so called "Interpretative Notes" 
(Notas Interpretativas), a document signed by the two 
countries in 1958 in the regulation of the Treaty. These 
classified notes stated that whilst "Brazil" should be 
understood as including all Brazilian territory, the so called 
"overseas provinces" should not be included in the meaning of 
Portugal. In so doing, the government of Prime-Minister 
Oliveira Salazar prevented Brazil from having any access to 
the Portuguese colonies. PINHEIRO,L. op.cit. p.99.
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products (particularly coffee and cocoa), and of foreign 
investment10. Despite these shortcomings, however, Brazilian 
lusophilia and alliance to the Western bloc was strong enough 
to justify a non-commitment towards African decolonization11.
During the subsequent government (Juscelino 
Kubitscheck, 1956-61), Brazilian stance towards African 
colonialism continued to be defined by the same reasoning. 
Indeed, although Brazil had supported Resolution n.1514 
(Declaration on Independence for Colonial Countries and 
Peoples) at the XV UN General Assembly (1960), it 
simultaneously abstained from voting on Resolution n.1573 
asking for Algerian self-determination, and voted against 
Resolution n.1542 which obliged Portugal to make available 
information on her colonies to the UN. In short, Brazil 
endeavored to accommodate its need to follow the international 
majority, with its loyalty to Portugal.
However, the signature of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and
10The so called "Point IV", a plan of economic assistance 
for underdeveloped countries, proposed by President Harry 
Truman (1945-53) in early 1949, not only gave priority to 
technical assistant and to private investment, but favored the 
Afro-Asian countries in particular, to the detriment of Latin 
America. MOURA,Gerson. Linhas de pensamento e agao da polltica 
externa brasileira - o Governo Dutra (1946-50)". Relatdrio, 
Convfenio MRE/CPDOC-FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 1983, p.103.
"According to Brazil's Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes 
(1946-51 and 1954), the Brazilian delegates at the UN should 
avoid giving the impression that the "organized anti-communist 
front" was divided, by not opposing the colonial powers. 
Letter from Raul Fernandes to Brazilian delegation at UN, 
12/08/50. Brazilian Foreign Ministry Archives/ONU/Of icios/ago- 
dez 1951.
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its prospects of increased African opportunities in 
international trade through the European Common Market, 
increased Brazilian fears of African competition. Therefore, 
notwithstanding Kubitschek's support for Portuguese 
colonialism in particular, Brazil co-sponsored the UN 
Resolution n.671 (XIII General Assembly, 1958) creating the 
Economic Committee for Africa (ECA). Brazilian delegates 
stated that the ECA would increase international control over 
the African economy, and would enhance fair competition 
between Brazil's and Africa's similar export products, by 
exposing and, as a consequence, by abolishing the exploitation 
of African workers, which was responsible for the low prices 
of African products12.
Over the following years the so called Independent 
Foreign Policy (1961-64) inaugurated a shift in Brazil's 
position towards the African continent. As noted by Selcher, 
"Quadros consciously sought to use an anticolonial posture as 
an ideological instrument to increase Brazilian prestige among 
African nations for cooperation in development"13. Indeed, in 
his first address to the Congress, President J&nio Quadros 
(1961) proposed a policy of enhancing common Afro-Brazilian 
interests in the international system, as well as condemning 
colonialism and racism14. Therefore Brazilian embassies in
12PINHEIRO,L. op.cit. . p. 104.
13SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian. . ." op.cit. . p. 157.
14BRASIL.PRESIDfiNCIADAREPtJBLICA. QUADROS, J&nio. Mensagem 
ao Congresso Nacional. Rio de Janeiro, Departamento de 
Imprensa Nacional, 1961, pp.91-101, p.96.
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Accra, Dakar, Lagos, and Porto Novo, and consulates in Nairobi 
and Salisbury, as well as in Portuguese Africa were created; 
scholarships for African students to receive training in 
Brazilian universities were sponsored by the Foreign Ministry; 
and steps were taken towards economic cooperation in common 
export products, like the establishment of the Cocoa Producers 
Alliance with Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Togo and 
Cameroon, etc15.
During Quadros' government Brazil also played down its 
support for Portugal in international organizations, even 
abandoning its traditional opposition to any resolution 
condemning Portuguese colonialism. By way of example, Brazil 
backed the terms of the UN Resolution n.1603, which called 
upon the Portuguese government to take the necessary steps to 
bring independence to Angola. In spite of this initial support 
for the resolution, however, Brazil finally abstained alleging 
that the second part of the resolution which created a special 
committee to conduct enquiries into Angola was "inoperative, 
excessive, and conducive to useless complications"16. 
Regardless of the fact that by doing so Brazil was again 
trying not to upset Portugal, the abstention per se 
represented some evolution in Brazil's position on the issue.
Nevertheless, those attitudes lacked a more solid 
basis, or perhaps, a wider consensus, on which a long-standing
15SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian... " , op.cit. . p.84-85.
16Idem/ p. 158.
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or a more consistent policy could be built. By way of example, 
only one month after having almost voted in favor of the above 
mentioned resolution, the Brazilian ambassador to Lisbon, 
NegrSo de Lima, publicly praised Portugal for what it had 
accomplished in Angola17. It must be emphasized that these 
statements were made after Negrao de Lima's visit to Luanda in 
May 1961, precisely when the Portuguese government was 
brutally repressing the Angolan armed rebellion which started 
in February, 1961.
Despite the fact that the subsequent government of JoAo 
Goulart (1961-64) maintained Brazil's support for 
decolonization and development in Africa, the priority of 
internal problems, and the remaining links with Portugal 
hindered the deepening and the improvement of the Afro- 
Brazilian relationship. Thus, notwithstanding the vote in 
favor of at least two anti-Colonialist Resolutions18, during
17Idem. ibidem: HIRSON, Zenaide Scotti. 0 Brasil e a
Ouestao Colonial Portuguesa: o caso angolano. Master thesis, 
Brasilia, UnB, July 1979, p.87-8; and RODRIGUES,Jos€ Hon6rio 
Brazil and Africa. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1965, p.319-20.
180n July 31, 1963, Brazil not only refused to support the 
Portuguese formula of considering its colonies around the 
world as "overseas provinces", but moreover it voted in favor 
of Resolution n.S/5.380 considering Portuguese policies in 
Africa a threat to peace and security, and requested that all 
states avert giving to Portugal any assistance, arms, or 
military equipment which could be used to wage colonial wars. 
RODRIGUES,J.H.op.cit.. p.327, 334; SELCHER,W. "The Afro-
Asian..." op.cit.. p.162-3; and on January 30, 1962, Brazil 
voted in favor of UN Resolution n.1742, which, among other 
points, lamented the lack of Portuguese cooperation with the 
Sub-committee for Angola, and asserted the Angolan people's 
rights of self-government and independence. SELCHER,W. "The 
Afro-Asian..." op.cit.. p.106.
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this period Brazil kept stressing its special ties with 
Portugal19. As Selcher argues, by trying to maintain a 
"friendship with Portugal/ yet defending the independence of 
Portuguese Africa/ to which Lisbon did not concede the 
remotest probability, Brazil was running the risk of 
alienating both Portugal and Black Africa"20.
The military take over in 1964 strengthened the 
Brazilian commitment to the Western bloc. In addition, the 
traditional friendship with Portugal was reinforced by the 
similar authoritarian profile of Portugal's and Brazil's new 
regime. As a result, the more progressive Brazilian stance 
towards African decolonization taken during the years of 
Independent Foreign policy was halted. As far as the colonies 
were concerned, the interests of their masters should be the 
only aspect to be taken into account. According to President 
Castello Branco (1964-67), "a realist policy of 
anticolonialism can neither ignore Portugal's case, nor the 
dangers stemming from a premature detachment from the West"21. 
In so doing Brazilian military ideologues and strategists 
strongly stressed the importance of keeping the Communist 
threat at bay, by increasing the protection of the South
19HIRSON,Z.S. op.cit. . p.104-6.
20SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian.. .", op.cit. . p. 160.
21BRANC0,Humberto de A.Castello. A Diplomacia da Revolugao 
Brasileira. Speech delivered to the Instituto Rio Branco 
graduates. Rio de Janeiro, 31/07/74. MRE. Departamento de 
Administragao, p.10. My translation.
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Atlantic region22. Nevertheless, the interest and the 
possibility of Brazilian participation in the creation of SATO 
(South Atlantic Treaty Organization) - a treaty analogous to 
NATO, seen as a redoubt against a possible Soviet presence in 
the South Atlantic by creating a military alliance between 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and South Africa - was constantly 
rejected23. Although the military regime paid a lot of 
attention to the region, it did not bestow it with a more
22According to Golbery do Couto e Silva, "Combat 
underdevelopment in backward areas in Brazil and the rest of 
the continent, cooperate also in the immunization of the 
young African countries to the fatal infection of Communism, 
be vigilant and attentive to any Soviet advance toward the 
Atlantic coast of Africa where the advanced and decisive 
frontier on our own national security is situated, 
collaborate by all means to keep it totally free of Communist 
domination - these are, more or less well-delineated, in a 
tentative order of decreasing priority, the principal 
directives which seem to us to be non-deferrable in a 
Brazilian geopolitics adequate to the present agitated and 
cataclysmic period, in a struggling world in the throes of a 
most' brutal collision of antagonistic civilizations". 
SILVA,Golbery do Couto e. Geopolltica do Brasil. Rio de 
Janeiro, Jos6 Olympio, 1967, p.137. As translated and quoted 
by SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian..." op.cit.. p.72-73. And as 
once clearly and straightforwardly put by general Carlos de 
Meira Mattos, "The moment a military power hostile to Brazil 
occupies Africa's Atlantic coast, at any point from Morocco to 
the Republic of South Africa, we will begin to feel in our 
country a climate of intranquillity and bellicose pressure 
without precedent in our history... In the framework of 
continental defense and Western strategy today Africa concerns 
Brazil much more than any other area of the universe. It will 
be there that we will have to protect our own territory from 
the horrors of war". MEIRA MATTOS, Carlos de. Proiegao Mundial 
do Brasil. Sao Paulo, Gr£fica Leal, 1961, p.25, quoted by 
SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian..." op.cit.. p.72.
^For an analysis of Brazil's position on this subject, 
see HURRELL, Andrew. "The Politics of South Atlantic Security: 
a survey of proposals for a South Atlantic Organization". 
International Affairs. v.59, n.2, Spring 1983. pp.179-93,
p.188-9; and HURRELL,Andrew. "Nato and the South Atlantic: a 
Case-Study in the Complexities of Out-of-area Operations", in 
COKER,Christopher (ed.) The United States. Western Europe and 
Military Intervention Overseas. London, MacMillan, 1987, 
pp.61-84, p.78-82.
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effective military policy, either because of the lack of 
support for the idea from the US, or because of Brazil's faith 
in the existing defence mechanisms such as the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947). Rather, Castello 
Branco opted for the strength of the "Luso-Brazilian 
Community" as a way of ensuring control along the Brazilian 
coast without committing the country to a military alliance 
which would incur higher costs than benefits.
In addition, the independent African states lost their 
importance in Brazilian foreign relations. From then on Africa 
was seen as belonging to the outer circle of Brazilian 
interests, after Latin America, the Western Hemisphere and the 
Western Community as a whole24. This was what became known as 
the principle of "concentric circles of solidarity", which was 
supposed to establish priorities for Brazilian foreign 
relations. The exception was South Africa, Brazil's chief 
commercial partner on the continent25. In trying to explain 
the maintenance of its strong economic links with Pretoria, 
notwithstanding condemning South Africa's presence in Namibia 
and Rhodesia, and denouncing the apartheid regime26 based on 
Brazil's alleged racial democracy, Brasilia made use of 
conciliatory explanations, by asserting that "international
24BRANCO,H.A.Castello. op.cit.. p.6.
25MARTINIERE,Guy. "La Politique Africaine du Brdsil (1970-
1976)". Problemes d'Amerique Latine (Note et Etudes 
Documentaires). Paris, v.XLVIII, n.4474, Juliet 1978, pp.7-64, 
p. 7.
26Idem, p. 14.
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isolation would not help the conditions of the blacks of the 
country"27. In summary, by exercising a declaratory policy of 
opposing the apartheid regime and, simultaneously, keeping its 
trade links with South Africa, Brazil took part in the general 
outcry against Pretoria regime without actually damaging its 
economic interests.
During the subsequent government of Costa e Silva 
(19 67-69) a slightly greater interest in Third World 
countries, led to a more critical stand regarding the 
colonialism issue - a position usually ascribed to the 
influence of anti-colonialist groups in Itamaraty28. As a 
consequence of this renewed interest in the issue, which 
encompassed intentions to explore new trade opportunities, to 
strengthen contacts with African coffee-exporting states, and 
to promote general political and economic activities in the 
region, new diplomatic and consular posts were created 
throughout Africa. In addition, the Division on Africa and the 
Middle East was finally detached from Itamaraty's Western 
European Bureau. From then on African and Middle Eastern 
affairs were handled by a special division (Secretaria Geral 
Adjunta para a Africa e Oriente M6dio).
However, the complaints of the Salazar government
^SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations with Portuguese Africa
in the context of the elusive 'Luso-Brazilian Community'". 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v.18, n.l, 
February 1976, pp. 25-58, p.34-5.
28SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian...", op.cit.. p.172-73.
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against Brazilian attempts to approach Africa directly, led 
Costa e Silva to turn back to a traditional support for
Portugal29. As a result, Brazil ratified some treaties with 
Portugal allowing the country to benefit from Portuguese
economic concessions and privileges in Angola, as well as in 
Mozambique30. From then on Angolan high quality petroleum 
became a possible alternative source for Brazil. Indeed, in 
September 1968, Brazil's state oil company, PETROBRAS, 
considered the possibility of taking part in the Angolan 
petroleum prospect and drilling31. Although still on a small 
scale Brazil was, step by step, becoming more and more
involved with Angolan, as well Mozambiquean, colonial status.
The subsequent administration (Garrastazti M6dici, 1969- 
74) kept the same kind of relationship. 1972 was declared by 
both'nations to be the "Year of the Luso-Brazilian Community", 
one of various ways of celebrating the one hundred and 
fiftieth anniversary of Brazilian independence. New Luso-
Brazilian agreements allowing Brazilian firms to operate in 
all Portuguese colonies were signed32. As a consequence, on 
the one hand Brazilian business in Portuguese Africa, mainly
29Idem, p. 171-74.
30ldem, p. 174.
31 Idem, p.176.
32ABREU, Fernando Jos§ Marroni de. L'evolution de la 
politique africaine du Br6sil. Memoire redige sous la 
direction de M.le Professeur Georges Couffignal. University 
Pantheon Sorbonne (Paris I). Novembre 1988 p.54; and 
HIRSON,Z.S. op.cit.. p.108.
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in Angola and Mozambique, blossomed33; on the other, Brazil 
also hoped to benefit economically, technically and 
politically from Portuguese membership of EFTA and, 
eventually, of the EEC34.
It is clear that this policy reflected the lack of a 
long-term view envisioning that the eventual independence of 
the Portuguese colonies would make the new African leaders 
hostile to Brazil because of the letter's strong association 
with the colonial regime. It is also true, however, that this 
view was no longer consensual in the decision making arena. 
The worsening of the pro-independence struggle in the region 
led to some disagreements regarding the best way to satisfy 
the so called national interests35. The quarrel between the 
Finance Minister, Delfim Netto, and the Foreign Minister, 
MArio Gibson Barboza, is a case to be noted. Whilst the former 
favored the maintenance of access to Africa through Portugal 
and the maintenance of strong trade links with South Africa, 
ignoring its political implications, the latter favored a more 
independent and anti-colonialist stance to improve the 
relationship with the continent as a whole, by directly
33By way of example, Brazilian exports to Angola increased 
from U$700.000 in 1971 to U$4.500.000 in 1973. MARTINIERE,G . 
op.cit.f p.19.
34SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian...", op.cit. r p. 181.
35According to Selcher, during the M6dici government the 
"national interests" were interpreted as being the aim of 
easing "in all possible ways the rapid development of economic 
and political potential" towards the accomplishment "the dream 
of major power international status". SELCHER,W. "The Afro- 
Asian...", op.cit.. p.33.
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approaching the independent African states36. In the end, the 
Foreign Minister's visit to Africa (October 25 to November 20, 
1972 )37, which was initially thought to be a way to improve 
relations with Africa, though not necessarily a reproach to 
the Portuguese colonialist policy38, strengthened the view 
that the time for ambiguities was running short39.
Indeed, from then on the government started to evaluate 
the actual political and economic advantages of keeping its 
"special relationship" with Portugal. Not being able - or
36SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations...", op.cit.. p.27-28; 
and SELCHER,W. "The Afro-Asian...", op.cit.. p.194.
37Minister Gibson Barboza visited nine countries - 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Zaire, Ghana, 
Dahomey, and Gabon.
38Angolan independence movements kept being censured by 
Brazilian delegation in the General Assembly. On November 14, 
1972  ^along with United States, Great Britain, Spain and South 
Africa, Brazil voted against Resolution n. 2918/XXVII, which 
proclaimed the Angolan, Guinea Bissau and Mozambiquean 
liberation movements as "authentic representatives" of their 
respective native population. MARTINIERI,G . op.cit.. p.16.
39By way of example, during his visit to Africa Minister 
Gibson Barboza was questioned by the President and the Foreign 
Minister of Kenya about Brazil's intentions in Africa. 
Moreover they were reported to have declared that "Brazilian 
policies should contribute to the end of colonialism in Africa 
and advance the independence of all African countries". "Gibson 
afirma Kenyatta que Brasil nSo discrimina". Jornal do Brasil. 
20/11/72, quoted by GLASGOW,R. "Pragmatism and Idealism in 
Brazilian Foreign Policy in Southern Africa". Munger Africana 
Library Notes. 23, February 1974, pp.4-20, p.15. Another
interesting example of how Africans were interpreting 
Brasilia's apparent rapprochement with Africa, is given by 
Anani Dzidzienyo who, after giving evidence of Brazil's 
traditional preference for Portugal in colonialist issues 
throughout history, argues: "It will require much more than a 
whistle-stop trip by the Brazilian Foreign Minister through 
some African countries to convince black Africa that Brazil 
and Brazilians have come to grips with the realities of Black 
Africa". DZIDZIENYO,Anani. "Brazil's view of Africa:2". West 
Africaf November 20, 1972, pp.1556-57, p.1557.
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perhaps it was still due to a lack of will - to change its own 
policy towards the issue without Portuguese support, Brasilia 
started to pressure Lisbon to do so following President 
Medici's visit to Lisbon (May 1973 J40. Eventually, not being 
able to convince the Portuguese government to change its 
policy, Brazil finally decided to play down its connections 
with Portuguese Africa as a way of decreasing Brazilian 
commitment to the colonial administration41.
Finally the "oil shock" in late 1973, and the sudden 
Afro-Arab unity, turned Brazil's declaratory stance against 
apartheid and colonialism in general, but sympathetic position 
towards Portuguese colonialist policy42 into an obstacle for 
Brazilian development. On the one hand, being dependent on 
imported oil to fulfil its demands to the extent of nearly 80% 
of its needs, the rise in petroleum prices jeopardized 
Brazilian economic growth due to its effects on the balance of 
payments and anti-inflation program. On the other, due to the 
Afro-Arab unity - which exchanged African support for the 
isolation of Israel for Arab oil boycotts against South 
Africa, Portugal and respective supporters -, to say nothing 
about the role of Nigeria itself which was then an important
^SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations...", op.cit.. p.30.
41ldszn, p.31-2.
42In spite of Brazilian decision of downplaying its 
backing for Portuguese colonialism, on November 2, 1973,
Brazil voted again with Portugal against Resolution 
n.3061/XXVIII which welcomed the independence of Guinea-Bissau 
and condemned Portugal for "illegal occupation" of areas of 
the country. Idemf p.35.
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oil supplier to Brazil, the possibilities of Brazil being 
punished by Arab oil producers were very strong. Indeed, on 
November 24, 1973, a resolution signed by 17 countries from 
Central and East Africa included Brazil as one of the six 
countries recommended for diplomatic and economic sanctions 
unless they immediately ceased their support for white- 
minority governments in Southern Africa43. Therefore, Brazil 
took some steps towards the moderation of its Portuguese 
backing in the UN44, as well towards the adoption of a more 
incisive language when publicly referring to African 
colonialism.
Nevertheless due to the remaining opposition towards a 
radical withdrawal of Brazilian support for Portugal from the 
more conservative elements of the government45; and due to the 
conspicuous Marxist connections held by most of the African 
liberation movements which were antagonistic to the strong 
Brazilian anti-Communist military regime, it was still not 
possible - or rather, perceived as still not desirable - to 
enforce a more assertive policy towards the end of 
colonialism. Once more, the decision towards a substantive
43 Idem, p.37 and 43.
“From then on Brazil started to adopt either abstention 
or absence on UN resolutions about Portuguese questions. Idem, 
p. 38.
“According to Selcher, "dubious about the effectiveness 
of international organizations such as the United Nations, 
proponents of the Community believed that Brazil was giving up 
concrete advantages for the illusory prospect of counting 
African votes on resolutions with little practical effect". 
Idem, p.32-3.
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change on Brazil's stance was left for the following 
government, when the regime's ideological stand was finally 
challenged by a distinct view about changing Brazilian 
national interests held by the ultimate decision makers.
2.Changing course — Brazilian Pragmatic Policy towards African 
colonialism
In his first Cabinet meeting Geisel spelled out his aim 
to give priority to Latin America and Africa saying that the 
foreign policy of his government would give priority Brazil's 
relationship with neighboring sister nations on this and the 
other side of the ocean46. Moreover, Geisel stated that he was 
prepared to make the necessary political realignments towards 
the fulfillment of Brazilian interests47, which in terms of 
policy towards Africa indicated the end of Brazilian 
compliance with Portuguese colonialism.
The reasons for such a remarkable change of direction 
were several. Indeed, the need for new markets for Brazilian 
products as well as the need for strengthening relations with
^BRASIL.PRESIDfiNCIA DA REPtJBLICA. GEISEL, Ernesto.
Discursos. v.l, Assessoria de Imprensa e RelagSes Publicas da 
PresidSncia da Reptiblica. 1975, p.37.
47Idsm, p.38.
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oil producing countries48, and the search for potential 
supporters for many political and economic demands in the 
international system, were strong reasons in favor of a new 
stand on the issue49. It finally became clear to Brazilian 
decision makers that a new and more positive policy towards 
African decolonization should be implemented.
Therefore, following the inauguration of Geisel's 
government - and, moreover, previous to the Portuguese 
Revolution - a secret circular accounting for the Brazilian 
new stance towards African issues was sent to the Cabinet 
members50. It is interesting to note that this circular was 
signed solely by Azeredo da Silveira, even though we can be
48In comparison to the first two months of 1973, during 
January and February of 1974 Brazil spent 550 percent more on 
oil.' It had done so even though the quantity purchased had 
risen just 37.8 percent. SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations..." 
PP t.Sit*., p.45.
49By way of example, it is worth mentioning the impact on 
the M6dici government in November 1973 of the African 
countries' support for Argentina against Brazil in their 
dispute over the utilization of ParanA River, by voting in 
favor of UN Resolution n.3129 which demanded prior 
consultation for cooperative exploitation of resources shared 
by two or more states. Idem, p. 37. For Brazil-Argentine 
dispute over the issue, see LIMA,Maria Regina S. de Lima. The 
PpliticaJ^Economv of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy, 
Trade and Itaipu. Ph.D.thesis, Vanderbilt University, 
Tennessee, August 1986, particularly pp. 356-72.
50Interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Maria Regina 
S.Lima and Monica Hirst. Rio, 24/05/79. The general ideas 
expressed in this circular were restated some months later in 
a speech delivered by the Head of the Department of Africa, 
Asia and Oceanic of Itamaraty, Minister Italo Zappa, in the 
Higher War College (Escola Superior de Guerra/ESG), on July 3, 
lately published by a military periodical: "O Brasil e a
Africa SubssArica". Secruranga e Desenvolvimento. ano XXIV, 
n.158, 1975, pp.35-51. Interview with Italo Zappa. Rio,
10/02/92.
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sure of the total acquiescence of President Geisel51. This may 
have been a strategy to assess the Cabinet reaction towards 
the issue without exposing the President52. According to 
Azeredo da Silveira, whilst all civil and some military 
ministers responded to the note quite positively, other 
military sectors remained silent53.
It was then that the Portuguese Armed Forces 
Movement/Movimento das Forgas Armadas (MFA) on April 25 helped 
Brazil to execute the change in its position towards African 
colonialism. Indeed, the announcement that the new Portuguese 
government was ready to give self-determination to the African 
colonies (April 26, 1974) relieved Brazil of its commitment to 
support Portuguese colonialism. However, it would not be 
correct to ascribe the effective change of Brazilian policy 
solely to the Portuguese political shift. In fact the 
unexpected initial resistance from the new Portuguese regime 
to working on the issue along with Brazil54 and Africa's equal
51 Interview with Azeredo da Silveira with Monica Hirst and 
Maria Regina S. de Lima. Rio, 24/05/79, CPDOC; and interview 
with ftalo Zappa. Rio, 10/02/92.
52Interview with Azeredo da Silveira with Monica Hirst and 
Maria Regina S. de Lima. Rio, 7/06/79. CPDOC.
53 Idem.
^According to Selcher, Portuguese Foreign Minister Mdrio 
Soares ignored the possibilities of Brazil playing a mediatory 
role on the issue, by choosing to consult European partners, 
as well as to talk directly to the African guerrilla leaders. 
SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations...", op.cit.f p. 46.
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recalcitrance due to Brazil's past stance on the question55 
pushed the country towards a more autonomous and pro­
independence attitude. As a result, Brazil recognized the 
Republic of Guinea-Bissau on July 18, 197456, e.g., seventeen 
days before the announcement that Portugal was prepared to 
sign an agreement with this country for the immediate transfer 
of power57.
Nevertheless, as Monica Hirst put it, "although the 
chief political point was Brazil's anti-colonialist position, 
the rapprochement with African colonies also had specific 
political implications due to the prevailing ideological 
options within the African national liberation struggle"58. 
Thus, in spite of the new positive mood towards the
55It is worth noting that Brazil's efforts to collaborate 
with" both parts expressed in the statement sent to the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) on June 8,1974 in response 
to the OAU request, were totally fruitless. No significant 
step or even answer seems to have come from the African 
countries in reply to the Brazilian declaration. MRE.Resenha 
de Polltica Exterior do Brasil, ano I, n.I, Brasilia, junho 
1974, p.67; SELCHER,W. "Brazilian relations..." op.cit. p.49. 
Nevertheless, the clearly ineffective OUA chairmanship of Idi 
Amin and its consequences for the OUA's ascendancy over the 
African countries as a whole, should not be ruled out as a 
reasonable explanation for the low impact of this exchange of 
letters.
56SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations...", op .cit.. p.51; and 
MARTINIERE,G. op.cit.. p.41.
57This announcement followed UN General Secretary Kurt 
Waldheim visit to Lisbon for talks with Portuguese leaders, 
between 2 and 4 August 1974. SOBEL,Lester A. (ed) Portuguese 
Revolution. 1974-76. New York, Facts and File, Inc., 1976, 
p. 70.
58HIRST, Monica. Pesos e Medidas da Polltica Externa 
Brasileira. IV Reuniao dos Centros Membros do RIAL. 
Universidad Sim6n Bolivar. Caracas, 4-6 Outubro 1982, p. 16, 
(mimeo). My translation.
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rapprochement with Africa, it is not the same as saying that 
this rapprochement would happen regardless of the ideological 
implications involved. It is really surprising that there is 
no evidence of complaints from the conservative supporters of 
Brazilian government against the recognition of the Republic 
of Guinea-Bissau, a Marxist-backed state. The reasons are 
various. Amongst them, the fact that, as posited by the then 
Head of Asian, African and Oceanic Department, Ambassador 
Italo Zappa (during a lecture in the ESG), in spite of the 
socialist countries' support for the PAIGC (Partido Africano 
de Independdncia da Guinea e Cabo Verde/African Party of the 
Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), this group knew how to 
avoid an excessive commitment to the extreme left59. Secondly, 
not only had the UN already issued a resolution in favor of 
Guinean sovereignty (Resolution n. 3061/XXVIII), but the OAU as 
well* as 84 individual states had already recognized the new 
Republic. Finally, due to the Portuguese resistance in 
accepting Brazilian mediation, and due to the need for Brazil 
to demonstrate its good intentions towards African 
decolonization so as to ensure the necessary rapprochement on 
the Continent as a whole, the prompt recognition of Guinea- 
Bissau, regardless of its ideological profile, seemed an 
imperative gesture for Brazil to make.
In the Angolan case, however, the conditions were very 
different. Brazil recognized the MPLA government on the day of 
its independence, it did so before all Western countries and,
59ZAPPA, Italo. op.cit. . p. 38.
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moreover, it supported the Cuban-Soviet backed group to the 
detriment of two pro-Western possible rulers, FNLA (Frente 
Nacional para Libertagao de Angola/National Front for 
Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para 
Independfencia Total de Angola/Nation Union for Total 
Independence in Angola). It is to the specificities of the 
Angolan case that I shall now turn.
3. Brazil defines its position towards Angola; "To._the victor*. 
the potatoes"♦
The decision to recognize Guinean independence opened 
up a*new era of Brazilian policy towards African colonialism. 
Therefore a special tour around Africa was scheduled. 
Following Azeredo da Silveira's visit to Dakar (25-29 November
1974), Ambassador Zappa went to Africa to start talks with the 
leaders of the national liberation movements. Then Silveira 
left Africa for Lisbon for talks with his colleague, Foreign 
Minister MArio Soares (2-4 December 1974J60.
♦This expression was originally coined by the Brazilian 
novelist Machado de Assis, in one of his most famous novels. 
It is nowadays employed to indicate a pre-commitment taken by 
the adversaries and/or by the observers of a dispute, towards 
the winner being awarded the object of dispute. AS SIS, Machado. 
Philosopher or dog? (Ouincas Borbal. New York, Noonday Press, 
1954, p.11-12.
nRE. Resenha de Polltica Exterior do Brasil, ano I, 
n.III, Brasilia, DF, dezembro 1974. pp.45-9.
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Silveira's visit to Senegal could be basically 
interpreted as a symbolic gesture towards the African 
continent61, notwithstanding the concession of a U$10 million 
credit to Senegal to finance the import of Brazilian products 
and the signature of an agreement for technical cooperation62. 
It should also be noticed, however, that during his visit 
Silveira met all Brazilian representatives in Africa in order 
to orchestrate the new foreign policy towards the continent63.
As for Silveira's visit to Lisbon, that should be seen 
as an attempt to update both Brazil's and Portugal's 
respective positions64. By this time both countries had 
finally decided to formulate a cooperative - although not 
necessarily common - policy towards Angolan and Mozambiquean 
decolonization, as a result of the talks held between Silveira 
and MArio Soares in New York on September, 197465, when in
61Actually, the fact that Silveira had started his tour by 
Africa and only after had gone to Portugal was regarded as 
"significant" by the Senegalese Foreign Minister, Assane Seek. 
"Neopragmatismo". Vejaf 4/12/74. p.25.
62MARTINIERE,G. op.cit. . p.52.
63BRASIL.Minist6rio das Relagoes Exteriores. Relatdrio, 
1974, p.75; and interview with Azeredo da Silveira by M.Hirst 
and M.R.S. de Lima. Rio, 24/05/79. CPDOC.
wThe Portuguese revolution was by then under the third 
Provisional Government, led by Prime Minister General Vasco 
Gongalves, a leftist who was the senior ideologist of the AMF. 
Moreover, general Antonio de Spinola, a well known moderate, 
with old connections with the Portuguese colonialism had 
already resigned (30/09/74), leaving power almost exclusively 
in the hands of leftist military officers and civilians who 
were very much in favor of the African independence.
65STUMPF,Andr6 Gustavo & PEREIRA,Merval. A Seounda Guerra; 
sucessao de Geisel. Rio, Ed.Braziliense, 1979, p.82.
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response to a Portuguese request, it was settled that Brazil 
would send a special representative to Luanda66.
Before that, however, Ambassador Zappa who was known 
for his ability to combine political and diplomatic skills, 
had been specially invited by Silveira to head the Africa, 
Asia and Oceania Department. Indeed, even before he showed 
such skills abroad, Zappa worked on behalf on the new 
Brazilian policy towards African decolonization by giving 
speeches at the Higher War College as well as by preparing
official documents to be sent to Brazilian embassies and
consulates on this matter. By way of example, on July 4, 1974, 
Zappa gave a speech at the Higher War College stating
Brazilian interests (and even obligations) in having a say in 
favor of African decolonization67. Hence, a few months later 
it was time for him to make the first direct contacts with the 
leaders of African liberation movements towards the
establishment of a normal relationship with the future new 
African states68. Furthermore, the aim of his mission - which 
was performed with Geisel's permission - was to clarify that
“interview with Azeredo da Silveira by Monica Hirst and 
Maria Regina S. de Lima. Rio, 24/05/79. CPDOC. In fact, 
according to Ovidio de Melo, who was later named Brazilian 
Special Representative to Angolan transitional government, he 
was informed about the possibility of being sent to Luanda as 
such, before Silveira departed to Lisbon in December. 
Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras, 10/01/92; 
and interview with ftalo Zappa. Rio, 10/02/92.
67ZAPPA, Italo. op.cit." and interview with Italo Zappa. 
Rio, 10/02/92.
68BRASIL.MRE. Relat6rio. Departamento de AdministragSo, 
1974. p.8-9.
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Brazil would recognize whoever came to power, refusing to 
single out any group or committing support to anyone69. As 
appropriately put by Ovidio Abreu de Melo, it was then that 
the implementation of the policy of "To the victor, the 
potatoes" ("Ao vencedor, as batatas") was decided70. For, 
Zappa met Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Holden Roberto (FNLA), Wilson 
Santos (UNITA), and Samora Machel (FRELIMO - Frente de 
Libertagao de Mogambique/Liberation Front of Mozambique)71.
As a result of this trip, and following the signature 
of the Alvor Agreements72, the then Brazilian General 
Counsellor to London, Ovidio de Andrade Melo, was designated 
to go on a special mission to Angola and Mozambique to propose 
the creation of a special representation before the 
transitional governments73. In the case of Melo succeeding in
69Interview with Italo Zappa. Rio, 10/02/92.
70Interview with Ovidio Abreu de Melo. Vassouras, 
10/01/92.
7I"Um bom inicio". Veja. 18/12/74, p.29.
72Following the Mombasa Summit (3-5/01/75) when the three 
Angolan liberation movements agreed on a common platform of 
negotiation with the Portuguese government, the so called 
Alvor Agreement was signed between Portugal and the three 
Angolan liberation movements, on January 15, 1975 in the
Portuguese province of Algarve. Under the terms of this 
agreement a transitional government which was to be run by the 
three groups was established, the duties of the Portuguese 
High Commissioner were spelled out, free elections within nine 
months were scheduled, and the independence day to be 
proclaimed on November 11, 1975 was finally settled. For the 
complete text of Alvor Accord see SOREMEKUM,S. op.cit.. 
Appendix II, pp.228-235.
73Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras, 
10/01/92.
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his endeavor, Brazil would be the first country to establish 
a diplomatic representation before the future states, and as 
a result, Brazil would make a symbolic gesture towards Africa 
by showing its commitment to make up for the loss of time74. 
At that moment, however, things developed in a more 
complicated way than it had been initially expected.
In spite of Geisel's continuous efforts to free Brazil 
from its historical opposition to African decolonization, by 
supporting the struggle for independence and recognizing 
Guinean independence even before Lisbon had done so, deep and 
old wounds could not be cured by a treatment started so 
recently. Hence, whilst the Angolans were too split to snub 
such an offer, Mozambique could count on FRELIMO's strength 
exemplified by its control of the Mozambiquean transitional 
government75, to express its less than delight with Brazil's 
fresh anti-colonialism76. Thus, whereas Melo was well received 
by the three Angolan movements, FRELIMO representatives denied 
Brazil the creation of such a representation, on the grounds
74Interview with Luiz Augusto Souto Maior, former Head of 
Minister Azeredo da Silveira cabinet. Rio, 5/12/91.
75ANDRESEN-GUIMARAES, Fernando J. C. C. The Origins of the 
Angolan Civil War. London, Ph.D. thesis, London School of 
Economics, march 1992, P.269.
76Indeed, in his first press conference, provisional Prime 
Minister Joaquim Chissano "criticized Brazil for its lack of 
support in the liberation struggle and placed future relations 
with Brazil on the same undecided and uneasy plane as those 
with South Africa". 0 Globo. September 18, 1974, p. 28, quoted 
by SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations...", op.cit.. p. 55.
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of Brazil's past positions on African decolonization77.
At this moment it became clear to Ovidio de Melo - if 
not yet to all Brazilian main decision makers - that an
exemplary Brazilian stance regarding the Angolan independence 
process had become almost a prerequisite for a good
relationship with Mozambique78. FRELIMO was acting as a self- 
appointed custodian of Angolan liberation movement. Actually, 
despite the fact that Mozambiquean independence was proclaimed 
on June 25, 1975, and that Brazil had actually tried to
establish diplomatic relations with Maputo before those with 
Luanda79, they were only achieved on November 15, 1975, i.e.
almost five months after Mozambiquean independence, and not 
coincidentally just four days after Brazilian recognition of 
Angolan independence.
Hence, by having the situation resolved in this way, 
Brazil now had to work on the alternatives at stake in the 
Angolan case. Therefore, taking the view that Brazil should do 
whatever possible to avoid Communist penetration in Africa80, 
the Brazilian government decided to contribute to the agreed 
transference of power from Portuguese to Angolan rulers as a
^Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras, 
10/01/92.
78 Idem.
79Interview with Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti. Sao Paulo, 
14/01/92.
“interview with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro by M.Hirst, 
Asp£zia Camargo and Leticia Pinheiro. Petrdpolis, 23/03/85.
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way of helping the new state to achieve political and, as a 
result, economic independence. What Brazil had not counted on 
was the possibility of a civil war starting during the 
process, and, moreover, of the MPLA being the winner81. So, it 
is to Ovidio de Andrade Melo's mission in Angola, and to the 
period when Brazilian decision makers had to detect and to 
ponder on its options, that I shall now turn.
4.The weighing up of costs and benefits
The document communicating the designation of Brazil's 
Special Representative to the Angolan Transitional Government 
dates from February 26, 197582. From then until the beginning 
of November, Ovidio de Melo was supposed to follow the process 
of transition on fair and impartial grounds. He was also 
supposed to work on behalf of future Brazil-Angola 
cooperation, by offering humanitarian aid to the leaders of 
all three liberation groups. Nevertheless, the apparently 
routine work of accompanying a transitional period which was 
supposed to end in a peaceful and institutional choice of a 
government, turned to be a confusing and risky job with
81 It should be noted that the MPLA was in an inferior
position when this decision was taken. SOREMEKUM,S. op.cit..
p.80-92.
^BRASIL.MRE.Resenha de Politica Exterior do Brasil, ano
II, n.IV. Brasilia,DF, margo 1975. p.92.
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limited options, when clashes between the three rival groups 
started.
According to Melo's testimony, from his first meetings 
with the leaders of the three liberation groups it was clear 
which was the most prepared, although not necessarily the most 
likely group, to run the new state, i.e., the MPLA83. In fact, 
a similar opinion about the MPLA's capabilities was shared by 
the Admiral Leonel Cardoso, the last Portuguese High 
Commissioner84, by some Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
officers85, and by US diplomats in Luanda86. Hence, Melo 
recalls that he gave full evidence of this superiority in his 
reports to Itamaraty87.
However, the overall profile of each group, including 
their ethnic, social and ideological contours had also to be 
taken into consideration by the Brazilian government. The
first two aspects were very important in terms of assessing 
the representativity of each of them within the country88.
“interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras,
10/01/92.
84,,As derradeiras palavras de Portugal". Veja. 19/11/75,
p. 36.
“STOCKWELL,John. In Search of Enemies - a CIA story. 
London, Andre Deutsch, 1978 p.63-4.
“interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras,
10/01/92.
87 Idem.
88MPLA was the organization with the strongest support 
amongst Angolan intellectuals and in the musseques (slums) 
surrounding Luanda, as well as ethnically related to de Mbundu
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Nevertheless, as far as Brazil was concerned, those aspects 
did not touch upon matters of Brazilian national interest. The 
latter feature, however, was a crucial element to be assessed. 
Indeed the political and ideological affiliation of each group 
indicated their likely international supporters and, as a 
consequence, it touched upon Brazil's political as well as 
strategic concerns.
Therefore, Brazil had to ponder on the FNLA's links 
with the United States - basically through the covert action 
performed by the CIA -, with Zaire and with South Africa, to 
say nothing about China; UNITA's initial links with China, and 
then with the United States and South Africa; and MPLA's 
connections with the Soviet Union, Cuba and Eastern Europe89.
Although Geisel had made clear that the foreign policy 
of "Responsible Pragmatism" would no longer be determined by 
"automatic alignments", he did not mean that Brazilian foreign 
policy should be formulated regardless of Brazil's association 
with the Western alliance. In so doing the involvement of
movement. As for the FNLA it was basically supported by the 
Bakongo tribe in North-western Angola and in Zaire. Finally, 
UNITA, the smallest group, had the Ovimbundu tribe as its 
supporters, mainly based in the Central and Eastern Angolan 
plateau. For an account of Angolan movements social and ethno- 
linguistic origins, see MARCUM,John. The Angolan Revolution - 
The anatomy of an explosion. Cambridge, Massachussets, 1969, 
v.l, Chapter 1-3, pp.13-120.
89For an account of Angolan liberation movements 
connections abroad see ANDRESEN-GUIMARAES,F. op.cit.. pp. 57- 
91; NEWSUM,H.E. & ABEGUNRIN,Olayiwola. United States Foreign 
Policy Towards Southern Africa. London, The MacMillan Press, 
1987 p.32 and 56-61; STOCKWELL,. op.cit.: and SOREMEKUM,S. 
op.cit.. p.79-80.
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Western countries, the United States in particular, had to be 
taken into account, particularly due to the strong pro-Western 
stance espoused by the Brazilian military class.
The indirect US involvement in the Angolan civil war, 
by means of CIA action and financial support to FNLA and later 
to UNITA, was conspicuous90. However, as long as this policy 
was being enforced unofficially, e.g., by covert means, Brazil 
could maintain its policy of neutrality with respect to the 
Angolan rival groups91. In addition, the indication that 
Washington did not want to be directly and openly involved in 
the conflict, due to its recent involvement in Vietnam, and 
its aim to avoid direct confrontation with Moscow92, helped to 
give the Brazilian position a stronger and more solid basis.
Nevertheless, Geisel's government could not disregard 
Cuban support for the MPLA. The main aspect to consider was 
Castro's foreign policy doctrine of support for revolution 
around the globe. Hence, the possibility of Cuba getting a 
safe base in Angola, opposite the Brazilian coast, was an
^LITWAK, Robert S. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine - 
American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability. 1969- 
1976. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.175-90.
91 It is worth noting that US attempts to convince Brazil 
to send black soldiers to Angola to help them in their covert 
military action against the MPLA, all failed. Both Minister 
Azeredo da Silveira and president Geisel himself totally 
refused to collaborate. Interview with Azeredo da Silveira 
with Monica Hirst and Maria Regina S.de Lima. Rio, 24/05/79. 
CPDOC; and interview with ftalo Zappa. Rio, 10/02/92.
92For US policy towards Angola, see ANDRESEN-GUIMARAES,F. 
QP.cit.. p.369-407.
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important factor in shaping Brazilian stance towards this 
group.
However, the Brazilian government had also to consider 
the control of the oil rich enclave of Cabinda when defining 
its position93. Indeed, as earlier mentioned, the effects of 
the oil crisis on the Brazilian economy were very much 
responsible for the adoption of a new stance on African 
decolonization. In addition, since the late sixties when 
PETROBRAS was chaired by General Geisel (1969-73), Brazil had 
been developing oil exploration plans in Angola94. Hence, the 
developments of the civil war, and the assessment of the 
latter by the Gulf Oil Corporation - the most important 
company in operation in Cabinda - eventually favored taking 
the side of the MPLA's as far as Geisel was concerned. Indeed, 
by mid-1975 the MPLA had secured control of Cabinda95; and, 
not only were Gulf sure that the MPLA was the likely successor 
to the Portuguese rule, due to its position as the most 
popular group in Angola, but furthermore the company had got 
the MPLA's word that it would not start a nationalization 
process which would have affected Gulf's business in the 
region. As the ultimate concern of Gulf was to stay in
93Interview with Luiz A.P.Souto Maior. Rio, 5/12/91; and
HURRELL,Andrew James. Brazil and the Third World - Hsm
BirectiQns in Brazilian Foreign Policy. Masters thesis,
St.Antony's College. University of Oxford, April 1982, p.48.
94SELCHER,W. "Brazilian Relations...", op. cit.. p. 32.
95MARCUM,J. op.cit.. v.II, p.261-62; and LITWAK,R.S. 
op.cit.. p.183.
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business in Angola96, it supported the MPLA during the 
transitional period from Portuguese rule97.
Likewise, Brazil also had to guarantee the possibility 
of access to the Angolan oil resources. Therefore, I shall now 
reconstruct the steps taken by Geisel and his closest advisers 
in their assessment of the best policy to be pursued, 
considering the expected political problems stemming from 
support of the MPLA, and the likely economic benefits of doing 
so.
Following a visit made by the Head of the Africa, Asia 
and Oceania Department, ftalo Zappa to Luanda, Ovidio de Melo 
was called back for consultation in Brasilia. That was in 
early August98, when the situation in Angola was relatively 
calm-with no significant change in the general balance, which 
was inclined to favor the MPLA99; and when there were doubts 
about Lisbon's intentions to honor the Alvor Agreements. 
According to Melo, at this moment Zappa proposed the closure 
of the Brazilian Special Representation. The motives being not 
only the precarious situation under which Melo was working in
%Only on December 21, did Gulf finally temporarily 
suspend its operations in Cabinda.
97NEWSUM,H.E. & ABEGUNRIN,0. op.cit.. p.31. In September 
1975, Gulf paid US$116 million in royalties into an MPLA bank 
account. LITWAK,R.S. op.cit.. p.217.
98Minister Italo Zappa was on his way back from the 12th 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the Organization of African Unity, in Kampala form July 28 to 
August 1st, 1975.
"ANDRESEN-GUIMARAES,?. op.cit.. p.84.
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Luanda; but, also, the presumed domestic difficulties that the 
likely recognition of Angolan independence would bring about, 
given the MPLA supremacy100. Although I could not confirm the 
accuracy of this information - indeed the latter has been 
denied by Ambassador Zappa himself101 -, the fact is that the 
call for consultation indicates a moment of indecision, or 
even of retreat, in Brazilian attitude towards Angolan process 
of independence.
However, following talks between Lisbon and 
Brasilia102, and notwithstanding Lisbon's decision to suspend 
the Alvor Agreement in August 29103, Brazil kept its initial 
policy for the sake of saving Brazilian future relations with 
Angola, Mozambique and all other Black African countries, 
sending Ovidio de Melo back to Luanda in early September.
From then until early November, however, the situation 
became even worse. The escalation of the Angolan civil war 
after the South African action inside the country to protect 
the Cunene River hydroelectric project104, brought the 
question of external intervention, and moreover the suspicions 
of Cuban presence in Angola, to the forefront of the
100Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras, 
10/01/92.
““interview with Italo Zappa. Rio, 10/02/92.
102Brasil ajudar£ a pacificar Angola". O Estado de Sao 
Paulo, 24/08/75.
103SOBEL,L.A. op.cit. . p. 128.
104ANDRESEN-GUIMARAES,F. op.cit. . p.84.
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international debate.
Robin Hallet gives us several examples of reports 
claiming Cuban presence in Angola, long before the date of 
independence105. For instance, on October 19, Jonas Savimbi 
was quoted in Le Monde, claiming that 750 Cuban soldiers had 
landed on the south coast of Angola to serve in the ranks of 
the MPLA, along with 10.000 tons of war material106. Four days 
later, another report carried by Le Monde allegedly based on 
a "reliable source", stated that 1.500 Cubans were fighting in 
the ranks of the MPLA or were on the point of arriving in 
Luanda for this purpose107.
Other public indications of Cuban direct involvement in 
Angolan civil war were published in The Observer in London on 
November 9, 1975. Then it was reported that MPLA had been
assisted by Cuban "commando specialists with small naval 
assault vessels" in their successful assault in Lobito and 
Benguela108.
105HALLET,Robin. "The South-African Intervention in Angola. 
1975-76". African Affairs, v.77, n.308, July 1978, pp.347-86.
106Idem, p. 364.
107Idem. ibidem. Although it is not my objective to
scrutinize these reports, it is indeed noticeable that many 
details present in the latter coincide with those later 
published on which is perhaps the most reliable source on the 
subject so far, e.g., Gabriel Garcia Marquez's chronicle of 
the so called "0peraci6n Carlota". MARQUEZ,Garcia. 0peraci6n 
Carlota. Lima, Sabueso Contemporaneo, Mosca Azul & Horizonte 
Editores, 1977.
108HALLET,R. op.cit. . p. 355.
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Finally, even in the Brazilian press it was possible to 
read reports on the issue, even if somewhat delayed109.
Having listed these examples, I argue that although the 
disclosure of Cuban presence in Angola by Washington occurred 
only on November 24, 1975110, indeed coming in the wake of the 
US domestic debate about the disclosure of American covert 
assistance to the FNLA and UNITA111; and in spite of Henry 
Kissinger himself having criticized the inefficiency of US 
Intelligence on this respect112, it is a matter of fact that 
reports about the likely Cuban action in Angola were available 
long before113. In other words, it is hard to believe that 
Cuban involvement was not the subject of Brazilian's 
suspicions, even if its escalation happened after November 
ll114. Indeed, according to perhaps the most reliable source 
on the subject, Geisel himself was quite aware of Cuban 
presence in Angola before Brazilian recognition was
109"De olho no Brasil". Jornal do Brasil. 10/11/75, refers 
to the recent news published by The Daily Telegraph reporting 
the landing of over 1000 Cuban mercenaries in Angola.
,,0MARQUEZ,G.G. op.cit. . p.7.
inLITWAK,R.S. op.cit.. p.185.
112It is worth noting that Kissinger himself had declared 
in a speech on a visit to Venezuela that "our intelligence 
services have grown so bad that we only found out that the 
Cubans were being sent to Angola after they were already 
there". Idem, ibidem.
ll3Litwak says that on August 1975 reports were issued of
significant Cuban involvement in support of the MPLA, as well 
as South African involvement in support of the FNLA and UNITA. 
Idem/ p.183.
,mHALLET,R. op.cit.. p.371.
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accomplished115. Nevertheless, even if it was not the case, I 
claim that the Brazilian stance should not be appraised only 
on the basis of a possible unawareness of the fact, but on the 
assumption of its continuous assessment of the question, since 
the process of involvement should not be seen solely as the 
result of a single decision, but rather as a slowly escalating 
process116. Nevertheless, supposing the question of Cuban 
troops had been assessed separately from the implementation of 
the recognition of the MPLA, the dismissal of the fact would 
be expected, due to its startling cumulative effect117. 
Therefore, Itamaraty's note to the 0 Estado de S5o Paulo dated 
November 9, denying knowledge of the question118, reveals a 
strong desire not to encourage debate about the issue. 
Therefore, it is my hypothesis that the news about Cuban 
presence in Angola was deliberately played down by Brazilian 
decision makers - Geisel and Silveira in particular - in order 
to stick to their wish to recognize Angolan independence. 
Another question, however, is to what extent they misperceived 
the impact of this fact on the more conservative members of 
the government.
"Confidential source.
116HALLET,R. op.cit. . p.365.
117For a discussion about the implications of fragmentation 
of issues within incremental processes, see BRAYBROOKE,D. & 
LINDBLOM,C.E. A Strategy of Decision. New York, Free Press, 
1970.
"‘“Diplomacia suspeitosa". 0 Estado de SSo Paulo.
11/12/75.
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5.Brazil honors its word: the recognition of Angolan
independence
Eventually the moment arrived when the final decision 
had to be announced. In late October/early November Brazil's 
Special Representative began to send messages to Itamaraty 
asking for instructions, since the MPLA leaders were demanding 
a decision from Brasilia119. Azeredo da Silveira was aware of 
the delicacy of the situation and, obviously, his 
responsibility was to give the best advice possible to 
President Geisel120. It was then that the Brazilian Foreign 
Minister decided to consult other countries.
Aware of the gravity of the question, Azeredo da 
Silveira tried to get international backing for presenting his 
suggestion to Geisel. Thus in early November he had talks with 
Great-Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and 
not surprisingly, with the United States. Despite those 
countries doubts regarding their own positions, all of them 
seem to have understood Brazil's intention to recognize 
Angolan independence121. Or, at least, that was the impression 
Azeredo da Silveira got and the one he delivered to President
119Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
120Interview with Saraiva Guerreiro with Monica Hirst, 
Aspdzia Camargo and Leticia Pinheiro. Petr6polis, 23/03/85.
121 Interview with Azeredo da Silveira by M.Hirst and 
M.R.S.de Lima .Rio, 24/05/79; and interview with Saraiva 
Guerreiro by M.Hirst, AspcLzia Camargo, and Leticia Pinheiro. 
Petr6polis, 23/03/85.
Geisel.
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In possession of this information/ and also of two 
documents presenting the reasons in favor of the recognition 
of the MPLA - one prepared by italo Zappa and the other by the 
then General Secretary of Itamaraty, Saraiva Guerreiro122 - 
Azeredo da Silveira called President Geisel. Then, following 
the common procedure observed by Geisel and Silveira of 
consulting each other on urgent matters by phone, they finally 
reached a decision123. Subsequently, just two days before the 
date of Angolan independence, Ovidio de Melo was finally 
informed of his country's decision124.
Distinct versions accounts for the way this issue was 
contemplated by the NSC's members, if so. There are those who 
say that Geisel addressed the Council by letter and all its 
members voted in favor of the recognition of the MPLA 
government125. Whilst others say that the decision did not 
rest on the unanimity of the members, but on a sufficient 
(sic) number of votes being in its support126. Whatever the 
case, the decision was fundamentally made on the grounds of 
Itamaraty's reports, since it was based on the papers made by
122Interview with Saraiva Guerreiro by M.Hirst, Aspdzia 
Camargo and Leticia Pinheiro. Petrdpolis, 23/03/85.
,23Confidential interview.
124Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
I25STUMPF,A.G.& PEREIRA,M.A. op.cit. . p.83.
126,1 Itamaraty foge ao parecer de militares para decidir", 
by Carlos Marchi. Jornal do Brasil. 2/07/79.
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Melo, Zappa and Saraiva Guerreiro, all handed in by Silveira 
to President Geisel127, which asserted "the MPLA's 
unquestionable capabilities to enforce its control over the 
country"128. Given the strong reaction against the decision 
soon after it had been announced, and moreover, after the 
confirmation of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, I 
argue that this particular and, indeed, fundamental 
information was deliberately played down or even suppressed in 
the reports sent to the NSC members.
It is in this sense that I claim that it was precisely 
1)because of the outstanding prestige of Itamaraty in the eyes 
of the military regime, which used to give this agency a 
considerable amount of autonomy; 2)due to Geisel's autocratic 
style and to the strong influence his Foreign Minister had 
over* foreign issues, both aspects able to keep possible 
obstacles at bay; and 3)due to a likely misperception by 
Geisel/Azeredo da Silveira of the eventual reaction of the 
more conservative supporters of Brazilian regime about the 
Cuban presence in Angola, that a decision which, in fact, did 
not fully fulfill the expectations of the military regime was 
finally implemented.
127Interview with Saraiva Guerreiro by Monica Hirst, 
Asp&zia Camargo and Leticia Pinheiro. Petr6polis, 23/03/85; 
and G6ES,Walder de. 0 Brasil do General Geisel - estudo do 
processo de tomada de decisao no regime militar burocr&tico. 
Rio de Janeiro, Ed.Nova Fronteira, 1978, p.38.
128ABREU,Hugo de. O Outro Lado do Poder. Rio de Janeiro, 
Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1979, p.55. My translation.
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Having said that I shall move to the reasons presented 
for recognizing the Angolan independence, despite direct Cuban 
involvement with the MPLA. As stated earlier, the Machadiana 
rationale was the core of Geisel's policy on the issue. 
Moreover, as later stated in an official document, in so doing 
Brazil intended to secure a good relationship with the rest of 
Black Africa129. I have already mentioned the Mozambiquean 
resistance to accepting the Brazilian new policy towards 
Africa without proof of good will. Therefore, only after 
Brazil decided to send Ovidio de Melo back to Luanda in 
September, did Azeredo da Silveira succeed in making 
arrangements with Joaquim Chissano over the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Brasilia and Maputo130. Moreover, 
only after Brazil honored its commitment to Angola, by 
recognizing its independence on November 11, did Mozambique 
normalize its relations with Brazil, on November 15, 1975131.
Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that by recognizing
129"The recognition of Angolan independence on the very 
same day as its declaration positively contributed to the 
development of the relationship between Brazil and the group 
of Portuguese speaking African countries". My translation. 
BRASIL.MRE.Realizagdes do Governo Geisel. 1974-79. Relatdrio. 
s/d, p.87. My translation.
130This agreement was made when both met during the UN 
General Assembly in September. "Brasil ter£ Embaixador em 
Mozambique". 0 Jornal do Brasil. 15/11/75; and "0 governo da 
FRELIMO define relagoes com o Brasil". 0 Globo. 18/09/74.
131"Brasil ter£ Embaixador em Mozambique". Jornal do 
Brasil. 15/11/75; "ResistAncia A politica externa supera
previsSo". Visao, 8/12/75, p.30; and "Angola: recuo pode ser 
total". O Estado de Sao Paulo. 25/12/75; BRASIL.MRE.Resenha de 
Politica Exterior do Brasil, ano II, n.Vll, Brasilia, 
out/nov/dez 1975, p.131.
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the MPLA, Geisel assured that a good relationship with Angola 
would be guaranteed even if the situation was later reversed. 
In other words, it was thought that due to the other two 
groups' pro-Western profile, it would be easier for Brazil to 
repair possible damage with them resulting from the 
recognition of the MPLA, than the contrary132. Therefore, 
Brazil should not fear any possibility of having harmed its 
economic and political interests in Angola, even if the final 
outcome of the waging civil war happened to favor other groups 
than the MPLA.
6.The impact of the decision
Brasilia recognized Angolan independence on the same 
day it was proclaimed133. Indeed, in order to relay its 
decision as soon as possible, the note was issued in Brasilia 
at 8 p.m. on November 10, to coincide with Angolan time134. 
Portugal, in its turn, only announced the transfer of
132Interview with Saraiva Guerreiro by M.Hirst, Asp&zia 
Camargo and Leticia Pinheiro. Petrdpolis, 23/03/85.
133Likewise, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao 
Tome e Principe, Congo Republic, Guinea, Algeria, Hungary, 
Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Mali, 
Mauritania and Mongolia recognized the Angolan independence. 
Later in February, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland Canada, 
Austria, Finland, Mexico, Peru, Spain, Japan and Zaire 
followed them. SOBEL,L.A. op.cit.. p.125 and 130.
,34Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
sovereignty to the "Angolan people" (November 10), through its 
High Commissioner in Angola, without actually recognizing any 
formal ruler of the new state. In so doing, Lisbon indicated 
that it was not yet recognizing the authority of any of the 
national liberation groups, which were still waging war 
throughout Angola135.
A deliberate effort was made by Itamaraty towards 
drafting a note of recognition which would not result in the 
government being criticized for having favored one particular 
side, i.e., the MPLA136. It was phrased in such a way that 
Brazil recognized the government installed in Luanda, and 
there was no mention of the MPLA:
"On the date established for the declaration of 
Angolan independence - November 11, 1975 - the
Brazilian Government recognizes the Government 
installed in Luanda (...). Since the creation, 
on January 31, of the Transitional Government of 
Angola, the Brazilian Government, absolutely 
neutral and determined not to intervene in the 
Angolan domestic affairs, maintained a Special 
Representation in Luanda, which will be converted 
to an Embassy by the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. By aiming to strength the natural links 
between the two countries,the Brazilian Government 
adopts the position of rigorously respecting the 
internal political process of this country"1 .
135SOBEL,L.A. op.cit.. p. 125. In fact, Portugal recognized 
the government formed by the MPLA only in February 22, 1976; 
and severed bilateral relations just three months after in May 
19.
,36"Para o Brasil, o poder e do MPLA" by Carlos Conde. £> 
Estado de Sao Paulo. 12/11/75; interview with Luiz Augusto 
Souto Maior. Rio, 5/12/91; and interview with ftalo Zappa. 
Rio, 10/02/92.
137BRASIL.MRE. Realizagoes do Governo Geisel. 1974-79. 
Relatdrio. s/d, p.88. My translation.
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A similar artifice in recognizing the government 
installed in Luanda, instead of the government of the MPLA, 
was also employed by Sweden, The Netherlands, Italy and 
Egypt138. On contrary, the Soviet government bluntly declared 
the USSR's recognition of the independence of the People's 
Republic of Angola, which had been "gained under the 
leadership of the MPLA"139. Other countries, however, such as 
Turkey, Cyprus, Zambia, Zaire and Luxembourg, actually 
recognized the FNLA and UNITA government140.
However, despite Itamaraty's ability to produce an 
impartial note of recognition, this fact did not succeed in 
inhibiting subsequent criticisms of Brazil's final decision 
from several voices within the country.
Following the announcement of the recognition, several 
newspapers spelled out their opposition141. No doubt this 
opposition came from the more conservative groups, especially 
from those directly or indirectly related to the Luso 
community in Brazil and from the military within and outside
138CAMARGO, Sonia de & OCAMPO,Jos6 Maria Vasquez. 
Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina e Brasil - uma d6cada 
de politica exterior. 1973-1984. Sao Paulo, Ed.Convivio, 1988, 
p.49.
139" Soviet Union has recognized People's Republic of 
Angola". Soviet News, n.5810, 18/11/75, pp.398.
140CAMARGO,S. & OCAMPO,J.M. op.cit. . p.49.
141"Dize-me com quem andas e dir-te-ei quem 6s". Jornal da 
Tarde. 13/11/75; "M6 Companhia", Jornal do Brasil. 15/11/75; 
"A palavra que falta". 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. 16/11/75.
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the government142. Although the criticisms were largely 
addressed to Azeredo da Silveira who was accused of being the 
main person responsible for the decision143, some of them also 
demanded direct explanation from President Geisel himself144. 
The criticisms were directly related to deep concerns over 
Brazilian security due to the Cuban involvement in the 
conflict on MPLA side - either as an autonomous actor or as a 
Soviet proxy. Moreover the alleged hastiness by which the 
decision had been taken, which disregarded the existence of 
other alternative groups to run the new Angolan state, was 
also an object of reproach145.
Within the military circles, it is worth mentioning the 
speech made by the Head of the Navy School (Comandante da 
Escola Naval), Admiral Ibsen Gusmao, which stated, in Geisel's 
presence, that Brazil's "most legitimate interests would be 
affected if the control of the South Atlantic should fall into 
the hands of a superpower traditionally foreign to the ocean 
area contiguous to our territory"146. Following that, other 
important military representatives also stressed their
142STUMPF,A.G. & PEREIRA,M.A. op.cit. . p.81; "0 holandes 
do Itamaraty". 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. 24/12/75; and interview 
with General Carlos de Meira Mattos. Rio, february 1992.
143"No gelo". Relat6rio Reservado. 23-29/12/75, ano IX, 
n.483.
144"A palavra que falta". 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. 16/11/75.
145"Independencia Dividida", Jornal do Brasil. 11/11/75.
146,1 Satide e Politica", Veia. 31/12/75, p.23.
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apprehension over the decision147. Presumably this concern was 
very much influenced by the similar stance the US military 
were spelling out, although there is no evidence of the 
Pentagon having actually worked on its links with Brazil's 
Armed Forces.
This outcry was reinforced by another controversial 
Brazilian decision in the foreign policy area. Also on 
November 11, the Brazilian delegation in the UN confirmed the 
vote previously taken in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural 
Committee in mid-October, voting in favor of Resolution 
n.3379/XXX which defined Zionism as a form of racism and 
racial discrimination148. Together these decisions led to a 
strong questioning of how Brazilian foreign policy was being 
handled149, especially as both decisions touched upon the 
Brasilia-Washington relationship.
Whilst the US government immediately put a lot of
147,,Quem determina a nossa politica externa", 0 Estado de 
Sao Paulo. 20/12/75, cites general Azir Benjamin Chalub, Head 
of High Command of the Armed Forces School, general Paulo 
Cesar Pinheiro de Menezes, Head of Military Engineering 
Institute, and Fritz Manso, Head of the Army Staff as also 
having spelled out their regards on the issue.
148U.N .GENERAL ASSEMBLY. Resolutions and Decisions Official 
Records. Thirtieth Session (16/9-17/12 1975). United Nations, 
New York, 1976, p.83-4.
149"Vit6ria do Racismo", o Globo. 12/11/75; "Diplomacia e 
Democracia". Folha de SAo Paulo. 14/11/75; "Para Senador 
Brossard, urn voto de extrema infelicidade". O Estado de Sao 
Paulo. 15/11/75; "Na defensiva". Veja. 19/11/75, p.24; 
"ResistAncia A politica externa supera previsao". VisAo. 
8/12/75, pp.28-30.
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pressure on the Brazilian government to change its vote on 
Zionism150, US criticisms of Brazilian recognition of the MPLA 
government, took longer. They started only in mid-December 
both by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, and by the 
Secretary of State himself. Ambassador Moynihan's comments 
about the danger to Brazilian security as a result of a 
possible Soviet base being installed in Angola151, which very 
much coincided with Brazilian conservative military fears, 
were promptly dismissed by the Brazilian authorities who 
steadily reaffirmed the recognition of the MPLA government152. 
Kissinger's strong criticisms of Brazilian policy towards 
Angola made to Azeredo da Silveira during the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation (Paris, 16-18 December
1975)153, were refuted by Silveira who reaffirmed Brazil's 
decision and stressed the autonomy of Brazilian foreign 
policy154. Moreover, he declared that Brazil would not remove 
its representative in Luanda, unless the US decided to 
intervene in the conflict by military means155.
15°"Itamaraty estranha nota de Washington sobre sionismo". 
Jornal do Brasil. 25/10/75; "Itamaraty reage A nota oficial de 
Washington", O Estado de Sao Paulo. 25/10/75; "Moynihan volta 
a criticar o Brasil". Jornal do Brasil. 29/10/75.
151 "Angola poderA ameagar o Brasil", by Sergio Motta Mello. 
0 Estado de Sao Paulo.16/12/75: "Moyniham faz lembrar
geopolitica de Golbery". 0 Estado de Sao Paulo. 17/12/75.
152"MPLA nao A ameaga ao Brasil". O Estado de Sao Paulo. 
17/11/75.
153,,Politica Externa: autonomia diflcil". Relat6rio
Reservado, ano IX, n.484, Rio, 6-12/01/76, p.l.
154Idgin.
155Interview with Silveira by M.Hirst, M.R.S.de Lima. Rio 
de Janeiro; and confidential interview.
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In spite of those immediate replies, Brazil's chief 
decision makers could not avoid taking some steps in order to 
calm the critics. Whatever was decided, however, had to be 
done in accordance with Geisel's determination of l)not having 
Brazilian development hindered by overstated concerns about 
Brazilian security156; and - as the anti-Zionist vote episode 
indicates157 - 2)not behaving solely according to Washington's 
views.
It was at this point that Geisel and Silveira reached 
the point of deliberating about the decision recently taken. 
Therefore it was necessary to outline the alternatives at 
stake.
7.The lesser of two evils: pondering alternatives
Insofar as the Brazilian decision to recognize Angola's 
independence had already paid off by the improvement of the 
relationship between Brazil and Mozambique - the establishment
156Geisel's speech during his first meeting with the 
Cabinet. BRAS IL. PRES IDfiNC IA DA REPtJBLICA. GEISEL, Ernesto. 
op.cit.. p.32-3.
,57It is reported that after having assessed its 
miscalculation in voting in favor of the Resolution in the UN 
Committee, the Brazilian government indeed thought about 
stepping back in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, due to 
the public pressures exerted by Washington, Geisel decided to 
keep the original vote in order to preserve Brazilian 
autonomy. G6ES,W. op.cit.. p.30.
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of diplomatic relations dates from November 15 - and with 
prospects of significant improvements in Brazil-Africa 
relations as a whole, it was time to face its impact on the 
internal environment. Therefore, Geisel and Silveira, had to 
work out on how to placate the domestic opposition for the 
sake of the government's stability, without actually changing 
the direction of the "Pragmatic" foreign policy. In other 
words, the struggle to build a consensus, by means of merging 
different points of view, was initiated.
Amongst the possible alternatives there was the simple 
closing of the Brazilian Special Representation in Angola 
without taking any step towards the creation of a substitute 
post. This option, however, would mean the immediate halt of 
diplomatic relations with Luanda which, after so much effort, 
was not an appealing option. Furthermore, this attitude would 
certainly be interpreted as a submission to internal and 
external pressures, leaving the door open for subsequent 
demands.
At the same time, the maintenance of the initial plans 
of immediately transforming the Special Representation into an 
Embassy, without making any efforts to appease domestic 
opposition, did not seem to be advisable, since it could 
hinder Geisel's future plans regarding the Brazilian foreign 
policy. Since he had taken office, Geisel was particularly 
concerned with the implementation of a "slow, gradual and 
safe" redemocratization as much as he was aware of the need to
301
pursue a "responsible” pragmatic foreign policy, e.g, a policy 
which did not have too strong an impact on the conservative 
supporters of the regime158.
The first step to be taken was to lower the profile of 
Brazil's relationship with Luanda. Thus, Azeredo da Silveira 
instructed Ovidio de Melo not to have any further contact with 
the MPLA government159. By not observing Itamaraty's 
instructions/ by attending a meeting with the Angolan Foreign 
Minister160, Melo signed his own sentence. Nevertheless the 
issue was too delicate to allow a pure and simple substitution 
of the Brazilian Representative. Since Melo had developed 
outstandingly good relations with the new Angolan rulers, his 
substitution could damage the Brasilia-Maputo relationship and 
subsequently damaging Brazil's image in Africa161. In 
addition, it was necessary to make arrangements to accomplish 
Ovidio's substitution in a way which, while mollifying 
opposition within and outside Brazil, would not suggest 
compliance with them. It was then that the request made by 
Ovidio de Melo to be temporarily substituted for medical
158SOUTO MAIOR,Luiz.A.P. "0 Pragmatismo Responsctvel", in 
£0_ Anos de Politica Externa Brasileira. Programa de Relagdes 
Internacionais, USP/IPRI, p.6. Forthcoming.
,59Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
I60ldem.
161 In fact, Brazil had to cope with MPLA complaints when 
it finally decided to substitute Ovidio de Melo. Interview 
with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Vassouras, 10/01/92; and "Angola: 
recuo pode ser total". O Estado de Sao Paulo. 25/12/75.
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reasons162 turned out to be the best way of resolving the 
impasse163.
Immediately after the announcement of Ovidio's 
replacement, the Brazilian press started to speculate about 
the reasons behind it. It was claimed that he had been removed 
due to Geisel's personal evaluation of his partisan 
conduct164. In addition, rumors were on the increase alleging 
that some governmental circles had started to admit a possible 
alteration in the Brazilian position regarding the support for 
the MPLA165. In response to this speculation, on December 22, 
with Geisel's approval166, Itamaraty issued an official note 
praising Melo's work and stating that his removal was a 
"temporary" measure, and was only due to his need for urgent 
medical treatment167. In spite of this note, however, press 
conjectures surrounding Melo's substitution were not
162Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
163Confidential interview.
164To be more precise, an article published in the O Estado 
de Sao Paulo stated that following the criticisms about the 
recognition, Geisel had decided to read Melo's reports to 
Itamaraty. It was then that Geisel probably came to the 
conclusion that the information sent by him to Itamaraty was 
clearly in favor of the MPLA which would have led the 
Brazilian government not only to hurry its final decision, but 
moreover to do it based on false information about the MPLA's 
supremacy. "Afastado diplomata brasileiro em Luanda". O Estado 
de Sao Paulo. 23/12/75.
165"Brasil pode rever posigao em Luanda", by Luiz Barbosa. 
Jornal do Brasil. 22/12/75.
166"Satide e Politica". Veja. 31/12/75, p.23.
167"Itamaraty chama a Brasilia o Ministro em Luanda". Q 
QlPbP- 23/12/75.
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immediately halted168. Finally when Azeredo da Silveira 
forbade Ovidio de Melo to give any interview to the press when 
he came back to Brazil169, and when the former avoided further 
comments upon the recognition of the MPLA170, the crisis 
seemed to be temporarily solved. In fact, by refusing to give 
further explanations, Itamaraty made Ovidio de Melo a 
scapegoat. In other words, deliberately or not, Itamaraty 
brought about the interpretation that within the policy 
towards African decolonization, the recognition of the MPLA 
government could be seen as the result of a human - and, 
therefore, punishable - misinterpretation.
8.Adhering to the decision despite negative feedback
Although the decision to remove Ovidio de Melo from 
Luanda was meant to cool off the Brazil-Angola relationship, 
Geisel did not actually change his government policy towards 
the supporting the new independent African states. On the 
contrary, after having somehow answered internal and external 
opposition without actually accepting its overall viewpoint,
168"Relagoes Brasil-Angola podem esfriar". O Estado de Sao 
Paulo. 24/12/75; and "Angola: recuo pode ser total". O Estado 
de sao Paulo. 25/12/75.
169Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
170SELCHER, Wayne A. Brazil's Multilateral Relations - 
between the First and the Third Worlds. Boulder, Westview, 
1978, p.116.
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Geisel stressed his full commitment to the policy of 
rapprochement with Black African countries, Communist or not.
On December 9, 1975 Ambassador ftalo Zappa, who was 
totally identified with the new Brazilian stance towards 
Africa, was promoted to the highest post in the diplomatic 
career hierarchy. Moreover, before the end of Geisel's 
administration, he was designated to be the first Brazilian 
ambassador to Maputo (1977/81).
In addition, it is worth taking into account Geisel's 
words during his speech at the end of the year:
"Special commendation must be credited 
to the policy of rapprochement with the 
new Portuguese speaking nations, within 
which, loyal to the principle of non­
intervention and respect to the people's 
self-determination Brazil established 
diplomatic relations with all former 
Portuguese colonies"171.
In this sense, although the ultimate decision makers 
had actually responded to the negative feedback which followed 
ensued the recognition of the MPLA, by removing Ovidio de Melo 
from Luanda, they did so under a sort of disguise which, due 
to its ambiguity, could please all sides. Therefore, although 
having cooled off the Brasilia-Luanda relationship for a 
while, it could be said that at the end of the day Geisel kept 
to his initial decision despite negative feedback. On December
171BRASIL. PRESIDfiNCIA DA REPtJBLICA. GEISEL, Ernesto. 
Discursos. v.II, Assessoria de Imprensa. Presidfencia da 
Reptiblica, fevereiro 1976, p.307-8. My translation.
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31, 1975/ the decree creating six new Brazilian embassies in 
Africa - Mozambique/ Angola, Lesotho, Sao Tom§ e Principe, 
Guinea-Bissau and Upper Volta - was signed172.
As for Ovidio de Melo, he was finally sent as Brazilian 
Ambassador to Bangkok (1976-82), according to his own wish, 
after having been offered a position in Paramaribo173, both of 
which were then considered posts of less importance. For 
reasons that only the need to ostracize him can explain, his 
promotion to the highest echelons in the diplomatic career 
hierarchy, which was expected to be shortly promulgated, was 
only signed ten years later, after the end of the military 
regime.
9.Conclusion
It is hard to maintain whether the recognition of the 
MPLA government was a product of a ingenious calculation from 
Geisel and Silveira partnership which, by ignoring presumed 
resistance, secured the accomplishment of Geisel's foreign 
policy goal at first blow; or if it was, purely and simply, a 
result of Geisel and Silveira's misperception of the military
172MRE. Resenha de Politica Exterior do Brasil. ano 11, 
n.Vii, Brasilia, out/nov/dez 1975, p.132.
173Interview with Ovidio de Andrade Melo. Rio, 3/02/92.
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regime's readiness to overcome the concept of "ideological 
frontiers".
In any case, the upholding of the recognition, in spite 
of US pressures and the domestic opposition that followed the 
disclosure of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, shows 
once more that to explain certain decisions it is not enough 
to proceed "top-down" either within the first debate 
(International system vs. nation state) or within the second 
debate (nation state vs. bureaucracy). As once posited by 
Ambassador italo Zappa, the task of converting foreign policy 
principles into effective diplomatic actions leads to 
dissension, and as a result, to internal negotiations. 
Moreover, he continued, "those negotiations are usually more 
difficult and harsher than those of the external interlocutor. 
In other words, to practice diplomacy outside is quite easy; 
the difficulty is to enforce it within the country"174.
In addition, the analysis of the decision making 
process demonstrated how it was possible to bend to 
international pressure without actually losing face. If the 
information that the CIA indeed pressured Brasilia to remove 
Ovidio de Melo from Luanda is correct175, his substitution was 
done with a good deal of dexterity, providing that it did not
174ZAPPA, Italo. Speech delivered for the Rio Branco 
Institute graduates, in 29/05/91. Mimeo, p.2.
175"A verdade aparece". Jornal do Brasil. 21/08/78. Quoted 
by CAMARGO,S. & OCAMPO,J.M.V. op.cit.. p.50.
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enter into the history of Brazil-United States relations as a 
gesture of appeasement from the former. If, on the other hand, 
the information is not accurate, there is little doubt that 
Ovidio's removal helped to calm Washington down. Whatever the 
truth, it is worth noting that by keeping cordial relations 
with Luanda, Geisel's government was able to fulfil its 
initial plans to enhance relations with African countries176.
In conclusion, this episode shows that what was 
impossible to achieve at the level of argument (or 
persuasion), e.g., the dislodging of the "ideological 
frontiers" precept from Brazilian foreign policy, was finally 
accomplished thanks to the way in which the decision to 
recognize the MPLA government was finally formulated and 
implemented.
I76MARTINIERE,G. op.cit.. p.51; SILVEIRA,A. Azeredo da . 
Politica Externa do Brasil. Lecture in 20/09/78. Departamento 
de Estudos, T 150-78, ESG, 1978, p.8 mimeo; and BRASIL.MRE. 
Realizagoes do Governo Geisel. 1974-79. relatdrio. s/d, p.92.
10.Appendix V
Chronology
* November 16, 1953 - Brazil and Portugal sign the Treaty of 
Friendship and Consultation.
* 1958 - Brazil and Portugal sign the "Interpretative Notes", 
a complement to the Treaty of Friendship and Consultation.
* 1958 - Brazil co-sponsors the UN Resolution n.671 (XIII 
General Assembly) creating the Economic Committee for Africa 
(ECA).
* 1960 - During the XV UN General Assembly, Brazil votes for 
Resolution n.1514 (Declaration on Independence for Colonial 
Countries and Peoples); it abstains from voting on Resolution 
n.1573 asking for Algerian self-determination; and it votes 
against Resolution n.1542 obliging Portugal to make available 
information on her colonies to the UN.
* May, 1961 - Brazilian Ambassador to Lisbon Negrao de Lima 
visits Luanda.
* January 30, 1962 - Brazil votes in favor of UN Resolution 
n.1742, asserting the Angolan people's rights of self- 
government and independence.
* July 31, 1963 - Brazil refuses to support the Portuguese 
formula of considering its colonies around the world as 
"overseas provinces", and votes in favor of Resolution 
n.S/5.380 considering Portuguese policies in Africa a threat 
to peace and security.
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* 1972 - Brazil and Portugal declares the "Year of the Luso- 
Brazilian Community", one of various ways of celebrating the 
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Brazilian 
independence.
* October 25 to November 20, 1972 - Foreign Minister M£rio 
Gibson Barboza visits nine African countries - Cameroon, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Zaire, Ghana, Dahomey, and 
Gabon.
* November 14, 1972 - Along with United States, Great Britain, 
Spain and South Africa, Brazil votes against Resolution n. 
2918 at the XXVII UN General Assembly, proclaiming the 
Angolan, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambiquean liberation movements 
as "authentic representatives" of their respective native 
population.
* November 1973 - African countries support Argentina against 
Brazil in their dispute over the utilization of ParanA River, 
by voting in favor of UN Resolution n.3129 which demanded 
prior consultation for cooperative exploitation of resources 
shared by two or more states.
* November 2, 1973 - Brazil votes against Resolution n.3061 at 
the XXVIII UN General Assembly, welcoming the independence of 
Guinea-Bissau and condemning Portugal for "illegal occupation" 
of areas of the country.
* November 24, 1973 - A  resolution signed by 17 countries from 
Central and East Africa includes Brazil as one of the six 
countries recommended for diplomatic and economic sanctions 
unless they immediately ceased their support for white- 
minority governments in Southern Africa.
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* April 25, 1974 - Portuguese Revolution
* April 26/ 1974 - Portuguese government announces being 
ready to give self-determination to the African colonies.
* July 4, 1974 - Ambassador Zappa gives a speech at the Higher 
War College stating Brazilian interests in having a say in 
favor of African decolonization.
* July 18/ 1974 - Brazil recognizes the Republic of Guinea- 
Bissau.
* August 4/ 1974 - Portugal announces being prepared to sign 
an agreement with Guinea-Bissau for the immediate transfer of 
power.
* September, 1974 - Azeredo da Silveira meets Portuguese 
Foreign Minister M&rio Soares in New York. As a result, Brazil 
and Portugal agrees to formulate a cooperative policy towards 
Angolan and Mozambiquean decolonization.
* November, 1974 - UN issues a resolution in favor of Guinean 
sovereignty (Resolution n.3061/XXVIII).
* November 25-29, 1974 - Azeredo da Silveira visits Dakar, 
when he meets all Brazilian representatives in Africa in order 
to orchestrate the new foreign policy towards the continent.
* end/November, 1974 - Ambassador Zappa goes to Africa to 
start talks with the leaders of the national liberation 
movements - Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Holden Roberto (FNLA), 
Wilson Santos (UNITA), and Samora Machel (FRELIMO).
* December 2-4, 1974 - Azeredo da Silveira visits Lisbon for 
talks with his colleague, Foreign Minister M&rio Soares. In 
response to a Portuguese request, it is settled that Brazil 
would send a Special Representative to Luanda.
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* January 3-5, 1975 - During Mombasa Summit the three Angolan 
liberation movements agree on a common platform of negotiation 
with the Portuguese government.
* January 15, 1975 - Portugal and the three Angolan liberation 
movements sign the Alvor Agreement, in the Portuguese province 
of Algarve. Under the terms of this agreement a transitional 
government to be run by the three groups is established, the 
duties of the Portuguese High Commissioner are spelled out, 
free elections within nine months are scheduled, and the 
independence day to be proclaimed on November 11, 1975 is 
settled.
* February 26, 1975 - Brazil communicates the designation of 
a Special Representative to the Angolan Transitional 
Government, Ambassador Ovidio de Andrade Melo.
* June 25, 1975 - Mozambiquean independence is proclaimed.
* August, 1975 - Minister Italo Zappa visits Luanda, after 
taking part on the 12th Session of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, in 
Kampala (July 28 to August 1st, 1975).
* August, 1975 - Ambassador Ovidio Melo is called by Brazilian 
government for consultations.
* August 29, 1975 - Lisbon suspends the Alvor Agreement.
* September, 1975 - Following talks between Lisbon and 
Brasilia, Brazil sends Ovidio de Melo back to Luanda.
* October 19, 1975 - Jonas Savimbi is quoted in Le Monde. 
claiming that 750 Cuban soldiers had landed on the south coast 
of Angola to serve in the ranks of the MPLA, along with 10.000 
tons of war material.
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* October 23, 1975 - Le Monde states that 1.500 Cubans were 
fighting in the ranks of the MPLA or were on the point of 
arriving in Luanda for this purpose.
* October/early November, 1975 - Brazil's Special 
Representative sends messages to Itamaraty asking for 
instructions, since the MPLA leaders were demanding a decision 
from Brasilia.
* early November - Azeredo da Silveira talks with Great- 
Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and with the 
United States. Despite those countries doubts regarding their 
own positions, all of them seem to have understood Brazil's 
intention to recognize Angolan independence.
* November 9, 1975 - Ovidio de Melo is finally informed of 
Brazil's decision.
* November 9, 1975 - Itamaraty publicly denies knowledge of 
the Cuban presence in Angola.
* November 10, 1975 - Portugal announces the transfer of 
sovereignty to the Angolan people through its High 
Commissioner in Angola, without actually recognizing any 
formal ruler of the new state.
* November 10, 1975 - Brazilian newspaper, Jornal do Brasil, 
refers to the recent news published by The Daily Telegraph 
reporting the landing of over 1000 Cuban mercenaries in 
Angola.
* November 11, 1975 - Brazil recognizes the goverment
installed in Luanda.
* November 11, 1975 - Brazilian delegation in the UN confirms 
the vote previously taken in the Social, Humanitarian and
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Cultural Committee in mid-October, voting in favor of 
Resolution n.3379 at the XXX UN General Assembly, which 
defined Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination.
* November 15, 1975 - Brazil establishes diplomatic relations 
with Mozambique.
* mid-November/mid December/ 1975 - Azeredo da Silveira gives 
instruction to Ovidio de Melo not to have any further contact 
with the MPLA government. Melo does not observe the 
instructions and attend a meeting with the Angolan Foreign 
Minister.
* November 24, 1975 - Washington acknowledges Cuban presence 
in Angola.
* On December 9/ 1975 - Minister Italo Zappa is promoted to
the highest post in the diplomatic career hierarchy.
* mid-December/ 1975 - US government criticizes Brazilian 
recognition of the MPLA government.
* December 16-18/ 1975 - During the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation (Paris), Henry Kissinger 
criticizes Brazilian policy towards Angola.
* December 21, 1975 - Gulf Oil suspends its operations in
Cabinda.
* December 22, 1975 - Itamaraty issues an official note
praising Melo's work and stating that his removal is a
"temporary" measure due to his need for urgent medical 
treatment.
* On December 31, 1975 - Six new Brazilian embassies in Africa 
- Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Sao Tom6 e Principe, Guinea- 
Bissau and Upper Volta - are created.
* February 22, 1976 - Portugal recognizes the government 
formed by the MPLA.
* May 19, 1976 - Portugal favor bilateral relations with 
Angola.
Chapter VII
Concilia ion
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This thesis aimed to assess the role of the decision 
making process on the contents of three decisions taken during 
the first years of Geisel's government. It has done so through 
a systematic investigation of the foreign policy making 
process employing some important concepts of the Foreign 
Policy Analysis, such as bureaucratic role-player, foreign 
policy executive, and foreign policy redirection. In so doing, 
the present analysis has intended to contribute to bring to 
the area of studies about Brazilian foreign policy, a clear- 
cut picture of the need to take into account the process of 
consensus building in order to explain what ended up being 
seen'as the national interest. Or quite simply, it jjatf^ aimed 
to add to the studies about what foreign policy was 
implemented and why, an explanation of how the latter was 
made.
Firstly, a review of the literature on Brazilian 
foreign policy under the military regime situating it in the 
level of analysis debate was done. I claimed that the studies 
that explained Brazilian foreign affairs within which I have 
called here the first debate (international system vs. nation 
state) proceeding "top-down" present the following problems. 
Either they did not assess the effects of Brazil's alleged 
leeway in its regional sphere of influence on the country's
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foreign policy. Or, on the contrary, they overemphasize 
Brazil's capabilities to have autonomous behavior in the 
international system, by freezing the international situation 
which supposedly have enhanced the country's aptitudes.
In addition, I examined the analyses made within the 
second debate (nation state vs. bureaucracy) also proceeding 
"top-down". In this case, the problem relates to the fact that 
although the existence of different policy makers is 
acknowledged, these studies do not correlate this polarity 
with the policy contents. The reason why they do not do so is 
because those who take this standpoint believe in the 
existence of a ultimate consensus among the policy makers 
which makes the analysis of the decision making process 
worthless. In so doing, they do not consider the process 
involved in consensus building, since they assume that the 
decision makers behave in response to the demands of the 
nation state, and assign to the latter a given national 
interest embodied in the National Security Doctrine (NSD).
In disagreement with those analysts, I do not believe 
that the option for the first level of analysis (international 
system vs. nation state), or for the second level (nation 
state x bureaucracy) both proceeding "top-down" are enough to 
explain foreign policy contents, particularly when a 
significant shift in the latter is implemented, as happened
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under Geisel's government1. Even if we take into account the 
political and economic conditions inherited by Geisel and the 
international situation as independent variables in the 
explanation of the foreign policy of "Responsible Pragmatism", 
in the final analysis, the latter's achievement was still 
dependent on the way in which the decisions were formulated.
Hence, I claimed that it is not enough to state that 
Brazilian foreign policy under the military regime was based 
on the precepts of the National Security Doctrine as the 
expression of the national interest. Rather, I maintain that 
only a decision making analysis can answer by whom they were 
defined, how they were pursued, and what they ended up 
meaning. In other words, my aim was to explain state behavior, 
looking at the unit's behavior, by analyzing Brazilian foreign 
policy under the Geisel government within the second debate 
(nation state vs. bureaucracy) proceeding "bottom-up". In so 
doing, this thesis adds a dimension to the area of studies 
about Brazilian foreign policy under the military regime 
which, despite its admitted importance by the analysts, had 
not yet been taken as the leading perspective in the 
explanation of the decision contents.
Underneath these assumptions there was a strong belief
•Taking Holsti's patterns of foreign policy orientation 
as ideal types, as he himself does, during Geisel's government 
Brazil re-oriented its foreign policy from a dependent to a 
diversified type. HOLSTI,K.J. "Restructuring Foreign Policy: 
A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy Theory", in 
K.J.Holsti (ed). Why Nations Realign. London, Allen & Unwin, 
1982, p.1-20, p.4.
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that the Brazilian state should not be seen as a monolithic 
actor behaving according to a given doctrine. Hence, in the 
second chapter my aim was to scrutinize the thesis which 
considers the National Security Doctrine to be the main 
explanation for the Brazilian foreign policy contents. In so 
doing, I claimed that under the Geisel government, if not also 
under preceding administrations, the National Security 
Doctrine served as a device for the retroactive 
rationalization and/or legitimization of the decisions taken, 
rather than a pre-existing body of ideas from which the 
decisions emanated.
In so doing, I assumed the existence of a process by 
which ideas and concepts were adjusted to the conjuncture of 
events and to the interests involved. Therefore, I assumed 
that-the Doctrine's applicability to reality was made possible 
within the very process by which these elements were 
incorporated. Thus, to the extent that talking about different 
interests is the same as talking about different actors 
sponsoring them, the composition of the decision making arena 
should be assessed. I then depicted the decision making arena 
under the Geisel government, where the President's strong 
hand, the autonomy of Itamaraty and the diminishing importance 
of the National Security Council as a locus for decision 
making were shown. Moreover, the solid partnership established 
by Geisel and his Foreign Minister, Azeredo da Silveira, since 
the very beginning of the government, is underlined.
319
Most of what is outlined above, accounts for my 
critique of the Realist approach, in particular the view that 
foreign policy positions are "primarily determined by the 
interplay of international forces"2, and the principle of the 
state as unitary, monolithic actor, searching for security. 
Nevertheless, before outlining the main aspects of the foreign 
policy implemented by the Geisel government, the third chapter 
of this thesis sets out the external and the internal scenario 
surrounding the implementation of the foreign policy of 
"Responsible Pragmatism". In doing so, I sustained that just 
as I do not consider the international system and the state as 
all-determining, neither do I consider that the decision 
makers "choose in a vacuum".
However this can lead to a misunderstanding. The fact 
that-I acknowledge a role to the international system and to 
the nation state for the explanation of the foreign policy 
contents, does not mean that I have taken a typical Realist 
perspective. Rather, I claim that I am, so to speak, on the 
side of 'bounded Realism', to adapt an idea of Herbert Simon3. 
It is bounded because I tried to incorporate the opportunities 
and constraints of the international system, although I have 
not explained the Brazilian foreign policy positions primarily 
determined by them. Indeed, my aim was to follow wise advice,
2HILL,Christopher & LIGHT,Margot. "Foreign Policy 
Analysis", in Margot Light & A.J.R.Groom. International 
Relations - A Handbook of Current Theory. London, Pinter 
Publ.,1985, p.156-73, p.157.
3SIMON,Herbet A. Administrative Behaviour. New York, 
Macmillan, 1959.
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which says that Foreign Policy Analysis should not be isolated 
from International Relations, after all, it is "essential to 
consider the ways in which the external environment determines 
foreign policy, or at least conditions the possible choices"4.
Likewise, although I have taken the state-centric view 
(the state as the most important actor in the international 
system), I must enphasize, I did not take the state-as-actor 
view (the state as a monolithic actor). Indeed, I have not 
explained Brazilian foreign policy positions by any 
abstraction such as the "interests of the state", just the 
opposite. My aim was to open the "box" in order to explain how 
certain interests were translated as the "national interest" 
within the process of decision making5.
Going back to the Introduction of this thesis, other 
crucial aspects such as the applicability of the decision 
making approach to less developed countries, the concept of 
bureaucracy, and moreover the choice for explaining as opposed 
to understanding the decision contents through a decision 
making perspective were discussed. In short, I recalled that 
the high level of complexity and institutionalization 
exhibited by Brazil's foreign policy structure allows the 
analyst to employ the decision making approach without the
4HILL,C. & LIGHT,M. op.cit.. p.164.
5I shall state that despite having taken this stance on 
this analysis, I would not take it as suitable for other issue 
areas such as International Terrorism, for instance, when I 
should better think the world as a multicentric system of 
relationships.
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fear of adapting the subject to the model. In addition, I have 
opted for working with the notion of bureaucratic role-player 
since in so doing I would take into account both the 
individual's skills and the structure within which he 
operates. Finally, I expanded on my option for looking at the 
variables and correlations (explaining), rather than for 
perceptions, ideas, etc. (understanding), due to my aim of not 
overemphasizing the realm of choice and underemphasizing the 
realm of constraint.
That leads me to tackle a second crucial point which 
can also be a motive for discussion, that is, if when 
analyzing the decision makers performance, a Rational approach 
has been applied. Indeed, the 6 stage-scheme proposed as an 
analysis technique, and therefore, as a way to organize the 
variables involved with the decision finally taken, might have 
indicated that I took a Rational model to explain my point. 
However, as I have said before, my aim was to explain rather 
than to describe the reality. In so doing, although I have 
logically explained the process of decision making, it does 
not mean that the process was logical in itself. Rather, my 
aim was to use the model as a way of retrieving from the 
reality its meaningful elements, not to try to convince anyone 
that the reality is identical to the model. Besides, by taking 
a somewhat rational perspective, even if only for purpose of 
analysis, does not mean that the way by which the decision 
maker "defines the situation" does not count; likewise, I am 
not implying that non-rational variables, such as the decision
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maker's values, do not influence the decision contents6.
Hence the examination of the stages was a 
methodological resource for explaining the decision contents 
as they were formulated within the decision making process. In 
so doing, the alternatives examined were those supposed to be 
the most likely to be contemplated during the process, not an 
attempt to anticipate all alternatives which should be taken 
into account by the decision makers. It seems appropriate to 
repeat that "theories are not descriptions of the real world; 
they are instruments that we design in order to apprehend some 
part of it. 'Reality' will therefore be congruent neither with 
a theory nor with the model that may represent it"7.
However, by not departing from a narrow view which 
presumes that the Geisel government had fixed objectives 
towards which its foreign policy was focused, does not mean 
that certain clear-cut objectives were indeed advocated by the 
president and his advisers. Hence, if some degree of 
maximization of interests was implied - and it actually was - 
the hypothesis of searching for "satisficing" interests would 
better fit my analysis. Indeed, I have departed from the view
6For an assessment of the degree to which foreign policy 
decision making is grounded in rational processes, see 
VERBA,Sidney. "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality 
in Models of the International System", in Klaus Knorr & 
Sidney Verba (eds.), The, international System: Theoretical 
Essays. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, pp.93- 
117.
7WALTZ,Kenneth N. "Theory of International Relations". 
F.Greenstein & N.Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science, 
v. 8, Addison, Wesley Publ.Co, 1975, pp.1-15, p.8-9.
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that the decision makers have searched for alternative courses 
of action, until one was found which met certain minimum 
criteria previously defined8. Abstention on Cuba being the 
most obvious example. That does not mean the non-existence of 
a process of pulling and hauling. The search for a 
satisfactory decision could indeed be intermingled by 
different actors pursuing their personal views about what was 
more satisfactory. Moreover, by employing the category of 
bureaucratic role-player, I aimed to retrieve both the 
institutional loyalties and the individual characteristics of 
the decision maker. In other words, when working with 
"official decision makers" as Geisel, Silveira and the 
military in the inner-circle, I was simultaneously working 
with Geisel as the President, the military, and the hard­
working German descendent; Silveira as the Foreign Minister, 
the holder of a more independent view of foreign policy, and 
the career diplomat; and the military as government, and as 
institution. In short, I claim that the bureaucratic role- 
player category accounted satisfactorily for the relationship 
between the positions Geisel, Silveira and the military 
occupied and the choices they made9.
Finally in the last chapters I presented my case- 
studies. The chapter on Cuba stated that although Geisel and
8WHITE,Brian. "Analyzing Foreign Policy: Problems and
Approaches", in M.Clarke & B.White. Understanding Foreign 
Policy - The Foreign Policy Systems Approach. Aldershot, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1989, pp.1-26, p.17.
9HOLLIS,Martin & SMITH,Steve. Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p.154.
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Silveira promoted a standpoint in favor of the lifting of 
sanctions against the Castro regime, the opposition to Cuba 
was a "sacred cow" in the consistency of the Brazilian 
military regime. Therefore, abstention was the solution chosen 
in order to avoid damaging the inter-American system, and at 
same time not to exacerbate domestic resistance. Nevertheless, 
what had been done mainly as an attitude of goodwill towards 
the inter-American system and as a way to decrease Brazil's 
isolation in the continent, turned into a step forward towards 
the normalization of relations with Cuba.
Following this, the chapter on China demonstrated that 
neither the positive Western stand towards Beijing, nor the 
expected advantages from a closer relationship with Beijing 
were enough for Geisel's government to resume diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Rather, 
it was Geisel's and Silveira's adroitness in overcoming the 
veto from the more conservative military within the decision 
arena which led to the normalization of diplomatic relations 
between Brazil and the PRC.
Finally the chapter on Angola stated that the decision 
to recognize the MPLA government was taken thanks to a 
strategy of playing down or even suppressing a information 
about Cuban presence in the country. In other words, it was 
due to the fact that Geisel deliberately played down the news 
about Cuban presence in Angola, that a decision which, in 
fact, did not wholly fulfill the expectations of the military
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regime could be maintained.
The general conclusions of this thesis can now be 
stated. The belief that the way decisions are made 
contributes a good deal towards their contents has been 
maintained throughout this thesis. True, the situation within 
which those decisions occurred was a determinant of their 
activation. If there had been no detente, if the Salazar 
regime had not been overthrown and, as a consequence, a new 
policy towards Africa had not been formulated, if Brazilian 
economic policy was not strongly based on exports, etc., 
perhaps there would not have been favorable conditions for the 
decisions. Nevertheless, this study demonstrated that in order 
to accomplish a change in Brazilian foreign policy "resistance 
in political, administrative, and personality structures and 
processes"10 had to be overcome.
In addition, I maintain as fundamental in this study 
the evidence that the partnership Geisel/Silveira was, in the 
final analysis, responsible for the achievement of those 
decisions. Indeed, thanks to its authority and, moreover, to 
its relative isolation from the other agencies within the 
decision arena, this "foreign policy executive"11 was able to 
tackle the current military stance on foreign policy. However,
10HERMANN,Charles F. "Changing Course: When Governments 
Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy", International Studies 
Quarterly, n.324, March 1990, pp.3-21, p.8.
"HILL,Christopher. Cabinet Decisions on Foreign Policy - 
the British Experience. October 1938-June 1941. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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despite the level of autonomy held by this partnership, it 
could not avoid provoking negative reactions in those who used 
to be the main basis of the regime.
Therefore, through a strategy of action that succeeded 
in overcoming the military veto, Geisel and Silveira secured 
the establishment of a more long-term view on the Brazilian 
foreign affairs. Indeed, the decisive aspect is the fact that 
a long-term evaluation of the role Brazil could play in the 
international arena was activated. In other words, although 
other crucial steps towards the enhancement of Brazil's role 
in the international system were also taken during this 
period, such as the disengagement from the US, the 
rapprochement to the Western European countries and Japan, the 
new policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, all of them 
important in strengthening Brazil's position within the 
international community, and moreover fulfilling the country's 
needs to diversify its markets, foreign financial sources and 
energy suppliers, the rapprochement with the PRC and the 
recognition of the MPLA government showed the strong concern 
with enhancing the country's solidarity with other developing 
countries which would reinforce Brazilian demands on the 
international community as a whole. Indeed, it was only by 
ousting the "ideological frontiers" precept, which was finally 
accomplished by Geisel's leadership along with a prominent 
performance by his Foreign Minister, that a pragmatic foreign 
policy could be realized.
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Certainly/ in order to have this long-term view as 
predominant, as opposed to the short-term view of those 
attached to the NSD's prevailing precepts, an innovative 
decision making structure had to be installed. Hence, 
considering the current period of continuing changes on the 
international relations, the importance of examining the 
conditions for foreign policy change is indisputable. If then 
we think about Latin American countries where new experiments 
with democracy are being made, the importance of emphasizing 
the possibilities of action within the decision making arena, 
which I have intended to demonstrate throughout this thesis, 
takes on a double political meaning. On one hand, it raises 
the need to be attentive to remaining authoritarian procedures 
which can overrule democratic chosen aims; on the other, and 
this actually complements the first point, it strengthens the 
requirement for enlarging the decision making arena with 
respect to foreign policy.
This statement raises a very serious issue. The 
question regarding how much a foreign policy can better 
respond to the legitimate national interests is a matter of 
speculation, since no one can define the latter beforehand. 
Likewise, the greater or lesser degree of democracy does not 
immediately respond to the degree of efficiency, whatever this 
is, of the foreign policy. In this sense, what has been said 
above about a long term-view as opposed to a short-term view, 
is obviously an ex post facto evaluation, considering the 
initial aims of the Geisel government and the decision's
aftermath. The main aspect to be stressed then is the 
assumption that to explain foreign policy the analyst should 
not look solely at the nature of the regime, nor at the 
state's place in the international system hierarchy, although 
both variables are certainly important. In other words, 
although a developing country run by an authoritarian military 
regime has certain characteristics which could help to explain 
its foreign policy contents, they should not be seen as 
established causes for predictable effects. Rather, to these 
structural characteristics should be added a view which takes 
the actual decision making process as a dependent variable to 
explain the foreign policy contents. In so doing, I am not 
implying that in other similar situations, the decision making 
process would have had exactly the same influence and 
importance, that is, I had no intention of making a broad 
generalization from this case-study. What I am saying is that, 
this perspective of analysis has a say and although the 
hypothesis of revealing similar results for other case-studies 
is not guaranteed, it should not be discarded either. Analysts 
interested in examining the variables that shape the decision 
contents in countries of similar profile to that of Brazil 
under the Geisel government, are invited to join me in studies 
to come.
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